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1 Introduction 
1.1 The research remit 
 
In March 2004 the Department of Health commissioned a research team from the 
Centre for Health Economics at the University of York and the National Institute for 
Economic and Social Research to develop new approaches to measuring NHS outputs 
and productivity.  The research objectives were development of: 
• A comprehensive measure of NHS outputs and productivity 
• Methods to facilitate regular in-year analysis of NHS productivity 
• Output measures capable of measuring efficiency and productivity at sub-
national levels. 
The research team was also asked to co-operate with The Atkinson Review on 
measurement of government output and productivity for the national accounts.  
 
Three interim reports on this research were produced (July 2004, November 2004 and 
June 2005) as well as memoranda on data requirements (September 2004) and 
methodology (January 2005, August 2005).  The work was presented for scrutiny at 
two workshops (7 July 2004 and 17 June 2005).  The research team presented work in 
progress to four meetings of the NHS Outputs Steering Group (7 July 2004, 2 
February 2005, 10 May 2005, 20 July 2005).  This is the Final Report on the research 
project. 
 
The background to the research remit referred to the Public Service Agreement (PSA) 
following the 2002 Spending Review that “set a ‘value for money’ (productivity) 
target of 2%”.  The target required information on quality improvement that had not 
previously been measured for the NHS as a whole.  While PSA targets have changed 
over time, it is likely that some measure of quality improvement will continue to be 
required in reporting performance.  Quality adjusted measures of NHS output were 
also required for other Department of Health purposes such as monitoring the 
performance of Trusts and identifying the scope for efficiency gains. 
 
It is important to appreciate that there are significant differences between the concepts 
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of efficiency, value for money, productivity and productivity growth that have 
implications for both methods of measurement and policy relevance of the resulting 
indices. 
• Efficiency is measured as the ratio of output produced with given inputs 
relative to the maximum feasible output. 
• ‘Value for money’ reflects the value individuals/society place on output 
relative to the costs of production. This often corresponds to a cost-benefit 
analysis. 
• Productivity is the ratio of a measure of total output to a measure of total 
inputs. 
• Productivity growth is the change in output relative to the change in inputs. It 
is often interpreted as reflecting the effect of technical change on production. 
 
Robust measurement requires precise definition of the concept to be measured.  
Effective employment of these measures in pursuit of policy objectives requires 
selection of the appropriate measure for the issue at hand. 
 
1.2 Research delivered 
 
The research team has responded to the research remit by delivering the following 
outputs. 
1. A methodology for producing a comprehensive quality adjusted index of NHS 
output.  This is referred to as the “value weighted output index”.  Data 
necessary to estimate this index are not currently available for all NHS 
activities but are feasible to collect. The DH has already planned or is 
considering collection of the relevant data. 
 
2. Methodologies for calculating quality adjusted NHS output indices with 
existing data.  These are cost weighted indices that incorporate varying 
combinations of changes in survival, health effects, waiting times, patient 
satisfaction, readmissions and MRSA.  We present estimates of experimental 
indices which examine their sensitivity to different ways of measuring waiting 
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times, survival, and to different assumptions about the health effect, discount 
rates and other parameters. 
 
3. For the small set of hospital based treatments where there are some data on 
health outcomes before and after treatment, we have produced a “specimen” 
index that illustrates how the recommended value weighted index can be 
populated with data on health outcomes when they become more generally 
available. 
 
4. We have suggested additional data that are feasible to collect that would not 
only improve future measurement of NHS output but would also be of value in 
managing the NHS. 
 
5. We have constructed a new index of labour input in the NHS. It combines data 
from a range of sources to calculate a volume measure of total hours worked 
and includes an adjustment to take account of increases in the skills of the 
workforce.   
 
6. Using the cost weighted quality adjusted index of outputs and inputs, we have 
produced provisional estimates of Labour Productivity Growth and Total 
Factor Productivity Growth for the period 1998/99-2003/04. 
 
7. The methodology and data used in these indices can be applied to sub-national 
groups of institutions (e.g. NHS Trusts). 
 
8. For many purposes, quality adjusted measures of output and productivity 
growth for particular diseases and across institutional settings will be of more 
value to the NHS than a comprehensive index. We indicate how, with planned 
changes to NHS data collection, it will be feasible to produce disease specific 
output and productivity indices with the methodology presented in this report. 
 
Although key data used in our output indices, predominantly from the Hospital 
Episode Statistics (HES), are available on a quarterly basis, we would not recommend 
publication of within year estimates of output growth. The quarterly HES data are 
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subject to significant revision and use of quarterly index numbers could be 
misleading. 
 
1.3 Quality 
 
Central to all the work reported is a method of defining and measuring “quality”.   
 
We define the quality of treatment as the level of the characteristics valued by patients 
and changes in quality are measured as the rate of change of these characteristics.   
 
Given that improving the health of patients is a primary objective of the NHS, 
improved health outcomes are likely to be the most important characteristic of 
treatment.  In addition, the literature suggests the main impact of technical change in 
health care has been to improve expected health outcomes—e.g. the expected health 
outcomes from heart surgery or management of diabetes are better today than ten 
years ago.  There is little data on health outcomes in the NHS and hence it has not 
been possible to measure quality improvement, productivity growth and technical 
change.   
 
For the present the main available health outcomes data are for mortality or survival 
rates. This is a severe limitation on any attempt to measure the quality of output or 
productivity since only 3% of NHS patients die soon after treatment.  There is no 
routine data with which to measure the improvement in health following treatment for 
the 97% of patients who survive.  It appears that this situation may change and the 
NHS may start collecting data on health outcomes.  In Section 4 of this report, we 
present the structure of output indices that should be used if and when data on health 
outcomes in the NHS become available. The equations could be used for a subset of 
patients if initially outcomes data are collected for only a limited set of procedures. 
 
It follows from our definition of quality that the unit for measuring NHS output 
should be the patient treated.  This makes it necessary to link the activities directed at 
treatment of a patient. For example, a patient undergoing treatment for heart disease 
would receive prescriptions for various drugs, attend outpatient clinics, undergo 
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diagnostic tests, perhaps surgery and follow-up care from a GP. At present it is not 
possible to identify the set of activities delivered to an NHS patient with a particular 
condition.  The Department of Health plans to introduce a patient identifier that in 
future will permit analysis of the care delivered to a patient across activities, 
institutions and over time.  For the present it is necessary to continue to use counts of 
activities as proxies for output.  However, the indices recommended could readily be 
adapted to a patient-based definition of output when linked data become available. 
 
1.4 Value for money and technical change 
 
Recent work in the US illustrates how, with data on outcomes and an ability to link 
activities/inputs to patients with particular conditions, it is possible to obtain 
approximate disease specific measures of value for money and technical change.  
Cutler et al. (2001), for example, examine improved survival rates for patients 
admitted with acute myocardial infarction (AMI).  By placing a monetary value on 
quality adjusted additional years of life expectancy and dividing by the cost of inputs 
used for treating this group of patients, estimates can be produced of the growth in 
value for money.  Similar work has been done for depression, schizophrenia and 
cataract surgery. 
 
The DH requested the research team to produce formulae and estimates for a 
comprehensive index of NHS output and productivity growth.  When data become 
available that identify the set of inputs used to treat particular conditions and the 
monetary value of output, the approach we outline in Section 6 can be applied to 
studies of individual conditions as in the US work. 
 
1.5 Structure of the report 
 
For any new method of measuring NHS output and productivity to be generally 
accepted, it is important that the methodology be well grounded in economic theory.  
In Section 2 we set out the theory behind measurement of Total Factor Productivity, 
the issues relevant to attribution of NHS activity to improvement in health outcomes 
and the choice of weights necessary to sum the many NHS outputs into a single index 
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number. 
 
Section 3 outlines recent and current DH practice for estimating output and 
productivity.  This provides a baseline for comparison with the quality adjusted 
indices provided by the research team. 
 
In Section 4 we set out our preferred approach to measuring quality adjusted output.  
This is a value weighted output index that attaches monetary values to the 
characteristics that measure quality.  We discuss the appropriate units of output and 
available data.  While it is feasible to collect the data necessary for a value weighted 
output index, the data are not currently available.  In the remainder of the section we 
explore the possibilities for estimating a quality adjusted cost weighted output index 
with existing data. Quality adjusting a cost weighted index is not straightforward and 
we set out the assumptions required. In the absence of data on health outcomes for 
most NHS activity, we focus on the possibility of quality adjusting for changes in 
long and short term survival and for changes in waiting times.  In order to illustrate 
the impact of including some information on health outcomes, we examine the 
structure of an index that includes an indicative health gain for survivors.  Ordinarily 
improvements in survival are considered an improvement in the quality of NHS care.  
However, for a number of conditions, the NHS provides terminal care.  We examine 
adjustments to the quality indicator required to deal with this issue.  The appropriate 
method for quality adjusting a cost weighted index for changes in waiting times is not 
obvious.  We explore several alternative methods for doing this.  We conclude section 
4 by comparing our approach to the recommendations of the Atkinson Review. 
 
In Section 5 we present results for an experimental quality adjusted cost weighted 
output index.  We show the sensitivity of the index to different ways of treating 
mortality rates, waiting times and choice of discount rate.  We also examine the 
feasibility of augmenting the index with available data on patient satisfaction, 
readmission rates and incidence of MRSA.  
 
The results reported in Section 5 reflect what is feasible at present when estimating a 
comprehensive index.  However, there are a few conditions for which outcomes data 
are available.  In Section 6 we use these data to estimate a “specimen” index.  We 
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present results for a value weighted output index and for variants of a cost weighted 
index that incorporate observed health gains in the survival adjustment and allow for 
changes in waiting times.  We also use the specimen index to illustrate the effect of 
substituting health outcome weights for cost weights. 
 
In Section 7 we draw on the results from Sections 5 and 6 and present two variants of 
the quality adjustments, one of which is our preferred variant.  We show the effects 
for hospital sector and for overall NHS output indices. 
   
Section 8 is devoted to measuring labour input in the NHS. It outlines methods for 
calculating labour volumes and quality adjusted labour input where the latter takes 
account of different productivities of workers, dividing the workforce by skill group. 
It combines data from the NHS employment census with the rich data on worker 
characteristics available in the Labour Force Survey.  
 
Section 9 brings together the output measures reported in Section 5 with the labour 
input measures in Section 8 to derive labour productivity estimates. Using estimates 
for growth in intermediate inputs and capital from a range of sources, productivity 
estimates are shown that account additionally for these two inputs.  
 
In Section 10 we summarise the lessons learned in the course of this research for the 
availability of relevant data. We stress the importance of making better use of existing 
data (e.g. by record linkage and diagnosis added to prescription forms), the scope for 
improving output measurement with data beginning to be collected (GP consultations) 
and the need for the NHS to routinely collect health outcomes data. 
 
We conclude in Section 11 with recommendations on how the Department of Health 
can advance work on output and productivity measurement.  
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2 Productivity and output measurement 
2.1 Total factor productivity growth in private markets 
 
If private markets are complete and competitive, prices reflect marginal utilities of the 
services to consumers and the marginal costs of providers. With some additional 
assumptions, the measurement and interpretation of productivity growth is then 
straightforward. Denote the vector of outputs from a firm at a time t as x(t). We index 
the goods by j. Let z(t) be the vector of n inputs (types of capital, labour and 
materials). ν(t) is a parameter which captures the state of technology at time t. The 
technology of the firm is described by the implicit production function 
  ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , 0g t t v t =x z              (1) 
Assume that the technology exhibits constant returns to scale. 
  
Differentiating (1)  with respect to time gives 
  0ij n
j nj n
g g gx z v
x z v
∂ ∂ ∂+ + =∂ ∂ ∂∑ ∑& &&            (2) 
A profit maximising firm in a competitive market will choose x(t), z(t) to satisfy 
/j jp g xθ= − ∂ ∂ , n nw g zθ= ∂ ∂ , where 1 /( / )jp g xθ = − ∂ ∂  is the Lagrange multiplier 
on the production constraint.  We can rearrange (2) as 
  11
1
jy z yn
j n
j nj n
x z g x v vv
x z px v v x v
θω ω ω ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂− = = ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠∑ ∑
& && &               (3)  
where   yj j j j j
j
p x p xω = ∑ , zin n in j ij
j
w z p xω = ∑   
and y is the value of output from the firm j jjy p x= ∑ . 
 
The left-hand side of (3) is the rate of change of a Divisia quantity index of outputs, 
minus the rate of change of a Divisia quantity index of inputs.  Since total factor 
productivity (TFP) is the ratio of an index of outputs to an index of inputs, the left 
hand side is also a measure of total factor productivity growth (TFPG). If production 
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takes place with constant returns to scale, then the total value of the product is 
expended on the costs of the inputs and we can replace the second term on the left 
hand side with the rate of change of an input index based on the cost shares 
n n n n
n
w z w z∑  
 
The middle and last terms in (3) are equivalent expressions for the rate of technical 
progress. In the last term the rate of technical progress is given as the increase in one 
output (x1), holding all other outputs and inputs constant, made possible by the change 
in technology.  Thus TFPG also measures the rate of technological progress.  
 
Technical progress increases welfare by relaxing the production constraint on the 
economy. Under certain assumptions total factor productivity growth can be given a 
direct welfare interpretation. Thus suppose that the economy is characterised by the 
implicit production function g(x,z,v) = 0 and resources are allocated to maximise 
current period welfare U(x,z) where x and z are vectors of outputs and inputs. The 
Lagrangean for the welfare problem is  
  ( ) ( ), , ,L U g vλ= +x z x z       (4) 
and from the envelope theorem 
 / / / vdU dv dL dv L v gλ= = ∂ ∂ =      (5) 
Hence, if U is derivable from an individualistic, non-paternal welfare function, the 
fact that the allocation in an economy with a complete set of competitive markets 
maximises some such welfare function, means that TFPG is an increasing monotonic 
function of the change in welfare resulting from technological change.     
 
The simple story above takes no account of changes in the stock of capital goods used 
to produce consumption goods.  Since what is consumed no longer equals what is 
produced it is more complicated to give a welfare interpretation to changes in the 
output index, though it is possible to do so in some cases (Sefton and Weale, 
forthcoming). 
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2.2 Total factor productivity growth and quality change 
 
A measure of TFPG in a market sector when there is quality change can be 
constructed in the following manner.  Let the production function for a firm or sector 
which produces only one type (j) of output be 
( )1, ,..., , , 0j j j Kj j jg x q q v =z             (6) 
Here xj is the volume or quantity of output j (the number of units produced) and qkj is 
the amount of outcome or characteristic k produced by consumption of one unit of 
output j. The vector qj determines the quality of the product. At the equilibrium of a 
market economy the price paid for a unit of output j depends on the outcomes it 
produces: pj(qj), and is also a measure of quality.  If the market for good j is 
competitive a profit maximising firm’s choice of output, inputs, and outcomes will 
satisfy /j j jp g xθ= − ∂ ∂ , / /j j kj j kjx p q g qθ∂ ∂ = − ∂ ∂ , and jnjn zgw ∂∂= θ . Totally 
differentiating the production function with respect to time gives 
0j j j jj kj jn j
k nj kj jn j
g g g g
x q z v
x q z v
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂+ + + =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∑ ∑& & &&                      (7) 
and after using the profit maximising conditions, assuming constant returns to scale to 
substitute total cost for the value of output in the weights on the inputs, and 
rearranging we get 
j j kj kj jn j j j jz
n j
m nj kj j kj jn j j j j j j
x p q q z g y v v
v
x q p q z p x v v x v
θω⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂+ − = =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑
& & && &       (8) 
where ∑=
n
jnnjnn
z
n zwzwω . 
 
Thus if we do not take account of the change in quality (the middle term in the left 
hand side of (8)) and merely calculate the difference between the rate of growth of the 
output and input indices we will not be measuring the rate of technical progress (the 
second and last terms).  Equivalently, if we define TFPG as the difference between 
the rates of growth of the value of output and the cost of inputs, we will typically 
underestimate TFPG if we do not allow for the changing value of outputs because of 
improvements in quality.  Consequently we need to take account of the change in the 
mix of outcomes (characteristics) embodied in each unit of output.    
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Denoting the marginal effect of outcome or characteristic k on the price of output j as 
/kj j kjp qπ ≡ ∂ ∂  we can write the rate of growth of the total value of output summed 
across all sectors ( j j jj jy p x y= =∑ ∑ ) as 
  j j jk kj kj j jk jy jj k
j k j kj kj j jk j
p x q q x q xy
y y p q x q x
π ω ω⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + = +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
& & & &&
       (9)  
where jk kj kj kj kj
k
q qω π π= ∑    
 
In competitive equilibrium these prices represent social values as well as costs of 
production. Thus, in principle the prices obtained in the competitive equilibrium 
enable us to calculate the rate of growth of the value of output and so derive the rate 
of technical progress via TFPG.  We need to estimate the hedonic price functions 
pj(qj) which relate prices to the quality of goods (Rosen, 2002).  In practice there are 
considerable difficulties even in market sectors in allowing for quality changes.  
 
The discussion shows that a measure of TFPG which relates only to the volume of 
outputs and ignores their outcome or quality characteristics is incomplete. Note also 
that it is also important to capture any quality change in inputs as well as outputs. 
Thus if the NHS is employing more skilled labour, a measure that merely counts 
number of workers without taking account of differences in marginal productivities 
across skill types, will overestimate TFPG. The contribution from using better quality 
labour is incorrectly attributed to technical progress. Section 8 deals with quality 
adjusting labour input.   
 
2.3 Application of TFPG methods in the NHS  
 
The construction of a NHS productivity measure should capture the valuable things 
that the NHS produces. However, operationalising this simple idea is not 
straightforward because of the difficulties of defining NHS outputs, attaching values 
to the outputs, and obtaining the relevant data.  
 
We distinguish activities (operative procedures, diagnostic tests, outpatient visits, 
consultations…), outputs (courses of treatment which may require a bundle of 
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activities), and outcomes (the characteristics of output which affect utility).  The focus 
in health economics has been on the change in health produced by a course of 
treatment, typically measured in quality adjusted life years (QALYs). But other 
characteristics of treatment also affect utility: the length of time waited for treatment, 
the degree of uncertainty attached to the waiting time, distance and travel time to 
services, the interpersonal skills of GPs, the range of choice and quality of hospital 
food, the politeness of the practice receptionist, the degree to which patients feel 
involved in decisions about their treatment, etc. The aim is to measure the change in 
the volume of NHS outputs taking account of quality changes (changes in the volume 
of characteristics produced) but not of changes in the marginal social value of those 
characteristics.  The distinction between outputs and outcomes is identical to that 
between goods and characteristics in consumption technology models (Deaton and 
Muellbauer, 1980, Ch. 10; Lancaster, 1971) where consumers value goods because of 
the bundle of characteristics that yield utility.  The quality of the output is a function 
of the vector of outcomes it produces. 
 
In the measurement of private sector productivity growth the focus is on outputs 
rather than the characteristics they produce because of the assumption that the market 
price of the output measures the consumers’ marginal valuation of the bundle of 
characteristics from consuming the output.  In measuring private sector productivity 
we also do not need to concern ourselves with counting activities because they are 
embodied in the outputs which are produced and sold. 
 
The direct application of the methods used to measure TFPG in the private sector is 
problematic in the NHS for two main reasons. First, there is no final market for NHS 
outputs which makes calculation of TFPG more difficult. Second, NHS production 
may not be optimal, which undermines the welfare interpretation of TFPG.    
 
One of the justifications for having the NHS in the first place is to eliminate a market 
in which patients buy outputs from producers. Even in the few cases where the NHS 
does sell its output to the final consumer, as for pharmaceuticals prescribed by general 
practitioners (GPs) and dispensed to patients who are not exempt from payment, the 
price does not equal marginal cost.   
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The absence of final markets has two major consequences for attempts to measure 
NHS productivity. The first is that some outputs are not counted at all or are poorly 
measured.  Instead there may be data only on the activities and even these may be 
lacking in many areas of activity. We discuss the implications in section 4. 
 
The second consequence is that, because there are no prices to reveal patients’ 
marginal valuations of NHS outputs, we have to find other means of estimating their 
value.  We can do so in two equivalent ways: we can measure the outputs and attempt 
to estimate the marginal valuations attached to them or we can measure the outcomes 
produced by each unit of output and attempt to estimate marginal valuations of the 
outcomes.  The bundle of outcomes produced by a unit of output is likely to change 
over time in the NHS because of, among other things, changes in technology or 
treatment thresholds. In a private market the price of output would change to reflect 
this. But in the absence of market prices for NHS outputs it is likely to be easier to 
calculate the change in the marginal value of output by focusing on the change in the 
vector of outcomes.  We show below how the changing mix of outcomes (quality 
change) may be allowed for in principle.  We discuss how quality adjustments based 
on the currently available data can be incorporated into an output index in section 4 
and show the results of applying these methods to calculate experimental quality 
adjusted indices in Section 5.   We have made suggestions as to how the quality 
adjustment can be improved by the collection of additional data in our Second Interim 
Report and discuss this further in Section 10.  
 
The major problem in interpreting TFPG in the NHS is that it is by no means obvious 
that the NHS is producing optimally.    It may be technically inefficient in the sense 
that it is possible to increase some type of output without increasing inputs or 
reducing some other output. It may also be producing the wrong mix of outputs.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates. 
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Figure 2.1 Productivity, efficiency and welfare  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consider the simple single input, single output case in Figure 2.1. Point A in year 1 
has higher productivity than point B in year 2 but welfare is lower at point A and, on 
any reasonable measure of technical efficiency, A has lower technical efficiency since 
it is further from its period production frontier. Technical progress has shifted the 
frontier upward from P1 to P2 but the productivity change does not even have the 
same sign as technical progress.  The increase in welfare between period 1 and 2 is in 
part due to technical progress (B was not even feasible with the old technology) and to 
improvements in efficiency, perhaps because of changes in institutional structures and 
incentive mechanisms.   
 
Note also that both technologies in this example have diminishing returns to scale so 
that increases in inputs along the frontier reduce productivity but that such a 
movement along the frontier can be welfare increasing.   
 
These considerations suggest that there are problems in interpreting productivity 
growth as a welfare or efficiency measure. Nevertheless it can be a useful summary 
statistic to be used in conjunction with other data on the NHS.  A further justification 
for attempting to measure productivity is that it will stimulate improvements in NHS 
information collection and processing which may lead to improved decision making 
within the NHS. 
 
Input 
Output 
Social welfare indifference curve
P2 
P1 
Production frontier B
A
A at year 1 has higher productivity than B at year 2 but lower welfare and is 
less efficient (further away from its period production frontier) 
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2.4 Value weighted NHS output index 
 
To measure NHS TFPG we need a measure of output growth which reflects the 
changes in quality. Let yjt be the social value of the volume of NHS output j (xjt) 
measured at the marginal social value of output j at date t (pjt). The marginal social 
value of output j depends on the mix of characteristics produced by a unit of output j: 
( )jt jt jt jt kt kjtky x p x qπ= = ∑          (10) 
where qkjt is the amount of characteristic k produced by a unit of j.  Notice that we 
assume that the marginal social value function is linear 
jt kt kjtk
p qπ=∑          (11) 
 
The assumptions that the marginal social value of a unit of output j is a linear function 
of its characteristics and that the πkt is independent of j are strong.  The latter for 
example requires that an improvement in the quality of hospital food (say) per day in 
hospital has the same effect on the value of treatment for throat cancer as on the value 
of a hip replacement.  
 
The total value of NHS output is t jtjy y= ∑ . We want to measure the discrete time 
version of the growth rate of y.  We could use the Tornqvist discrete time 
approximation to the continuous Divisia index (9) but for simplicity present the 
analysis in terms of a base weighted index.1  In practice there is little difference 
between a chained base weighted index and the Tornqvist index.  The base value 
weighted output index that we seek to measure is 
1 1jt kt kjtj kxq
yt
jt kt kjtj k
x q
I
x q
π
π
+ += ∑ ∑∑ ∑          (12) 
which allows for changes in volume of outputs (xjt) and of their characteristics (qkjt) 
but holds the marginal value of the characteristics (πkt) constant.  
 
We can also express the value weighted index as  
                                                 
1 We compare the results obtained from calculating base weighted indices with those from current 
weighted indices and Fisher indices (the square root of the product of the current and base weighted 
indices). 
 
 22
11 kt kjtjt jt jtxq k
yt
jt kt kjt tk
qx p x
I
x q y
π
π
++ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑∑ ∑  
                  ( ) ( )1 1 kt jtxjt qkjt pjt ytj kg g ω ω⎡ ⎤= + +⎣ ⎦∑ ∑       (13) 
where gxjt is the growth rate of output xj, gqkjt is the growth rate of characteristic k 
produced by output j, ktptω  is the proportion of the marginal value of output j 
accounted for by the k’th characteristic, and jtytω  is share of the total value of period t 
output accounted for by output j. 
 
Note that year to year changes in the marginal value of characteristics (πkt) produced 
by an output j do not affect the year to year rate of growth of output j (gxjt).  They will 
however affect the weights for any index form with chained weights.  Thus the 
overall, weighted average, rates of growth over a period of years will depend on the 
changes in the marginal values.  This is precisely analogous to the effect of changing 
product prices in output indices for private sector goods and services. 
 
2.5 Changes in marginal social values over time 
 
In section 2.4 we specified the value of NHS output as j jjy p x= ∑  
k jk jj k
q xπ=∑ ∑ .  In the rate of growth of the value of NHS output we assumed that 
the marginal social values of output (pj) or of outcomes (πk ) were constant over time.  
If instead we had allowed changes in marginal values over time then the rate of 
growth of the value of NHS output would have been  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1kt jtxjt kt qkjt pjt ytj kg g gπ ω ω⎡ ⎤+ + + −⎣ ⎦∑ ∑    (14) 
where ktgπ  is the growth rate in the marginal value πkt of characteristic k.  
    
(14) depends both on changes in production conditions (the rates of growth of 
outcomes per unit of output and the rates of growth of outputs) but also on preferences 
(the rates of growth of the marginal social values of outcomes).   We argue that 
changes in the marginal social values of outcomes between periods should not affect 
the growth rate between periods of the value of NHS output. The measure of output 
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growth is intended to measure changes in real value of output: the volume of outputs 
and the volumes of valuable characteristics they produce.  Thus ktgπ should not be 
included in the value weighted index of NHS output.  
 
For example, under plausible assumptions the growth in the value of a QALY is 
determined by the rate of growth of income and the elasticity of marginal utility of 
income (Gravelle and Smith, 2001). But it is not affected by decisions within the NHS 
(except perhaps to a negligible extent because NHS decisions affect population health 
and thus the growth rate in income by improving worker productivity across the 
economy).  We should not count changes in the marginal value of the QALY when 
calculating real NHS output growth.  
 
This does not mean that changes in the value of QALYs and other outcomes have no 
relevance for decision making.  Most decisions in the NHS have effects on outputs 
and outcomes over several periods – the health gain to a treated patient will typically 
accrue over several years. In evaluating these decisions the changing value of health 
should be taken into account: health changes accruing in different periods have 
different values.  Changes in the value of health, and other characteristics, should 
affect decisions about the allocation of resources within and to the NHS.  But they 
should not affect the calculation of changes in productivity between one period and 
the next, especially if the measure of productivity is intended to be used in part for 
monitoring the performance of the NHS.   
 
Whilst we may want to exclude the growth in the marginal value of outcomes as 
contributing to TFPG we have to know whether and how the marginal values change 
over time in order to use the correct weights in calculating productivity growth.  
 
Note that  
 j k jk jkk
kj j k jk
p q q
p p q
π π
π
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑
& &&
         (15)             
which again brings out the importance of the distinction between outcomes and 
outputs. Even though we argue that the rate of growth of marginal social values 
should not be counted as part of productivity growth this does not mean that we 
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should remove all the rate of growth of marginal social value of outputs since part of 
/j jp p&  is due to changes in quality rather than to changing preferences. 
 
2.6 Outcomes and attribution 
 
The characteristics qkjt are the marginal effects of the NHS.  Thus for example we 
wish to measure the marginal effect of output xjt on the health of individuals receiving 
this treatment, holding constant all other factors which affect health. Similarly the rate 
of growth of the effect of output j on characteristic k is the change in the marginal 
product from one period to the next due to changes in the technology (defined widely 
to include the way the NHS is organised). Since the other factors which affect the 
marginal product will also affect its rate of growth we should hold them constant in 
calculating the growth in the marginal product of NHS outputs from one year to the 
next.  Although the effects of other factors (e.g. improvements in diet) on the marginal 
product should be excluded from the calculation of the growth rate for a particular 
year, they are not ignored because they affect the weights applied to the growth rates.   
 
Parts of the national income accounting literature note that health depends on factors 
in addition to health service outputs (OECD, 2000; para 7.26 – 7.28). For example 
health depends on income, education, age and other factors exogenous to NHS 
activity. Hence it is argued one cannot use health outcomes to adjust outputs to take 
account of “quality” changes because changes in health outcome may not be 
attributable to health service outputs. But what we want is the marginal effect of 
output j on health.  If the health production function is additively separable in health 
service outputs and other factors, then the marginal effect of a health service output is 
well defined irrespective of the level of other variables affecting health.  
 
It is more plausible that the health production function is not additively separable so 
that the marginal effect of xj on health q depends on the confounding factors. This 
does not present a fundamental argument against the use of outcomes. The 
longstanding practice of standardising mortality rates to produce a measure of 
population health suggests a way round the difficulty.  Standardisation produces a 
measure of population health from which the effects of population structure (age and 
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gender strata) have been removed so that one can make comparisons of mortality 
across periods or areas without the confounding effects of demographic structure.  
Under certain circumstances direct standardization can identify the true differences in 
mortality. The assumptions required are non trivial (age and gender specific mortality 
can be affected only proportionately by area or period (e.g. Yule, 1934)) but direct 
standardisation is still useful. (The more common method of indirect standardisation 
which produces SMRs requires even stronger assumptions.)  
 
Consider a simple example where health depends on a single NHS output x1 and 
another variable not controlled by the NHS, for example education or income, x2. The 
health production function is  
 0 1 1 2 2 3 1 2t t t t t t t t tQ a a x a x a x x= + + +        
and the marginal product of health service output is  
 1 1 1 3 2/t t t t t tq Q x a a x= ∂ ∂ = +         (16)  
Generally we expect the effect of health service activity on health to depend on other 
factors ( 3 0ta ≠ ). Hence the growth in the marginal health effect of NHS output, 
which is crucial for quality adjusting NHS output indices, is affected by changes in 
the confounding factor: 
 1 1 1 3 1 2 1
1 3 2
t t t t
t t t t
q a a x
q a a x
+ + + ++= +           (17) 
   
To remove the effect of the confounding factor we can choose an arbitrary fixed level 
of the confounding factor in (17).  If we think that the changes in the coefficient 3a t  
are not due to health service decisions then we should also standardize with respect to 
it as well:  
 1 1 1 3 2
1 3 2
t t
t t
q a a x
q a a x
+ + += +        (18)
Obvious choices for 3a  and 2x  are their base period values or an average of the base 
period and current period values.  
 
The health gains from treatment may increase simply because patients live longer. 
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Consider the example of an increase in life expectancy that is not due to developments 
in the NHS but reflects rising living standards, changes in diet etc. As a result an NHS 
treatment, such as a hip replacement, may produce a greater outcome (QALY gain) 
because the recipient of a hip replacement is on average alive for longer to enjoy the 
reduced pain and increased mobility resulting from the procedure. Thus the marginal 
product (the QALY gain) of the treatment is greater for reasons arising outside the 
health service. As far as possible, effects of changes to life expectancy which are quite 
independent of the procedures carried out should be kept out of calculation of the year 
on year growth rate in quality adjusted output of hip replacements.   They should, of 
course, be allowed for in decisions about efficient resource allocation in the NHS but 
this is not the purpose of constructing an index of NHS output. 
 
There will be some cases where the QALY gain may be partly due to improvements 
in the procedure and partly due to patients being “better behaved”- e.g. circulatory 
treatments produce more QALYs if patients do not smoke. In terms of (16) the 
production function is not separable and judgement will be needed about how to 
unravel the impacts of factors exogenous to the NHS.    
 
2.7 Cost and value weights 
 
By using costs to value outputs, a cost weighted output index can be calculated: a cost 
weighted sum of the growth rates of output 
1 1 (1 )jt jtj jt jt jtx jtct xjt ctj j
jt jt jt kt ktj k
x c x x c
I g
x c x x c
ω+ +⎛ ⎞= = = +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑     (19) 
where cjt is the unit (average cost) of output j (see section 3). The cost weighted index 
x
ctI  is equivalent to the value weighted quality adjusted index 
xq
ytI  only if  
(a) quality change is zero for all characteristics of all outputs 
(b) cjt is proportional to the marginal social value of output (Dawson et al., 
2004a, section 2.11):  
 jt t jt t ktk kjtc p qλ λ π= = ∑         (20) 
 
There is limited information on both characteristics and their marginal social value so 
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that attempts to estimate xqytI  are bound to involve compromises.  Suppose that we 
could observe the changes in characteristics but not their marginal values (πkt). How 
far does the assumption (20) that the output mix in the NHS maximises social value 
subject to budget constraint take us in estimating xqytI ?  Using (20) in (19) gives  
xq
ytI      ( ) ( )1 1 kt jkt jtxjt qkjt t ctj m
jt
q
g g
c
π λω⎡ ⎤= + +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑   
           ( ) ( )1 1 kt jtxjt qkjt pjt ctj mg g ω ω⎡ ⎤= + +⎣ ⎦∑ ∑       (21) 
Knowledge of cjt and λt is not sufficient to calculate the value weighted output index. 
We require knowledge of the relative importance of each characteristic ktpjtω  in 
determining the marginal social value of output: we need to know the marginal social 
values of each characteristic (πkt), and the amount of each characteristic produced by 
each output (qkjt). However if only one characteristic k is socially valuable then 
assumption (20) and knowledge of unit costs and the growth rate of the single 
valuable characteristic (k) is sufficient: 
( ) ( )1 1xq jtyt xjt qkjt ctjI g g ω= + +∑        (22) 
In practice there is also imperfect information about the amount of the characteristics 
(qkjt). Section 4 discusses the possibility of using the currently available data to quality 
adjust the cost weighted output index.    
 
 
3 Current practice 
 
The terminology employed by the Department of Health differs in some respects from 
that used in the economics literature.  In our outline of current practice we use the 
Department of Health terminology but attempt to relate it to the economic concepts 
set out in Section 1.1 and used in this report. 
 
3.1 The cost weighted activity index (CWAI) 
 
Prior to 2004 the measure of annual NHS productivity change published by the 
Department of Health was based on estimating the change in a cost weighted activity 
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index (CWAI) less the change in NHS expenditure deflated by the index of NHS costs 
and prices, to generate a cost weighted efficiency index (CWEI).  
 
CWAI was estimated using data on activity for twelve categories of Hospital and 
Community Health Service (HCHS) expenditure: 
• Inpatient and day case episodes 
• Outpatient, A&E and ward attenders 
• Regular day patients 
• Chiropody 
• Family planning 
• Screening 
• District nursing 
• Community psychiatric nursing 
• Community learning disability nursing 
• Dental episodes of care 
• Ambulances 
Each category of activity was weighted by its share in HCHS expenditure.  There was 
no adjustment for improved health outcomes so that the only source of productivity 
improvement was an increase in the number of patients treated in hospital, ambulance 
trips, etc. per pound of real expenditure.  
 
3.2 The ‘experimental’ NHS cost efficiency and service effectiveness 
indices 
 
In 2004 the DH replaced the CWEI and developed two new ‘interim’ indices: an NHS 
cost efficiency index and a service effectiveness index.  The approach was dictated by 
the need to respond to the Treasury’s view that ‘Value-for-money’ should be 
measured in ways that permitted assessment of performance against a target of 1% 
p.a. improvement in cost efficiency and 1% p.a. improvement in service effectiveness.  
The latter was generally understood to refer to return on expenditure to improve 
quality.  
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3.2.1 The experimental cost efficiency index 
 
The experimental cost efficiency index incorporates a change to the measurement of 
outputs and a change to the measurement of inputs.  The change to the measurement 
of outputs involved replacing CWAI with an Output Index, which includes 
significantly more activities than CWAI and uses Reference Costs to weight different 
activities.  The Output Index now counts over 1,700 categories of NHS activity and 
includes activity in primary care.  The services covered are: 
• Elective inpatients (over 500 activity categories) 
• Non-elective inpatients  (over 500 activity categories) 
• Outpatients (around 300 activity categories) 
• A&E (9 activity categories) 
• Mental health services (30 activity categories) 
• Primary care prescribing (almost 200 activity categories) 
• Primary care consultations (5 activity categories) 
• NHS Direct calls answered (1 activity category) 
• NHS Direct online internet hits (1 activity category) 
• Walk in centre visits (1 activity category) 
• Ambulance journeys (1 activity category) 
• General Ophthalmic Services (1 activity category) 
• General Dental Services (1 activity category) 
• Others including Critical care, Audiological Services, Pathology, Radiology, 
Chemotherapy, Renal dialysis, Community services, Bone marrow transplants 
& Rehabilitation (over 100 activity categories) 
 
The coverage is not complete (Lee, 2004) and some of the omitted activities, such as 
the Prison Health Service, are not small; though others (Parentcraft Classes) seem 
unlikely to have a large impact on the index.  But the extension of coverage is a very 
significant improvement. 
 
Use of Reference Costs to weight Hospital and Community Health Services (HCHS) 
activity means that increases in more expensive treatments will have greater weight in 
the Output Index than increases in relatively low cost treatments.  This is also true of 
 30
primary care prescribing which is measured as prescriptions issued and weighted by 
the cost of drugs prescribed.  An increase in prescribing more expensive 
pharmaceuticals will have a greater effect on the Output Index than increased 
prescribing of less expensive drugs.  The Output Index is currently used by ONS to 
measure NHS output in the National accounts. 
 
Table 3.1 shows the relative weights for each main type of activity in the Output 
Index. 
 
Table 3.1 Components of the NHS output index 
 
 Cost share 
DH Output Index 
(Laspeyres) 
 
 2001/02 Growth in 2002/03 relative to 2001/02 
Electives+ day cases 12.84 5.10 
Non-electives 20.64 4.92 
Outpatients 10.99 4.19 
Mental Health 9.56 3.62 
GP & practice nurse consultations 12.44 10.27 
Dentists 4.69 -0.61 
Prescriptions 16.48 7.85 
Accidents & Emergency 2.17 4.52 
CCS 3.97 -0.28 
Other 6.20 5.94 
Total 100 5.36 
 
 
In comparison with the previous CWEI, the experimental cost efficiency index 
includes a revised index of inputs in addition to the revised measurement of outputs. 
Since there are no measures of quality associated with the activities included in the 
Output Index, the DH has attempted to estimate expenditure on inputs net of 
expenditure intended to improve quality.  Total expenditure on inputs is reduced by 
estimated expenditure on: 
• Increases in capital charges 
• Increases in Private Finance Initiative revenue expenditure 
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• Increases in HCHS drugs expenditure 
• Increases in Information Technology expenditure 
• Increases in clinical supplies expenditure 
• Increases in Family Health Services drugs expenditure 
• Cost of occupational enrichment 
• Cost of grade enrichment 
• Cost of reduced waiting times 
The remaining expenditure on NHS services is deflated by the public sector price 
deflator to obtain an index of changes in real NHS inputs.  The resulting productivity 
measure has been published as an index of NHS unit costs (Department of Health, 
2004a, 2004b). 
 
3.2.2 The service effectiveness growth measure 
 
In the absence of data on quality improvement for all the activities included in the 
DH’s new Output Index, and the need to quantify quality change for the Treasury, the 
DH has identified some areas where it believes that aspects of quality change can be 
measured and valued in monetary terms.  Under consideration are: 
• Reduced waiting times (outpatient, A&E, inpatient treatment) 
• Reduced mortality rates for specific conditions (CHD and cancer) 
• Improved patient experience 
Discussion of how to value these quality improvements is still under way but 
possibilities include: 
• Incorporating changes in mortality rates and estimates of the number of ‘lives 
saved’.  Given the age and gender of lives saved, an estimate could be made of 
the Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) produced and valued at £30,000 per 
QALY.  An alternative is the £1m per road death avoided used by the 
Department of Transport. 
• Placing a value on reduced waiting times and patient experience using data 
from discrete choice experiments. 
(Source: personal communication.) 
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3.3 Pharmaceuticals and prescribing  
 
Prescriptions issued in primary care are counted as activities and therefore as outputs 
in the DH’s new Output Index.  The cost weight on this activity is total expenditure on 
the drugs prescribed.  By contrast, in the hospital sector drugs are treated as inputs, 
not outputs.  For hospital based activity, drugs prescribed only enter the output index 
as an element in the cost weight (Reference Cost) attached to an activity such as a 
bypass operation or dialysis: they are not counted as an activity. 
 
The impact of the current treatment of prescribing in primary care as an output 
weighted by the cost of the drugs prescribed can be seen in Table 3.2.  It is the 
movement toward prescribing more expensive drugs that contributes most to the 
growth in output. 
 
Table 3.2 GP prescribing in the NHS output index (annual growth rates) 
 
 2002/03 2001/02 2000/01 
    
Number of prescriptions 5.44 5.41 5.01 
Cost weighted prescriptions 7.85 7.52 6.28 
 
Impact on overall index 
   
DH output index 5.24 4.22 1.82 
DH output index  excluding prescriptions 4.74 3.53 0.66 
 
 
When the new NHS output index is used in estimates of productivity growth, 
prescription drugs are also counted as an input. ONS in their measure of productivity 
change present two variants for family health services drugs (net of receipts from 
prescription charges) employing deflators based on the average unit cost of all items 
and a Paasche price index for existing items. The latter is an attempt to adjust the 
deflator for the changing quality of drugs. These two variants lead to quite big 
differences, amounting to about half a percentage point per annum from 1995 to 2003 
in real input growth (Lee, 2004, Hemingway, 2004). ONS rely on the Prescription 
Pricing Authority (PPA) and plan to consider the division by item in more detail in 
future revisions.  
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These problems would disappear in our “preferred” value weighted index of NHS 
output (12).  Patients treated would be the unit of output weighted by health gain.  
Pharmaceuticals would be counted as an input.  If prescribing more expensive drugs 
turned out to be cost effective in improving health outcomes, this would appear as a 
productivity increase. 
 
There is no doubt that GPs add value through the activity of prescribing—otherwise 
all licensed drugs would be available over the counter.  If this value added is not 
reflected in the assumption that the wage rate approximates the marginal product of 
GPs, a measure of this value added would be the correct weight for the activity of 
prescribing in the short-term cost weighted activity index. 
 
 
 
4 Quality adjustment with available data 
 
In this section we discuss how we can use available data to calculate a quality 
adjusted index of NHS output which corresponds as closely as possible to the ideal 
value weighted output index 
 1 1jt kt kjtj kxqyt
jt kt kjtj k
x q
I
x q
π
π
+ += ∑ ∑∑ ∑       (12)  
Calculation of (12) requires information on the outputs (xjt), the outcomes qkjt, and the 
marginal social values of the outcomes πkt.   Previous NHS output indices have been 
derived from information on outputs and have implicitly assumed that unit costs 
measure marginal social values.  As we noted in section 2.7, even if this assumption is 
correct the resulting cost weighted index is not equivalent to the value weighted index 
unless there is no change in quality.  With current information any outcome index will 
have to rely heavily on the assumption that unit costs measure marginal social value. 
Thus the main focus of the section is the extent to which it is possible to use 
additional existing data to calculate a quality adjusted cost weighted index. Sections 
4.1 to 4.4 examine issues in the measurement of outputs (x), section 4.5 discusses 
sources of information on marginal social values (π), and sections 4.6 to 4.13 consider 
how existing data on long and short term survival, readmissions, MRSA, waiting 
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times and patient satisfaction can be used to proxy changes in outcomes as quality 
adjustments (q). The annex provides a flow chart showing the relationship of the 
various indices estimated in the report. 
 
4.1 Activities or outputs as the unit of analysis 
 
International guidance on the measurement of government output for national 
accounting purposes recommends distinguishing activities, outputs and outcomes.  In 
the health service, activities would include operative procedures, diagnostic tests, 
outpatient visits, and consultations; outputs might comprise courses of treatment 
which may require a bundle of activities; and outcomes would be defined as the 
characteristics of output which affect utility.  
 
4.1.1 Activities: institutional approach 
 
NHS productivity measures have been based upon estimates of the number of 
particular types of activities (procedures, consultations etc) or the number of patients 
treated in various institutional settings (see section 3).  
 
There are advantages to continuing within this framework. In instances where care for 
a patient with a particular condition is provided entirely within one setting, 
aggregation within the setting is equivalent to aggregation by patient pathway or 
disease group. It ensures compatibility with current NHS reporting systems and is 
likely to prove amenable to analysis at a disaggregated level. It can be a useful means 
for monitoring and managing lower level units within the NHS. Further, the approach 
would ensure consistency with other policy initiatives, most notably the Payment by 
Results reforms (Department of Health, 2002a).   
 
The major disadvantage is that most patient cases pass through more than one 
institutional setting and their care requires several activities. For example, a patient 
who has a hip replacement will typically have been seen in general practice, in an 
outpatient department, treated as an inpatient in hospital and received after care 
treatment from her general practitioner and from personal social services. Such care 
patterns can lead to double counting and make problematic the valuation of output of 
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separate sectors contributing to joint production across sectors.   
 
Current routine administrative data systems cannot track patients and their resource 
use as they move along care pathways across settings.  Even within institutional 
settings data may not be appropriately linked. For example, whilst there are very 
detailed data on types and quantities of different drugs dispensed to the patients of 
individual general practitioners, they are not linked to the individual patient or even to 
diagnostic group, so it is not possible to say who got what prescriptions or for what 
condition. 
 
4.1.2 Outputs: patient-centred or disease-based approach 
 
The bulk of NHS activities or services are delivered to individual patients with the 
aim of improving their health.  But a disease or patient pathway approach has 
demanding data requirements.  The approach is being investigated by US researchers 
(Berndt et al., 2002; Berndt, Busch and Frank, 2001; Cutler and Huckman, 2003; 
Shapiro, Shapiro and Wilcox, 2001) and, in the UK, by the Office for National 
Statistics. It is probably the best way forward in the long run but is not fully 
implementable with the types of data available in the NHS in the short to medium 
term. One key element required is linkage of patient records across activities and this 
improvement in the data is planned by the DH.  Another requirement is the use of 
clinical teams to identify procedures and tests relevant to specific conditions and 
provision to update coding for procedures along clinical pathways as technology 
changes. 
 
The relative advantages of the patient/disease group and institutional setting 
approaches depend on the degree of coverage, ease and timeliness of data collection; 
the dangers of double counting (for instance, where patients suffer multiple health 
problems); the ability to link to data on outcomes or prices; and the usefulness of the 
disaggregated measures (for instance, in changing behaviour).   
 
For the short to medium term the lack of linked routine data means that the 
measurement of NHS output will be based predominantly on the measurement of 
activities rather than patients.    
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4.2 Unit of hospital output 
 
The main source of data on hospital output (excluding outpatient activity) is the 
Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) which is derived from the cleaned returns submitted 
by hospital trusts.2 There are four possible measures of hospital activity. 
• Consultant episodes. The basic unit in HES is the consultant episode. Each 
observation records the treatments provided to a patient whilst they are under 
the care of a particular consultant.  HES contains episodes which are 
unfinished at the start and end of each HES year.  
• Finished consultant episodes (FCEs). A count of episodes means that an 
episode which spans two HES years would be counted in each year. FCEs are 
episodes which have finished by the end of the HES year, though they may 
have begun before the start of the HES year. The DH’s new Output Index use 
finished consultant episodes (FCEs) since unit costs are derived from the 
Reference Costs data and these are defined for FCEs.  
• Provider spells (PS). Around 8% of patients have more than one FCE during a 
spell in a hospital.  It is possible to link episodes in the same spell to count 
provider spells.   
• Continuous inpatient spells (CIPS). Some patients (around 1%) are transferred 
to another provider at the end of an episode and it is possible to link episodes 
across providers to yield continuous inpatient spells.   
 
The amount of HES activity by year for FCEs, and CIPS is shown in Table 4.1. 
where, as they should, total FCEs exceed total CIPS. Both of these HES volume data 
are also always larger than those reported in the Reference Cost returns. The growth 
in activity (measured as the total numbers of Reference Cost hospital activities, and 
by HES based FCEs and CIPS) varies according to the measure employed, with all 
showing a larger increase in activity between 2002/03 and 2003/04. Appendix B 
describes our use of HES in more detail, including the construction of unit costs for 
spells. 
 
                                                 
2 From 2003/4 HES data includes outpatient attendances and Accident and Emergency department 
activity but this had not been included in released databases at the time of producing this report. 
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CIPS more nearly correspond to the patient journey. CIPS capture most 
comprehensively the full package of inpatient care and they are less vulnerable to 
being miscounted if transfers among providers vary over time or if there are changes 
in how “being under the care of a consultant” is defined. We have therefore calculated 
most of our indices using CIPS, though we also report comparisons of CIPS and FCE 
based indices (section 5).    
 
We recommend that future measures of hospital sector output use CIPS as the unit of 
outcome. 
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Table 4.1 Number of episodes, CIP spells from HES and number of episodes 
from Reference Costs 
 
 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 
HES data       
Episodes       
Electives 5491046 5577523 5573942 5485256 5664968 5815929 
Non-electives 6486405 6613290 6692208 6802085 7025377 7516611 
Total  11977451 12190813 12266150 12287341 12690345 13332540 
       
Growth   98/99-99/00 99/00-00/0 00/01-01/02 01/02-02/03 02/03-03/04
Electives  1.57% -0.06% -1.59% 3.28% 2.66% 
Non-electives  1.96% 1.19% 1.64% 3.28% 6.99% 
Total   1.78% 0.62% 0.17% 3.28% 5.06% 
       
CIP spells       
Electives 5427066 5487579 5479633 5386575 5578093 5736331 
Non-electives 5783750 5618166 5595606 5607484 5963742 6411777 
Total  11210816 11105745 11075239 10994059 11541835 12148108 
       
Growth  98/99-99/00 99/00-00/0 00/01-01/02 01/02-02/03 02/03-03/04
Electives  1.12% -0.15% -1.69% 3.55% 2.84% 
Non-electives  -2.86% -0.40% 0.21% 6.35% 7.51% 
Total   -0.94% -0.27% -0.73% 4.98% 5.25% 
       
Reference Cost data      
       
Electives 4730410 4805812 5166244 5171867 5360406 5467913 
Non-electives 5051451 5220380 5350960 5604390 5684987 6021765 
Total  9781861 10026192 10517204 10776257 11045393 11489678 
       
Growth  98/99-99/00 99/00-00/0 00/01-01/02 01/02-02/03 02/03-03/04
Electives  1.59% 7.50% 0.11% 3.65% 2.01% 
Non-electives  3.34% 2.50% 4.74% 1.44% 5.92% 
Total   2.50% 4.90% 2.46% 2.50% 4.02% 
       
 
 
4.3 Alternative sources for hospital activity  
 
There are two alternative sources of information about hospital activity: 
• the Reference Cost returns and 
• the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES). 
Table 4.1 compares Reference Cost activity volumes with those for HES FCEs and 
CIPS. 
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The Reference Cost returns have been compiled annually since 1998 and have 
become steadily more comprehensive. Hospital activity is summarised as aggregated 
counts separately for elective inpatients, elective daycases and non-electives by each 
Healthcare Resource Group. Based on version 3.1 HRGs, the Reference Cost returns 
include up to 3×565 HRG categories for hospital activity (excluding “unclassified” 
HRGs). 
 
Hospital activity is also available from the Hospital Episode Statistics. HES returns 
have been submitted by NHS providers since the late 1980s. HES contains data on 
every admitted patient, and comprises individual patient records, with information 
extracted directly from each patient’s medical record. 
 
HES provides different counts of activity to that recorded in the Reference Costs 
returns, the main reasons being the following:  
• First, the HES data undergo a more thorough process of validation than the 
Reference Cost returns. Among other things, this validation strips out 
duplicate records and ensures assignment to the correct Healthcare Resource 
Group. The estimates of activity submitted in the Reference Cost returns are 
not subject to the same validation process.  
• Second, HES counts all FCEs, whereas there is variable practice in what is 
recorded in the Reference Cost returns: sometimes all FCEs are recorded, 
sometimes only first FCEs are recorded. The main discrepancies between 
activity counts in HES and Reference Cost returns relate to activities with very 
long lengths of stay, including rehabilitation, mental health, bone marrow 
transplants, cystic fibrosis, etc. These are in HES but stripped out of Reference 
Cost activity.  
• Third, there may be differences in how activity is apportioned to each year. 
HES includes all FCEs that are completed within the financial year. It is not 
clear how patients are counted in the Reference Cost returns when their 
hospital stay crosses the end of the financial year.  
 
As well as being more thoroughly validated, HES is to be preferred to the Reference 
Cost return for the following reasons: 
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• Ideally, as explained in the previous section, we should be capturing each 
individual’s journey through the health system. The best available measure of 
this the Continuous Inpatient Spell (CIPS). CIPS cannot be derived from 
Reference Cost returns.  
• Being individual patient records, it is possible to aggregate the HES data in 
various ways. We aggregated the HES data into Healthcare Resource Groups, 
so that there is an equivalent set of activity categories as for the Reference 
Costs. But it is perfectly feasible to aggregate the data to other groupings, such 
as specialty or OPCS procedure. Moreover, HES data can be allocated easily 
to different HRG classifications, as the classification system is periodically 
revised. This flexibility in deciding activity categories is lacking in the 
Reference Cost returns, because these data have already been aggregated. 
• We argue that NHS activities should be quality adjusted. For hospital activity, 
the HES data include items by which it is possible to make these adjustments, 
notably the waiting time prior to admission and the discharge status of the 
patient (from which mortality rates are derived). This information is not 
available in the Reference Cost returns. 
 
For there reasons, we use HES based activity estimates rather than the Reference Cost 
returns for all elective inpatient, daycase and non-elective hospital activity. We use 
the Reference Costs database for the other sources of activity.  
 
There are two broad HRG groups in HES not included in the reference costs – these 
have code T (mental health) and U (unclassified). In a spells calculation we need to 
include all HES activity. If we did not do so then patients whose spell included one of 
the omitted categories would be excluded. In addition it is also important that 
unclassified groups are included in a count of activities since it is likely that over time 
less and less activities get put into an unclassified category. It is necessary to impute 
unit costs to these activities. In the case of group T we used average unit cost for other 
Mental Health activities and for group U we used the median cost across FCEs. 
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4.4 General practitioner consultations 
 
Estimates of consultation activity are derived from the consultations reported by 
respondents in the General Household Survey and are available by location (surgery, 
home, phone) and provider (GP, practice nurse (but only after 2000)).  The estimate of 
the number of consultations per year is made by multiplying the number of reported 
consultations in the 14 days prior to interview by 26.  
 
No allowance is made for seasonal factors - the date of the consultation varies across 
respondents and has also varied between rounds of the GHS.  There have been 
implausibly large changes in the numbers of consultations reported in the GHS for 
some age-gender groups from one year to next.  The GHS was also not undertaken in 
1997/8 and 1999/2000 so that estimates for these years have to be interpolated.  Data 
on consultations with practice nurses was not collected before 2000.   
 
These deficiencies of the GHS as source of GP consultations information are widely 
recognised (Atkinson, 2005, pp 108-111).  The DH has been investigating the use of 
GP record systems as a source of more accurate and detailed data.  We have 
previously made detailed suggestions on how such data should be collected (Dawson, 
et al., 2004b, 2004c).   
 
New data from the QRESEARCH database derived from downloads from around 500 
general practices has recently become available but too late for inclusion in this 
report.  We have agreed to undertake an analysis of general practice consultation rates 
data from QRESEARCH for the DH which will examine what if any adjustments 
need to be made to QR consultation counts to produce an estimate of consultation 
activity.  This report will be delivered separately in the Spring of 2006. 
  
4.5 Measures of marginal social value of outputs 
 
4.5.1 Unit costs 
 
Current NHS practice, which follows the recommendation of Eurostat (2001), is to 
use production costs (such as the average costs as reported in the annually produced 
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Schedule of Reference Costs) as weights in the calculation of output indices.  This 
implies that costs reflect the value that society places upon these activities. So 
cochlear implant (with a unit cost of £23,747 in the 2002/03 Reference Costs) is 
assumed to be 25 times more valuable than a normal delivery without complications 
(unit cost £921). The use of unit costs as weights reflecting the marginal social value 
of outputs has the support, albeit reluctant, of Hicks (1940) but as we have noted 
(section 2.7) it rests on the strong assumption that resources are allocated efficiently 
in the NHS so that unit costs are proportional to the marginal value of output 
produced.   Even with this assumption the use of unit costs will not allow for quality 
changes (section 2.7) in the calculation of growth between one year and the next. 
 
Reference Costs estimates of unit costs are based on allocations of fixed costs to 
HRGs with FCEs as the unit of measurement.  We have investigated whether it would 
be possible to improve on this method of estimating activity costs by using regression 
analysis.  The Second Interim Report (Dawson et al., 2004c; section 3.7.1) describes 
how we attempted to estimate cost functions using a provider Trust level panel of data 
on activities and costs and the problems we encountered.  Our subsequent estimations 
were no more successful. We describe these attempts in Appendix D. Apart from 
difficulties in trying to back compute total provider costs from the Reference Cost 
data on unit costs and activities, the main problem is one of degrees of freedom.  
There are more HRG activity types (approximately 550) than Trusts (approximately 
180) so that even with observations over 6 years it is necessary to use quite high 
levels of aggregation of activities.    
 
We feel that the unit costs in the Reference Costs are very unlikely to measure 
marginal costs, even long run marginal costs, because of the accounting procedures 
used to generate them.  We understand that, as a result of the introduction of Practice 
Based Commissioning and Payment by Results, the DH is considering the production 
of a new set of unit costs for spells, rather than for FCEs.  There is a danger that 
Payment by Results will encourage misreporting behaviour, with providers reporting 
their Reference Costs close to the tariff and being reluctant to divulge information 
about where their costs deviate from the tariff. If such behaviour is widespread, in 
future the Reference Cost database may not even approximate average, let alone, 
marginal costs. 
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There is Reference Cost data on unit costs from 1997/98.  The data had patchy 
coverage in the early years: only 76% of activity currently recorded had unit costs 
assigned to them in 1997/98. Moreover there were some considerable fluctuations in 
unit costs for specific HRGs in the early years (Street and AbdulHussain, 2004).   
 
We therefore decided to use the unit estimates for 1999/00 for all previous years. 
When there were missing unit cost data we used the estimates from the previous or 
following year if these were available. Some activities measured in HES have no 
corresponding unit costs in the Reference Costs databases and for these activities we 
felt it was better to retain them in the index by applying the weighted average 
reference cost for all other activities for that year. Having dealt with the question of 
duplicate entries we took great care to ensure that no other entries were dropped as a 
result of missing data. The general principle was that it was important not to lose any 
patients merely on the grounds that the records were less than complete. To this end 
we replaced missing data for HRG unit costs by averages for the whole. Other missing 
variables were again replaced by suitable population averages. For example, in order 
to determine the individuals’ age we use the variable STARTAGE (age at start of 
episode) from the first episode in the spell. However, this is missing for some 
individuals, (e.g. in 2002/3 35,554 episodes did not have age recorded). These were 
replaced with the mean age for individuals of the same gender in the particular HRG 
and year. For those in sparsely-populated HRGs, missing values were replaced with 
the mean for the whole population. 
 
4.5.2 Private sector prices 
   
Under certain conditions the market prices for goods and services measure their 
marginal social value and hence can be aggregated for the construction of measures of 
the growth rate of output.  One possible method of valuing NHS output might be to 
use prices from the private sector.  Some NHS activities have close matches in the 
private sector.  The main example is that some types of elective care are provided 
both in the private and public sectors. There are also a few private sector general 
practitioners. Non-emergency ambulance transport is similar to a taxi service. 
 
In principle it might be possible either to use the private sector prices of outputs to 
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value NHS outputs or to estimate hedonic price functions to value characteristics or 
outcomes of NHS output such as waiting times and hotel services.   However there are 
problems with attempting to use private health sector prices as measures of marginal 
social value of NHS outputs or outcomes: 
(a) the private sector produces very little emergency care and relatively little non-
elective care, roughly half of NHS activity.  
(b) private sector outputs have a different mix of characteristics compared to the NHS.  
The health effects of treatment are probably broadly similar, but waiting times are 
much shorter and the quality of hotel services higher.  Thus it would be necessary to 
attempt to estimate hedonic price functions to derive the marginal value of 
characteristics (πkjt) rather than use the market price of the output to weight NHS 
outputs.  Time and resource constraints meant that we did not consider this to be a 
feasible option for this project, though it may be worthwhile for the DH to 
commission scoping review to investigate the possibility. 
(c) private patients are not a random sample of the population – they tend to be richer 
and better educated. Thus any estimated hedonic price function from the private sector 
may not predict the marginal valuations of characteristics for the general population.   
(d) much private health care is purchased by insured individuals so that the market 
price of care will overstates its marginal value to the private patient.  
(e) because the NHS is now encouraging commissioners (PCTs and general practices) 
to buy care from the private sector, prices for care to private patients will be 
increasingly influenced by the prices set by the NHS, which are based on Reference 
Costs. 
 
Private sector prices are therefore unlikely to be useful as sources of marginal social 
values for most NHS outputs. 
 
4.5.3 International prices  
 
There is a precedent in cost benefit analysis for using world prices to value domestic 
output when domestic prices are absent or distorted. The rationale is that because 
trade could take place at world prices, they are legitimate measures of opportunity 
cost to the domestic economy. This option is not particularly useful in the valuation of 
UK health care outputs. There is not a significant world market in health care. In the 
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countries that do have published prices for health treatment, these tend to be 
administered prices subject to stringent domestic regulation or negotiation. It is highly 
unlikely that the relative prices observed in other countries will correspond to the 
relative value of NHS outputs. 
 
These caveats notwithstanding, we did report in our Second Interim Report (Dawson, 
et al., 2004c; section 3.7.2) whether the valuations of activity would be sensitive to 
the use of price information from other countries. We concluded that international 
prices were not likely to be useful as sources of relative marginal social valuations of 
NHS outputs. There were major differences in definitions of outputs so that it was not 
clear that similar outputs could be compared. Even when we were reasonably 
confident that the outputs were similar there were marked differences in the relative 
costs of treatments between different countries. For example the 2001/2 ratio of the 
costs of bilateral primary and primary hip replacement to the cost of a percutaneous 
transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA) was 2.54 in Australia and 0.94 in Italy.  
(The ratio in the Reference Costs database was 1.89). Other studies have also found 
marked differences in the input usage and hence costs for particular conditions (Baily 
and Garber, 1997).  
 
4.5.4 Value of health 
 
A value per QALY of £30,000 is believed to be compatible with the decisions made 
by the National Institute of Clinical Excellence, although they do not mention a value 
of life explicitly (Devlin and Parkin, 2004).  The DH has commissioned research into 
the value of a QALY but its results are not yet available.  We have taken £30000 as 
our reference value, assuming it applies for the year 2002/3 and adjusted it by the rate 
of growth of money GDP for other years.  
 
4.5.5 Value of waiting time 
 
A value weighted output index requires that we weight changes in the various 
characteristics by an estimate of the monetary value of each characteristic.  One 
source of data on willingness to pay to reduce waiting times is evidence from discrete 
choice experiments. A recent review of the literature (Ryan, Odejar and Napper, 
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2004) reported that few studies addressed the issue of the monetary value of reducing 
waiting times for health care and contrasted this with the significantly greater volume 
of work on the value of time saving in transport. Of the six UK papers, only one 
sampled the English population. The other five were location or procedure specific.  
Ryan summarises the available evidence converting to 2002/03 prices. Propper’s 
analysis of English data suggests estimated values between £36.25 and £94.19 for a 
one month reduction in waiting time.  Hurst’s study of waiting time for non-urgent 
rheumatology estimated values between £11.95 and £23.68 per week.  Ryan points 
out that the Propper and Hurst studies give similar values assuming a linear additive 
model. A major limitation of the data available is its age. Propper’s survey was 
undertaken in 1987.  While it is possible to adjust prices for inflation, it is also likely 
that willingness to pay to reduce waiting time has changed over the last eighteen 
years.   
  
We illustrate the effect of adopting a value weighted output index in place of a cost 
weighted index for a small subset of outputs where we have some health effects data 
(section 6).  We have used the upper limit of the Propper evidence, £94.19 per month 
which corresponds to £3.13 per day in 2002/03 prices. This was the willingness to pay 
of retired individuals with above average incomes in the original survey.   To explore 
the sensitivity of the index to price, we also use £50 per day which implies that a one 
month reduction in waiting is worth £1400. This is an arbitrary number which 
introspection suggests is likely to be at the high end of any willingness to pay for a 
reduction in waiting time for most elective care.   
 
If the DH wishes to make a value weighted output index a regular part of reporting 
NHS performance, we recommend that new research is undertaken on social 
willingness to pay to reducing waiting times.  
 
4.5.6 Expert groups 
 
Clinical experts could provide estimates of the health effects of treatment without the 
need to deny cost-effective treatment to some patients for some treatments.  They 
have been used in the UK for CABG (Williams, 1985), in the Netherlands to estimate 
burden of disease for 52 diagnostic groups accounting for 70% of health care costs, 
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and in the US for producing quality adjusted price indices for depression treatment 
(Berndt et al., 2002).  
 
We discussed the use of expert groups in our Second Interim Report (Dawson et al., 
2000c, section 3.1).   We do not believe that they should be used to provide 
comprehensive annual updates of the estimated health effects.  Such groups are costly 
to convene, organise and train.  They would be useful for a limited set of major 
conditions, supplementing the regular annual snapshot before and after health data 
collected from patients that we recommend (section 10.1).  
 
4.6 Quality adjustment for health effects of treatment  
 
In the next four sections we consider how far it is possible to use existing data to 
quality adjust the output index for changes in the health effects of treatment, waiting 
times, and patient satisfaction with the process of care.  We consider first what we 
would like to measure in principle. 
 
We assume for the moment that the only valuable characteristic of NHS care is its 
effect on health status and examine how we might use data on post treatment 
mortality to produce a quality adjusted index of NHS output. In this and following 
subsections we consider various methods of using mortality information and 
combining it with other very limited data on the health effects of treatment, stressing 
the assumptions required. 
 
As we are assuming in this section that health is the only relevant characteristic of 
health care we drop the subscript identifying the characteristic. Thus we use qjt, πt 
instead of qkjt, πkt.  Denote the discounted sum of QALYs produced by the treatment if 
the patient survives treatment by 
*
jtq
* * * *( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )s sjt jt jt jt jts ss s h s s h sθδ σ ρ θ δ σ= =∑ ∑ ∑           (23) 
δ is the discount factor on QALYs.  * ( )jth s is the expected level of health s periods 
after treatment, conditional on being alive at time t:  
* *( ) ( , ) ( )jt jth s s hθ ρ θ θ= ∑                        (24) 
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* ( )jt sσ  is the probability of surviving s periods given that the patient survived 
treatment j at date t, h(θ) is the health level from having health state θ,  where θ  is a 
vector of mental and physical health characteristics, and * ( , )jt sρ θ is probability of 
being in health state θ  conditional on surviving s periods after treatment j at date t.  
To reduce notational complexity in examining the properties of the various indices we 
ignore the effect of age and gender on mortality, survival and the probability 
distribution of health states.  Some HRGs are already age specific.  A more 
disaggregated analysis is analytically straightforward by defining the output type by 
finer age categories and gender as well as HRG.  
 
 
If the patient had not been treated their discounted sum of expected quality adjusted 
life years would have been  
 ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )o s o o s o ojt jt jt jt jt jts sq s s h s s h sθδ σ ρ θ δ σ= =∑ ∑ ∑                  (25) 
( )ojh s  is expected health if the patient would have survived s periods hence without 
receiving treatment j. ( )ojt sσ  is the probability of surviving s periods if not treated. It 
depends on the probabilities of health status θ  at s conditional on surviving without 
receiving treatment ( ( , )oj sρ θ ) . 
 
Setting health status when dead to zero, the expected increase in discounted QALYs 
from treatment j at time t is 
*(1 ) ojt jt jt jtq m q q= − −                   (26) 
where mjt is the probability of death within a short period of treatment j.  This 
expression for the health effect of treatment is useful because it distinguishes three 
components of qjt which are controllable by the NHS to different degrees and hence 
should be treated differently in calculating output growth rates attributable to the 
NHS. 
 
The amount of health outcome produced per unit of output can change over time 
because of changes in  
• short term post treatment mortality rate mjt; 
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• survival probabilities and health status probabilities conditional on survival 
* ( )jt sσ , * ( , )jt sρ θ  
• survival and the health status probabilities conditional on not having 
treatment ( )oj sσ , ( , )oj sρ θ  
 
The first is arguably the component most clearly attributable to the NHS for many 
treatments given current data and the third is unaffected by the NHS for all treatments.  
The effect of the NHS on the second will vary across treatments from relatively little 
effect on say varicose vein stripping and a large effect for cancer treatments.  
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the effect of treatment j at date t.  The lower dashed line shows 
the expected time stream of health given treatment after allowing for the treatment 
mortality probability.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Expected time streams of health without treatment ( ( )ojh s ), with 
treatment conditional on surviving treatment ( * ( )jth s ), and with treatment 
( *(1 ) ( )jt jtm h s− )
 
 
 
Let the marginal social value at time t of a QALY be πt (£s per QALY) so that the  
*(1 ) ( )jt jtm h s−  
* ( )jth s
t 
( )ojh s
h 
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marginal social value of unit of output j at time t is  
*(1 ) ojt t jt t jt jt jtp q m q qπ π ⎡ ⎤= = − −⎣ ⎦             (27) 
We wish to calculate the value weighted output index (12) which in the special case in 
which health is the only socially valuable characteristic is 
      1 1 1 1 (1 )(1 )jt t jtj jt jt t jt jtxq yyt xjt qjt jtj j
jt t jt jt jt t jt jtj j
x q x q q x
I g g
x q x q q x
π π ωπ π
+ + + +⎛ ⎞= = = + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑  (28) 
where 1( ) /xjt jt jt jtg x x x+= −  and 1( ) /qjt jt jt jtg q q q+= − are the discrete period rates of 
growth of the output j and the health outcome per unit of output j.   
 
Consider the health adjusted cost weighted output index  
1
1
1 1
jt
jt jtj
jtjt jt jt jtxq
ct j
jt jt jt jt jt jtj
q
x c
qx q c x
I
x q c x x c
+
+
+ +
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞ ⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
∑ ∑ ∑           (29) 
The assumption of efficient allocation of NHS resources with only one quality 
characteristic outcome takes the form 
*(1 ) ojt t t jt t j jt jt jtc q m q qλπ λπ ⎡ ⎤= = − −⎣ ⎦         (30) 
We can interpret  t tλπ  as the cost per QALY used by the NHS in making its treatment 
decisions and is the optimality condition that at the margin all treatments have the 
same cost-effectiveness ratio. If we make the assumption (30) the health adjusted cost 
weighted output index is also the value weighted output index  xqctI   =  xqytI  . (This is 
just (22) with simpler notation.) 
 
If we do not assume efficient allocation then we can justify calculating xqctI  by arguing 
that we are interested in a weighted average of the growth rates of the “real” parts  
(outputs, quality as measured by health gain per unit of output) of the value of NHS 
activity and that costs are convenient weights.   
         
We can write the term qjt+1/qjt in (28) as 
* * *
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
* *
(1 )
1
(1 )
o o o
jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt
qjt o o
jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt
q m q q a q a q q q
g
q m q q a q q q q
+ + + + + + +− −= + = = −− −     
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        *
*
* *(1 )(1 ) (1 )ojt jt
o
jt jt jt
ajt o oq q
jt jt jt jt jt jt
a q q
g g g
a q q a q q
= + + − +− −            (31) 
where ajt = (1−mjt ) is the survival rate (proportion of patients getting treatment j who 
are alive for at least a short period after treatment).  ajtg is the growth rate of survival 
and *
jtq
g , o
jtq
g  the growth rates in * , ojt jtq q . 
 
The NHS output growth rate in any year should not include changes in qjt which arise 
because of changes in health if not treated ( ojtq ).  Hence in calculating the growth rate 
we should set  o
jtq
g  = 0 and the health effect adjustment should be not (31) but  
*
* * *
1 1 1
* (1 )(1 )jt
o o
jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt
ajt q
jt jt jt jt jt jt jt
q a q a q q a q q
g g
q a q q q q q
+ + +⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= − = + + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
          (32) 
Notice that although we hold ojtq  constant in calculating the annual growth in qjt 
attributable to the NHS, changes in health without treatment will lead to changes in 
the weights.  
 
The larger is the growth in survival (gajt) and the larger the growth in health after 
treatment ( *
jtq
g ), both of which may be attributable to the NHS, the greater is the 
health effect adjustment factor (qjt+1/qjt) and the greater the index of NHS output.   
 
In general we do not have data on health conditional on surviving treatment *jtq  or 
conditional on no treatment ojtq . We do have data on the probability of surviving 
treatment  ajt  for all hospital spells. It is also possible that in the near future we may 
have information on longer term survival * ( )jt sσ  for a large number of NHS patients.3 
We therefore consider in the next section how it will be possible to use information on 
treatment survival and longer term survival.   
 
 
                                                 
3 Note that we make a distinction between short term survival (a) and long term survival conditional on 
short term survival (σ*) whereas the little data currently available is couched in terms of unconditional 
survival probabilities which is the product of  a and σ*. 
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4.7 Quality adjustment using long term survival 
 
We want to estimate the quality adjusted cost weighted index (29) where the quality 
adjustment factor is given by (32).  We do not know health status conditional on 
treatment and surviving s periods * ( )jth s .  One possibility is to assume that health 
status s periods after treatment is proportional to the current health status ( )th s  of an 
average person who is s years older: * ( ) ( )hjt jt th s f h s= . Such data are available for 
example from the 1996 Health Survey for England.4 Then we can estimate the growth 
in discounted expected QALYs conditional on surviving treatment as 
       
** * *
1 11 1 1
* * **
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
s h h s h
jt jt tjt jt jt jt jt ts
hss h
jt jt jt jtjt jt ts
s f h sq s f s f h s
q s f qs f h s
δ σ σ δ σ
σδ σ
+ ++ + +⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑∑       (33) 
Notice that we have use ( )th s  rather than 1( )th s+  in the numerator since changes in 
the general health of the population should not affect the rate of growth of health 
conditional on surviving treatment.  We do allow for changes in the proportionality 
factor hjtf  to affect the health conditional on short term survival since this will reflect 
improvements in medical technology or in patient selection, both of which should be 
attributed to the NHS.  In the current state of knowledge we cannot generally estimate 
the change in the proportionality factor from one period to the next and so assume that 
it is constant. Hence the proportionality factors cancel from the numerator and 
denominator in the middle ratio in the final part of (33) and we have  
 
** * *
1 11 1
* * **
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
s h s h
jt jt tjt jt jt jt ts
ss h
jt jt jtjt jt ts
s f h sq s s f h s
q s qs f h s
δ σ σ δ σ
σδ σ
+ ++ +⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑∑       (34) 
Thus with information on *( ), ( )t jth s sσ  and assumptions about hjtf  we can compute 
* *
1 /jt jtq q+ .   If it is also the case that the growth rate in survival (
* *
* 1 /t jt jtgσ σ σ+=  - 1)  is 
constant over s then we do not even need to make assumptions about the magnitude of 
the proportionality factor: (34) simplifies to  
                                                 
4 To keep the presentation simple we have assumed implicitly that all patients in an HRG have the 
same age and gender so that all have the same survival probabilities and expected health status. In 
practice when long term survival data become available it would be necessary to consider whether it 
was necessary to calculate age and gender specific survival rates and expected health status. 
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*
1
* ** (1 ) (1 )
jt
q t t
jt
q
g g
q σ
+ = + = +       (35) 
   
We still need information on ( ), ( )o ojt jth s sσ  to calculate ojtq  for (32) and estimates of 
( )th s  are of little help since we would have to specify proportionality factors which 
vary across the activity types and we have no information on survival without 
treatment for most types.   One way to proceed, which is more plausible for treatment 
of cancer and CHD than for cataracts, is to assume that the alternative to treatment is 
death so that ojtq  = 0 and (32) becomes 
 
* * * *
1 1 1 1 1
* * *
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
s h
Sjt jt jt jt jt jt t j
s
jt jt jt jt jt jt
q a q a s s f h s
q a q a s q
σ δ σ
σ
+ + + + +⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∑        (36) 
Again if we assume a constant growth in long term survival for all ages the health 
effect adjustment (36) simplifies further to  
 
*
1 1 1
** (1 )(1 )
jt jt jt
at t
jt jt jt
q a q
g g
q a q σ
+ + += = + +          (37) 
 
There are two practical issues to consider. First to which HRGs should the adjustment 
in respect of say cancer survival be applied?  Cancer diagnoses appear in a number of 
HRGs.  One possibility is to apply the adjustment to the HRGs which treat the highest 
proportions of patients with cancer diagnoses. Alternatively one could attach group 
cancer patients by the HRG of their activity.   
 
Second, we must choose a time horizon S for the adjustment.   Lakhani et al. (2005) 
have recently presented estimates of 5 year cancer survival rates. The longer the 
horizon over which the summation in (36) takes place the more accurate the estimate 
of health effects.  But a long time horizon has disadvantages. If the adjustment to a 
year is based on the survival experience of patients actually treated in that year then 
the output indices for S previous years will have to be revised every year. The 
alternative is to adjust the index for a particular year using the survival experience of 
patients treated S years previously.  Thus the longer is S the greater the extent of 
revisions or the more out of date the adjustment. 
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Rather than use general population estimates of ( )th s  it may in some cases be 
reasonable to make an even cruder assumption, that survival after S years is very low 
or that * ( )jth s  after S years is very low.  Setting  
* ( )jth s  = 0 for s  > S  and assuming 
that each year to S has the same QALY score ( * ( )jth s  = 
*
jh ) we get  
 
* * *
1 1 1 1 1
5* *1 *
1
( )
( ) ( )
s
Sjt jt jt jt jt jt
s s
jt jt jt jt jt jts
q a q a s
q a q a s s
σ σ δ
σ σ δ
+ + + + +
=
=
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑         (38) 
If the trend improvement in survival was reasonably stable over long periods then the 
use of the lagged survival change data would be a reasonably accurate estimate of the 
adjustment based on actual survival experience since one is interested in the growth 
rate in survival, not in actual levels.   
 
We believe that the use of longer term survival data is a promising way forward which 
will become feasible in the medium term (Lakhani et al., 2005). It will be especially 
promising if it is coupled with a programme to measure the health status of samples of 
NHS patients before and after treatment (see section 6; Appendix C). 
 
4.8 Quality adjustment with short term survival 
 
4.8.1 Simple survival adjustment 
 
In the absence of longer term survival data we now consider what can be done to 
quality adjust the output index using the data which is currently available. 
 
In the absence of information on longer term survival * ( )jt sσ  we cannot estimate *jtq , 
the change in the discounted QALYs associated with treatment conditional on 
survival ( *jtq ).  If we assume that 
* *
1jt jtq q +=  does not change over time ( *
jtq
g = 0), so 
that the only reason why qjt changes over time is that the post operative survival rate 
changes, the health effect adjustment becomes      
  
*
1 1 1
*
o
jt jt jt jt jt jt
o
jt jt jt jt jt jt
q a q q a k
q a q q a k
+ + +− −= =− −                          (39) 
where */ojt jt jtk q q= .  Clearly increases in ajt+1 other things equal lead to a higher 
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quality adjustment factor.   For activities with the same ajt and kjt, the larger the 
survival in period t+1 the greater the health adjustment factor.  
 
 
Comparisons of quality adjustment factors across activities with different */ojt jt jtk q q=  
require a little more thought.  Remember that we are interested in the effect on the 
quality adjustment factor qjt+1/qjt which is the ratio of health effects, not in the effect 
of kjt on the level of health effects.  Suppose for definiteness that survival has 
increased, so that the quality adjustment factor has increased. Differentiating (39) with 
respect to kjt gives 
 ( )
1 1
2
( / )jt jt jt jt
jt jt jt
q q a a
k a k
+ +∂ −=∂ −
                (40)   
Thus outputs with a larger kjt have a larger health adjustment. Higher */ojt jt jtk q q=  can 
arise from a smaller *jtq  for the same 
o
jtq  or a larger 
o
jtq   for the same 
*
jtq . The 
marginal effects of *jtq  and 
o
jtq  are  
 ( )
1 1
* 2
( / ) ( ) ojt jt jt jt jt
jt jt jt
q q a a q
q a k
+ +∂ − −=∂ −
     (41) 
 ( )
*
1 1
2
( / ) ( )jt jt jt jt jt
o
jt jt jt
q q a a q
q a k
+ +∂ −=∂ −
       (42) 
 
Thus, other things equal, activities with larger *jtq  have smaller health quality 
adjustment factors.  This might appear paradoxical for two reasons. First, the larger is 
*
jtq  the greater the health effect in each period so that the health adjustment factor is 
smaller for more beneficial activities.  Second, the larger is *jtq  the greater is the 
absolute increase *1( )jt jt jta a q+ −  in the health effect between the two periods.  But both 
“paradoxes” disappear when we remember that what we are interested in is the health 
adjustment factor which is the ratio of the health effect in the two periods. An 
increase in  *jtq  increases both numerator health effect qjt+1 and denominator health 
effect qjt but has a smaller proportionate effect on qjt+1 than on  qjt  and so the ratio 
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qjt+1/qjt  gets smaller.  
 
Even with the assumptions that * * 1jt jtq q +=  is constant over short time intervals we 
cannot measure (39) directly unless we know the magnitudes of * , ojt jtq q  in order to 
calculate kjt  */ojt jtq q= .  In future it may be possible to estimate * , ojt jtq q  using new data 
on longer term survival and on health status from surveys of patients before and after 
treatment and from the results of evaluations of different types of treatment. But for 
the moment, for the vast majority of activities we have no data on * , ojt jtq q , though we 
do have information on survival ajt. We can therefore calculate the survival adjusted 
cost weighted output index 
  
1
1
(1 )(1 )
jt
jt jtj
jtxa jt
ct xjt ajt ctj
jt jtj
a
c x
a
I g g
c x
ω
+
+
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= = + +
∑
∑∑          (43) 
 
The effect of this simple survival adjustment5 on the rate of growth of NHS 
productivity will not be great since the vast majority of NHS patients survive their 
treatment so that survival rate does not change rapidly. Thus, for example, the 30 day 
CIPS mortality rate for Phakoemulsion Cataract Extraction with Lens Implant (HRG 
B02) fell from 0.0017 in 1999/2000 to 0.0013 in 2002/3, an annual rate of decline in 
the mortality probability of 0.56%. The survival rate rose from 99.83 to 98.87, an 
annual rate of increase in the survival rate of 0.013%.  In terms of Figure 4.1 the 
effect of increased survival is shown in the shift upward in the dashed line plotting 
health post treatment *1(1 )
o
jt j jm h h+− − . The effect is small relative to initial health.  
 
                                                 
5 An alternative apparently simpler adjustment is to apply the survival rates in each period to scale the 
output of that period: 1 1 /jt jt jt jt jt jtj jc x a c x a+ +∑ ∑ .  Unfortunately this index equals the value 
weighted index 1 1 /jt jt t jt jt tj jx q x qπ π+ +∑ ∑  under the assumptions that * *1jt jtq q+ = , 
1 0
o o
jt jtq q+ = = , and *jt t jtc qθπ= .  The last assumption is perverse. It is not an efficiency 
assumption: it requires that decision makers ignore the possibility of that a patient may not survive 
treatment when allocating resources across treatments. By contrast, the first two requirements and the 
efficiency assumption ( )* ojt t t jt jt jtc a q qλπ= −  imply that the survival adjusted cost weighted index 
(43) does equal the value weighted index.   
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The difference between what we would like to measure (true health adjustment) and 
what we can measure using survival data only is  
( )1 1 1 1 1 1( )o ojt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt
o
jt jt jt jt jt jt
a q q a a a q q q a a
a q q a a q
* * *
+ + + + + +
*
- - + -
- =
-
     (44) 
In general we cannot say anything about the direction of the bias in using 1 /jt jta a+  
instead of (32). But if survival increases and health conditional on survival increases 
then (44) will be positive and the simple survival adjustment will underestimate the 
true adjustment.  If there is little change in health conditional on surviving treatment, 
(44) becomes  
1 1 1( )o ojt jt jt jt jt jt jt
o
jt jt jt jt jt jt
a q q a q a a
a q q a a q
*
+ + +
*
- -
- =
-
          (45) 
and  1 /jt jta a+   will always have the same sign as (32) and will always be less than it 
in absolute value.  1 /jt jta a+   is a conservative estimate of the true health adjustment 
(32) if health conditional on surviving treatment is constant or increasing. 
 
Table 4.2 gives some indication of the underestimation of the growth rate of the true 
health effect  ( ( ) ( )1 / 1jt jt jt jta k a k+ − − − ) when it is calculated as the growth rate of 
survival ((ajt+1/ajt) – 1) . The example has a rate of survival of 0.97 in the base year 
which is approximately the average survival rate of patients. The greater the reduction 
in mortality the greater the increase in the survival rate and the greater the growth rate 
in the true health effect.  Notice that because survival is initially high even quite large 
proportionate reductions in the mortality risk have small effects on the survival rate 
and on the true growth in the health effect.  The true growth in the health effect is 
larger the larger is */ot tk q q= . Thus, as we discussed above, the smaller the 
proportionate effect of treatment on the discounted sum of QALYs, the larger is the 
true growth in the health effect.  
 
In the absence of information on the effect of NHS care on health and hence on the 
true growth rate it is impossible to say how large the underestimation of the overall 
growth rate of the effect of hospital care on health is.  If our central guesstimate of the 
average value of */ot tk q q= = 0.8 is correct, then the kind of increases in short term 
survival which are perhaps towards the upper end of what is plausible (from 0.970 to 
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0.971 or 0.972 -- corresponding to proportionate reductions in mortality of 3.3% or 
6.75%) underestimate the true growth in the health effect by 0.5% to 1%.  Of course, 
the calculation takes no account of changes in health effects arising from increases in 
health conditional on surviving treatment.   If *jtq  grows then the simple survival 
adjustment would be more of an underestimate. Once again we see the importance of 
having improved estimates of health conditional on surviving treatment. 
 
Table 4.2  Error in using survival growth rate as estimate of growth rate in 
health effect of treatment 
 
  Year t Year t +1 
Survival  0.97 0.971 0.972 0.975 0.980 0.985 
Mortality  0.03 0.029 0.028 0.025 0.020 0.015 
Mortality % decrease   -3.33% -6.67% -16.67% -33.33% -50.00% 
        
Survival % growth    0.10% 0.21% 0.52% 1.03% 1.55% 
        
True health growth        
if true  k =  0.5  0.21% 0.43% 1.06% 2.13% 3.19% 
 0.8  0.59% 1.18% 2.94% 5.88% 8.82% 
 0.9  1.43% 2.86% 7.14% 14.29% 21.43% 
Error using survival 
growth 
       
if true k = 0.5  0.11% 0.22% 0.55% 1.10% 1.65% 
 0.8  0.49% 0.97% 2.43% 4.85% 7.28% 
 0.9  1.33% 2.65% 6.63% 13.25% 19.88% 
 
 
If jtq*  is constant ((45) holds) so that holds the difference between the quality adjusted 
cost weighted and survival adjusted cost weighted indices is  
( ) 0
' ''
1 jt jt jtxq xact ct xjt ajtj
jt j t j tj
q x c
I I g g
q x c
⎛ ⎞− = + ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑          (46) 
 
Since we do not observe  , ojt jtq q*   we cannot determine the magnitude of the absolute 
downward bias in using  1 /jt jta a+   instead of  1 /jt jtq q+ . When there is efficient 
allocation (30) for conditions where the alternative to NHS treatment is very poor 
health ( ojq   is small) or treatment has a large effect so (that *jtq  is large relative to  ojq ), 
the bias is small. But if qjt is very small (the treatment has a small effect on health) the 
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bias is very large. Fortunately, the smaller the health gain from the treatments the 
smaller the weight of the treatment in the cost adjusted value weighted index (since 
costs are proportional to health gains by assumption (30) and so the downward bias is 
bounded. But if (30) does not hold so that unit cost is not proportional to marginal 
value then the downward bias when  jtq   is small may not be offset by having a low 
cost weight attached to such outputs.   
 
We also see from (43) that an increase in survival will have a smaller effect on the 
index the smaller is the cost weight cjt.  When (30) holds this is reasonable. The 
increase in the health effect from an increase in survival is proportional to  jtq*   and 
the smaller is cjt the smaller is  ojt jt jt jtq a q q*= -   and the more likely is  jtq*   to be 
small.  But if (30) does not hold, the fact that survival gains in low cost activities will 
have smaller effects on the index than survival gains in high cost activities is less 
appealing. 
 
A further difficulty with the pure survival adjustment is that it takes no account of the 
age of the patients treated.  A given post operative survival gain has the same effect 
on the output index if the treatments have the same cost and volume, even though one 
treats a much younger group of patients. Again this is reasonable if unit costs are 
proportional to health effects since the cost weight adjusts for the effects of 
differences in average age at treatment on health effects.  But if we do not believe that 
unit costs are proportional to health effects we may want to find another means of 
allowing for differences in age across HRGs. 
 
We conclude that adjusting for survival is better than ignoring survival changes. We 
consider in the next two sections how it is possible to improve on a pure survival 
adjustment by combining a little more information (from a small sample of treatments 
where there some information on health effects and from estimates of life expectancy)  
with further assumptions. 
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4.8.2 Incorporating estimates of health effects 
 
To proceed further we must, in the current state of information about the health effects 
of treatment, replace knowledge with additional assumptions.  We consider the 
implications of assuming 
(a) health conditional on treatment is constant from one period to the next for all 
treatments 
1jt jtq q* * +=                (47) 
(b) the ratio of health conditional on surviving treatment to health conditional on no 
treatment is constant over time and the same for all treatments 
/ojt jtq q k* =                (48) 
 
The assumption of efficient allocation (30) by itself does not enable us to claim that a 
simple cost weighted index is what we want: 
1 1 1jt jt jt jtxq
yt j j
jt jt jt jt
x q x c
I
x q x c
+ + += ≠∑ ∑            (49) 
unless the quality of care is constant.  But assumption (30) is useful since we can 
combine it with (47) and (48) to get  
1 1
1 1
jt jt
jt jt jt jtj j
jt jtxq xq
yt ct
jt jt jt jtj j
q a k
x c x c
q a k
I I
x c x c
+ +
+ +
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠= = =
∑ ∑
∑ ∑         (50) 
 
Notice that we cannot make assumptions (30), (47) and (48) and then construct an 
index by applying the quality adjustments factors ajt+1 – k, ajt – k separately to the 
outputs in each year since 
1 1 1 1[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
jt jt jt jt jt t t jtj j
jt jt jt jt jt t t jtj j
x a k c x a k q
x a k c x a k q
λπ
λπ
+ + + +− −=− −
∑ ∑
∑ ∑  
            
* *
1 1 1 1
* *
( / ) ( / )
( / ) ( / )
jt jt j jt jt jt jt jj j
jt jt j jt jt jt jt jj j
x q q q x q q q
x q q q x q q q
+ + + += =∑ ∑∑ ∑                   (51)
   1 1jt jtj xqyt
jt jtj
x q
I
x q
+ +≠ =∑∑                            (52) 
Only if */jt jq q  is the same across all treatments would separate application of the 
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quality adjustments factors ajt+1 – k, ajt – k to xjt+1, xjt produce the correct result.  Our 
assumptions imply that */oj jq q  is constant across treatments, not that 
*/jt jq q  is 
constant across treatments. The difference is that */oj jq q  does not involve the survival 
rate ajt, whereas */jt jq q  = 
* *( ) /ojt j j ja q q q− = */ojt j j jta q q a k− = − does.  To ensure that 
*/jt jq q  is equal across all treatments we would have to make the additional (and 
patently false) assumption that all ajt are equal which then means that ajt+1 must be the 
same across all j, though possibly different from ajt.  Hence the  separate application 
of the quality adjustments factors ajt+1 – k, ajt – k to xjt+1, xjt as in (51) is valid only if 
we can apply the same adjustment factors to all treatments which is equivalent to 
scaling a simple cost weighted index by (at+1 – k)/ (at – k).   
 
From our review of the EQ5D literature and analysis of data from BUPA and York 
NHS Trust (summarised in Appendix C), we have snapshot estimates of health status 
before ( bhl ) and after (
*hl ) for a limited set of treatments.  (See section 6 where we use 
these estimates in a specimen index for the set of treatments to illustrate, inter alia, 
the implications calculating a value weighted index rather than a cost weighted index.) 
We also use these estimates in section 5 to get very rough estimates of the cost 
weighted quality adjusted output index for all activities xqctI  by making assumptions 
(a) and (b) above and using */oh h  - the average value of */bh hl l  for our limited 
sample of treatments - as an estimate of */oj jq q  = k in (50).  We use k = 0.8 as our base 
case but consider variants 0.7 and 0.9. Notice that we are estimating a ratio of sums of 
discounted QALYs by a ratio of health status snapshots. We discuss the implications 
further in section 4.8.3. 
 
 
Clearly the assumptions that the set of treatments for which we happen to have data 
on */bh hl l  are representative of the effects of all NHS treatment is very strong but we 
make it to illustrate the importance of having information on the health effects of 
treatment.    
 
Calculating the index (50) with k set equal to the mean of the values in the sample of 
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procedures for which there are health outcome data creates a problem with some 
activities which appear to have a negative health effect given the assumed value of k 
and the observed value of ajt.  Some activities have high mortality rates so that the 
terms ajt+1 – k, ajt – k in the quality adjustment factor in (50) are close to zero or 
negative.  Small changes in ajt can then to large changes in the index and if both are 
negative the adjustment will indicate negative growth when there has been an 
improvement in output in the sense that 0 > ajt+1 – k > ajt – k.  
 
A negative value of ajt – k implies that the activity has a negative social value.  This 
may be true for some treatments but is clearly incorrect for others, such as terminal 
care.  In the case of terminal care the problem arises from the factorisation of the 
health effects as ajt * ojt jtq q−  where *jtq  is the post treatment health stream conditional 
on survival.  This is not appropriate for terminal care since all treatment ends in death.  
The solution is to reformulate the health gain as total discounted QALYs from start of 
treatment minus ojtq . Terminal care can then have a positive health outcome: patients 
are better off with terminal care than without it.  In other cases the problem may be 
that our estimate of kj as the mean of our sample of procedures for which there are 
outcome data is too large: if we had health data specific to the treatment  ajt – kj would 
be positive.  Finally, it is possible that there are treatments which have a negative 
health effect and no other valuable characteristics: they have a negative social value.  
These create problems for a cost weighted index because they clearly violate the 
underlying assumption that their unit cost measures their social value: unit costs 
cannot be negative.   
 
If we had information on health effects and could use health effect weights (as in (28)) 
then activities with negative or very small social value would not lead to small 
changes in ajt having disproportionate effects on the index because their weight in the 
index would be negative or very small.  
 
In the absence of such information we have to make ad hoc adjustments to calculate 
an index which is not disproportionately sensitive to changes in ajt for activities with 
small or negative ajt – k.  We adopt a cut off rule: if either ajt+1 – k or ajt – k is less 
than a threshold value, say 0.15, we use the pure survival adjustment ajt+1/ajt and 
 63
otherwise we use (ajt+1 – k)/(ajt – k).  We calculate indices with various values of the 
cut off in section 5.4.   
 
Table 4.3 shows the magnitude of the error in the calculated growth rate in the health 
effect for different size errors in the estimated value of */ot tk q q= .  The illustration 
assumes that the survival rate is 0.97 which is not far from the average post-operative 
survival rate.  The assumed proportionate increase in survival and reduction in the 
mortality rate are on the large size, as is the true growth rate in the health effect when 
the true k exceeds 0.70. Notice again that because survival is high the survival growth 
rate (1.03%) is low, and is considerably less than the true growth in the health effect 
in the second column.   The third column shows the error in adjusting purely by 
survival i.e. by setting k = 0.   A pure survival adjustment does worse than assuming a 
positive value of k when the true value of k is 0.71 or above: it does worse when the 
proportionate effect of treatment is smaller.   Our central estimate of k based on the 
small sample of HRGs where there is health effects data is 0.8 and for a true value of 
k = 0.81 we see that the pure survival adjustment is worse than setting k at 0.7, or 0.8. 
 
Table 4.3  Effect of error in estimated k = */ot tq q  on error in calculated growth 
rate in health effect  
 
Year t survival 0.97, mortality 0.03; year t+1 survival 0.98, mortality 0.02; % growth in 
survival 1.03%, % growth in mortality -34%. 
Estimated k 0.0 0.7 0.8 0.9
Estimated growth in health effect 1.03% 3.70% 5.88% 14.29%
True k True growth in health 
effect 
Estimated minus true growth rate in health 
effect 
0.91 16.67% -15.64% -12.96% -10.78% -2.38%
0.85 8.33% -7.30% -4.63% -2.45% 5.95%
0.81 6.25% -5.22% -2.55% -0.37% 8.04%
0.71 3.85% -2.82% -0.14% 2.04% 10.44%
0.51 2.17% -1.14% 1.53% 3.71% 12.11%
0.31 1.52% -0.48% 2.19% 4.37% 12.77%
   
 
The table suggests that even using the same fairly rough and ready estimate of k for 
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all treatments where survival exceeds k by a reasonably margin (say 0.05 or more) 
will be better than just using a pure short term survival adjustment.   
 
 
4.8.3 Life expectancy and health effects 
 
We now consider how it is possible to use information on the age of treated patients to 
modify the survival and health effects adjustments.   
 
Consider a simple example.  Let Ljt be the certain remaining length of life of patients 
who survive treatment j in year t and of those who are not treated.   *jh  and 
o
jh  are the 
levels of health status conditional on treatment and without treatment in all periods 
and these are constant over the remaining life of patients and are not affected by the 
period of treatment (there is no technological progress).  The expected discounted 
health gain from treatment j in period t is  
( )* *
0 0
1 jtjt jt rLL Lrs o rs o
jt jt j j jt j j
eq a h e ds h e ds a h h
r
−
− − ⎛ ⎞−= − = − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ∫                  (53) 
The quality adjustment factor to be applied to the between period t and t + 1 is 
therefore 
( )
( )
1*
11
*
1
1
jt
jt
o rL
jt j jjt
rLo
jt jt j j
a h hq e
q a h h e
+−++
−
− ⎛ ⎞−= ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠
                (54) 
 
Replacing */oj jh h  with the constant k which we estimate from the mean of our sample 
of health effect studies as in the previous section, the quality adjusted cost weighted 
output index analogous to (50) but allowing for changing life expectancy due to 
changes in the mix of patient types is  
( )
( )
1
1
1
1
1
jt
jt
rL
jt
jt jt rLj
jtxa
ct
jt jtj
a k ex c
a k e
I
x c
+−+
+ −
− ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠=
∑
∑                        (55) 
Notice that in section 4.8.2 we assumed that the mean ratio of snapshot health status 
for our small set of specimen HRGs for which such data exists was equal to the ratio 
of sums of discounted QALYs over the lifetime of patients ( */oj jq q ).  Here we make 
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the possibly more plausible assumption that the ratio of snapshot health status values 
is equal to the ratio of snapshot health status without and with treatment ( */oj jh h ). 
 
The adjustment rests on the implicit assumption that all patients in t have the same life 
expectancy Ljt. Since patients generally differ by age and often by gender it will 
matter whether we calculate the life expectancy adjustment using estimates based on 
the mean age and gender of patients jtrLe− = i ijtrE Le− or whether we calculate use ijtrLe−  
for each age and gender group and then use ijtrLEe− .  The difference between ijtrLEe−  
and jtrLe−  is typically very small, less than 0.5% on average for electives.  In section 5 
we report results using both approaches to determine how sensitive the indices are to 
the use of grouped or individual calculations of the life expectancy adjustment.   
 
We use data on age specific health status from the 1996 Health Survey for England 
plus life tables to calculate healthy life expectancy, rather than actual life expectancy 
for use in the output indices.  See Appendix A.  
 
Note that if life expectancy does not change between periods the life expectancy terms 
in (55) cancel out.  Thus the index does not reflect cross treatment differences in age 
at treatment.  The rationale is that we have assumed that costs are proportional to the 
marginal value of treatment so that any differences in average age at treatment which 
affect life expectancy and health gains are already allowed for.  Since we have 
suggested that this assumption is not appealing we have investigated using life 
expectancy with the survival adjustment and estimated health effects in our specimen 
index where we have HRG specific information on the health effects.  We report in 
section 6.4 the results from estimating  
 
( )
( )
1*
1 1
*
(1 )
(1 )
jt
jt
rLo
jt jt j jj
rLo
jt jt j jj
x a h h e
x a h h e
+−+ +
−
− −
− −
∑
∑      (56) 
 
 
4.8.4 Cost of death adjustment 
 
The conclusion from sections 4.8.1 to 4.8.3 is that in the absence of much of the 
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required data on the effects of NHS activity on health we have either to use a simple 
survival adjustment which will have a small effect or to make strong assumptions, 
bolstered by further ad hoc adjustments, in order to incorporate health effects into a 
cost weighted index.  There is a third possibility to which we now turn which replaces 
the assumption of efficient allocation (30) with another assumption about the 
relationship between unit costs and the health effects of treatment. 
 
Instead of making the assumption of efficient allocation (30) to use information on 
costs cjt to make inferences about the effect of treatment on health suppose we assume 
that unit costs are equal to the value of output before making any allowance for death:  
 ( ) ( )ojt t jt jt t jt jt jtc q q q m qp p* *= - = +             (57) 
This implies that health care providers take no account of mortality risk when 
determining treatment and only consider the gain in health from successful treatment. 
Then we can use the assumption to estimate the value of the true health effects, which 
allow for mortality risk, 
 [(1 ) ]ot t jt jt jt jt t jtjt jtq m q q c m qp p p* *= - - = -            (58) 
and the value of the  1jtq +   at period  t value of health is  
 1 1 1 11
o
jt jt
t jt t jt jtjt o
jt jt
q q
q c m q
q q
p p
*
+ + *
+ ++ *
-
= -
-
            (59) 
This gives an estimate of the value weighted index as 
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If nothing is known about  
0
1 1
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jt jt
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q q
q q
*
+ +
*
-
-   we can set  
0
1 1
0 1jt jt
jt jt
q q
q q
*
+ +
*
-
- = . This is equivalent to 
assuming that  ojt j jtq k q*=   for all j and t and  jtq*  1jtq* += .  The index then simplifies 
to  
 
{ }
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*
1 1 1
*
jt jt t jt jtj
x
jt jt t jt jtj
c m q x
I
c m q x
γ π
π
+ + +−= −
∑
∑            (61) 
 
We can interpret t jtqp *  as the cost of death for a patient who would have survived 
treatment. Thus the index in (61) is a cost weighted output index in which we deduct a 
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cost of death from the unit cost of activity.  We can use  tp = £30000,  a value which 
is generally believed consistent with the approach used by NICE in order to calculate  
XI
g  .  However, we still need an estimate of the discounted sum of QALYs obtained 
by the average individual who receives treatment j in periods t  and t+1.  One 
possibility is to assume that jtq*  is proportional to the average expected discounted 
sum of QALYs for people with the same age and gender distribution as those treated 
( ˆ jtq ). We can use general population estimates of QALYs in from the Health Survey 
for England, combined with appropriate life tables. However, we are still left with 
problem of estimating the proportionality factors  fjt ˆ/jt jtq q*= . We would expect the 
factor for patients receiving cataracts to differ from the factor for those undergoing 
heart surgery. 
 
The only source of information from which we can infer patient health post treatment 
is the death rate. One apparently simple and appealing possibility is to employ a 
proportionality factor ( )jt jtf m  = 1 jtm−  with the aim of ensuring that we have an 
index which attaches a low cost of each death to death in those treatments which have 
a high mortality rate.  With this adjustment we obtain the index 
 
( ) ${ }
( ) ${ }
1 1 1 11jt jt t jt jt jtjtj
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∑           (62) 
where ˆ jtq  is estimated from life tables, HSE QALY estimates and the age-gender 
distribution of patients getting treatment j.  Since very few mortality rates exceed 0.5 
we can avoid the difficulty that the cost of death is decreasing with the mortality rate 
when it exceeds 0.5 by setting fjt = 0 when mjt > 0.5. 
 
We experimented with calculations of the index based on a value of £30,000 per 
QALY. We found that the simple proportionality factor fjt  = 1- mjt point to the 
hospital service as a whole subtracting output. There is no practical resolution to this 
bizarre result except to use a scaling factor which several orders of magnitude smaller 
than 1-m.  This would be entirely arbitrary.  In addition, the underlying assumption 
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(57) about the relationship between unit costs and health effects on which the cost of 
death adjustment rests is less acceptable than the efficient allocation assumption made 
elsewhere in our this report.   We do not recommend this approach. 
 
4.8.5 In-hospital versus 30 day mortality  
 
Hospital Episode Statistics have a field indicating whether the patient was dead or 
alive on discharge from hospital.  The data are available from 1988/89 onwards. It is 
also possible, though it requires considerable processing, to match HES records with 
ONS mortality records to count mortality within any required period after admission 
to hospital.  HES has recently introduced a field recording the date of death if the date 
was between the start of the HES year (1 April) and 30 April of the following year (30 
days after the end of the HES year).  Thus is it possible to count deaths in hospital 
plus those within 30 days of discharge.   We assign deaths to HRGs using the HRG of 
the first episode of the spell where a spell consists of more than one episode. 
 
There are three obvious counts of deaths: in hospital deaths, deaths within 30 days of 
admission, in hospital deaths plus deaths within 30 days of discharge. Measuring 
deaths within 30 days of discharge will represent a longer follow up than deaths 
within 30 days of admission.  
 
Some deaths (e.g. road accidents) outside hospital will have nothing to do with the 
quality of NHS care. Moreover, the matching of HES to ONS is not perfect: around 
10% of spells with a discharged dead code according to HES do not have a matching 
ONS death record (see Appendix B).  
 
This suggests that some patients discharged alive but dying within 30 days may not 
have a matching ONS death record. Hence using in hospital deaths from HES plus 
deaths within 30 days after discharge from ONS will understate the 30 day post 
discharge mortality rate.  On the other hand counting only deaths in hospital runs the 
risk of missing deaths which occur outside hospital which are capable of being 
affected by the quality of care.   
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The correlations between in-hospital and 30 day post discharge survival rates for all 
HRGs in 2002/03 are 0.985 for electives and 0.991 for non-electives. (The survival 
rates are based on CIPS since this is our preferred unit of output for the NHS hospital 
sector.) The correlations between the growth rates of the two measures of survival 
rates (in-hospital and 30 day), taken between 2001/02 and 2002/03 are 0.944 for 
electives and 0.994 for non-electives.  
 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 plot the growth rates of in-hospital and 30-day survival rates 
between 2001/02 and 2002/03 for elective HRGs and for non-elective HRGs. These 
growth rates have been Winsorised at the 5th and 95th percentile to remove outlier 
observations.   
 
 
Figure 4.2   Growth rates for in-hospital and 30 day CIPS based survival rates, 
2001/02-2002/03, electives 
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Figure 4.3 Growth rates for in-hospital and 30 day survival rates, 2001/02-
2002/03, non-electives 
 
 
Some HRGs have small numbers of cases (see Appendix B) so that their death rates 
are subject to large random fluctuations. It would be possible to allow for small 
number randomness with various shrinkage estimators but we decided not to do so.  
Precisely because such HRGs have small amounts of activity they will have little 
influence on the survival adjusted indices as they will account for a tiny proportion of 
activity. 
 
We have estimated indices with both types of death rate in section 5.  We feel that at 
the moment the choice between possibly more accurately recorded in hospital deaths 
and the possibly more useful but less well measured 30 day deaths is finely balanced 
but have a mild preference for 30 day mortality.  The data on 30 day deaths should 
continue to improve.  Moreover, there is some evidence that publication of in hospital 
mortality rates in US led to reductions in reported in-hospital mortality for some 
conditions but an increases in reported 30 day deaths (Baker et al., 2002). Use of 
mortality data to quality adjust an output series does not necessitate its use as a 
performance indicator but it seems more prudent to use a mortality measure which is 
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less susceptible to manipulation. 
 
We recommend that the DH continue to encourage the refinement of the record 
linkage and that the short term survival adjustment be based on 30 day deaths.  
   
4.8.6 Conclusions: survival based quality adjustment 
 
In this sub section we have  
• constructed a set of quality adjustments to the cost weighted output index 
which attempt to allow for the changing health effects of treatment.  
• shown how to use estimates on long term survival (say up to five years) when 
these become available (section 4.7).   
• shown how to use existing measures of short term survival (section 4.8.1).  
• demonstrated that the pure survival adjustment will almost certainly 
underestimate the true growth in the effect of treatment on health,  
• shown how guesstimates of the proportional effect of treatment compared to 
no treatment (section 4.8.2) and data on life expectancy (section 4.8.3) can be 
incorporated into survival adjustment.   
• shown that assuming that the unit costs are proportional to health effects when 
mortality risk is ignored, rather than making the standard assumption that 
allocation is efficient and unit costs proportional to health leads to an 
adjustment which takes the form of a deduction of a cost of death from the 
output valued using the unit costs (section 4.8.4).   
We defer judgement on recommending one of these adjustments until we have 
considered the results from calculating them on actual data, either on the whole of the 
hospital sector (section 5) or for our specimen set of HRGs for which we have some 
health effect data (section 6). Section 7 contains calculations based on our preferred 
variant. We wish to see if the resulting estimates of output growth are either 
implausible or overly sensitive to unverifiable assumptions about the parameters. 
However in light of the dubious underlying assumptions about unit costs required to 
derive the cost of death adjustment (section 4.8.4) and some preliminary calculations 
we do not recommend it and so do not report results using it. 
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Table 4.4   Summary of output indices with survival based adjustments 
 
Quality 
adjustments 
Weights Form Rationale 
in section 
Results 
in 
section 
Assumptions Comments 
Long term 
survival 
Costs * *
1 1
1 5*1 *
1
( )
( ) ( )
s
Sjt jt jt
jt jtj s s
jt jt jts
jt jtj
a s
x c
a s s
x c
σ σ δ
σ σ δ
+ +
+ =
=
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑
∑  
4.7 Not yet 
feasible 
Efficient allocation. * ( )jth s  
constant s = 1,…,5; zero s >5.  
( )ojth s  = 0 all s.  
Survival increases in more 
costly HRGs have bigger 
impact. 
Survival. Costs 
1
1
jt
jt jtj
jt
jt jtj
a
c x
a
c x
+
+
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  
4.8.1 5.4.1, 
6.3 
Efficient allocation.   Survival growth has larger 
effect if HRG more costly.  
Underestimates true growth.  
Impact of survival unaffected 
by age of those treated. 
Survival.  
Health 
effect. 
Costs 
1
1
jt j
jt jtj
jt j
jt jtj
a k
x c
a k
x c
+
+
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  
4.8.2 5.4.2, 
6.4 
Efficient allocation.  *jtq , 
o
jtq  
constant. Same proportionate 
effect of treatment on QALYs 
with and without treatment, 
all HRGs  ( */oj jq q k= ) in 
sec 5, 6. kj varies across j in 
section, 7. 
Quality growth has larger 
effect if HRG more costly.  
Quality adjustment unaffected 
by age of those treated.  
Requires adjustment set to 
ajt+1/ajt survival rate low 
(close to k) to avoid instability 
in index 
 
Survival. 
Health 
effect.  Life 
expectancy. 
Costs ( )
( )
1
1
1
1
1
jt
jt
rL
jt
jt jt rLj
jt
jt jtj
a k ex c
a k e
x c
+−+
+ −
− ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠∑
∑  
4.8.3 5.4.3 Efficient allocation. *jth , 
o
jth  
constant; same proportionate 
effect of treatment on health 
status all HRGs in sec 5, 6.  kj 
varies across j in section, 7. 
Certain life; same for treated 
and untreated; same for all 
patients in HRG 
Quality growth has larger 
effect if HRG more costly.  
Requires adjustment set to 
ajt+1/ajt survival rate low 
(close to k) to avoid instability 
in index 
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Survival. 
Life 
expectancy. 
Life 
expectancy ( )( )( )( )
1*
1 1
*
1
1
jt
jt
rLo
jt jt j jj
rLo
jt jt j jj
x a h h e
x a h h e
+−
+ +
−
− −
− −
∑
∑  
4.8.3 6.4 *
jth , 
o
jth  constant. Certain 
life; same for treated and 
untreated; same for all 
patients in HRG 
 
Cost of 
death 
Costs ( ) ${ }
( ) ${ }
1 1 1 11jt jt t jt jt jtjtj
jt jt t jt jt jtjtj
c m f m q x
c m f m q x
π
π
+ + + ++−
−
∑
∑  
4.8.5 Not 
reported 
Cost proportional to health 
effect ignoring mortality risk 
Requires proportionality 
factor fjt to be very small to 
avoid negative output 
cjt unit cost, volume xjt volume;  ajt, mlt   proportion patients alive, dead on discharge (or after 30 days);  *jh constant health status conditional on surviving treatment. 
o
jh  
constant health status if not treated. *( )t sσ  probability of surviving s years; k estimate of proportionate effect of treatment on quality adjusted life years (QALYs); Ljt life 
expectancy at mean age of patients treated; r discount rate on QALYs; πt value of QALY (£s); ˆ jtq  QALYs lost by death of average patient; fjt(mjt) proportionality factor 
measuring seriousness of HRG. 
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4.9 Readmissions 
 
4.9.1 Readmissions as health effects 
 
A non-trivial proportion of patients are readmitted to hospital within 28 days of 
discharge as emergencies. Figure 4.4 shows a rise in these readmissions over time, 
with the data being described in more detail in the Appendix. Some of these 
readmissions will reflect poor quality care, in that with proper care the readmission 
would not have occurred (Hofer and Hayward, 1995; Ludke et al, 1993; Thomas, 
1996). However, it is not possible from these data to distinguish whether some failure 
of treatment occurred during the first hospital stay because “readmissions” are defined 
as any emergency admission at all within 28 days of discharge, whether or not they 
were related to the earlier admission.  
 
Since 2001 readmission rates have been used by the Department of Health, CHI and 
the Healthcare Commission, as performance indicators for NHS Trusts.   In this 
section we discuss whether and how readmissions should be used to quality adjust a 
cost weighted output index to reflect poor quality care on first admission. Since 
readmissions may also be a distressing experience for patients per se, irrespective of 
the consequences of poor care at first admission for their health, we also consider in 
section 4.9.2 how to adjust for readmissions as an aspect of the patient experience.  
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Figure 4.4 Emergency readmission to hospital within 28 days of discharge, by 
age band 
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Source: Department of Health 
 
For some procedures a proportion of patients will be readmitted because of 
complications arising from the treatment. Let 1jtx  be the number of first admissions 
and 2jtx  be the number of readmission, so that the readmission rate is Rjt = 
2 1/jt jtx x . 
The readmissions may be in a different HRG but this is allowed for in the notation 
since 2jtx  is the number of readmissions to whatever is the appropriate HRG for 
readmissions for unsuccessful treatments from the initial HRG j.   
 
If the first admission is successful the health gain to the patient is 1* 1ojt jtq q−  (assume 
for the moment that there is no mortality risk for admissions or readmissions).  If the 
operation is unsuccessful (probability Fjt) and they are not readmitted the effect of the 
first admission for this unsuccessful group 2 1o ojt jtq q− .  But if they are readmitted they 
get a health gain from readmission, compared to having no readmission, of 2* 2ojt jtq q− .  
We assume that the interval between admission and readmission is short enough to 
ignore any effect of an unsuccessful first admission on health for the time between 
admissions or that health change after an unsuccessful first admission is zero.    
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The value of total health gain is 
1 1* 1 1 2 1( )(1 ) ( )o o ot jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jtj x q q F x F q qπ ⎡ − − + −⎣∑  2 2* 2( )ojt jt jtx q q ⎤+ − ⎦   (63) 
If the NHS maximises the value of health subject to the constraints that total cost does 
not exceed the NHS budget and that 1 2 0jt jt jtF x x− ≥ , then  
( ) ( ) ( )1 1* 1 2 11 o o ojt t t jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jtc F q q F q q Fλπ µ⎡ ⎤= − − + − +⎣ ⎦   (64)  
( )2 2* 2ojt t t jt jt jtc q qλπ µ⎡ ⎤= − −⎣ ⎦  
     ( ) ( ) ( )1* 1 2* 1 21 o ot t t jt jt t jt jt t jtR q q R q q R cλπ ⎡ ⎤= − − + − −⎣ ⎦    (65) 
where jtµ  is the Lagrange multiplier on 1 2 0jt jt jtF x x− ≥  and λt is the reciprocal of the 
multiplier on the budget constraint.  Consider solutions in which all those for whom 
the first treatment is not successful are readmitted Fjt = Rjt so that the constraint binds 
and  jtµ  > 0. (This makes no essential difference to the conclusions.)  We can 
substitute for jtµ  in (64) to get  
( ) ( ) ( )1 1* 1 2* 1 21 o ojt t t t jt jt t jt jt t jtc R q q R q q R cλπ ⎡ ⎤= − − + − −⎣ ⎦    (66) 
 
In allocating resources to first admissions allowance must be made for the fact that 
with probability Fjt = Rjt the patient will have an unsuccessful first admission and then 
be readmitted, getting a health gain 2* 1ojt jtq q−  but generating additional costs 2jtc .  The 
health gain when Fjt = Rjt is  
1 1* 1 2 2* 1( )(1 ) ( )o ot jt jt jt jt jt jt jtj x q q R x q qπ ⎡ ⎤− − + −⎣ ⎦∑      (67) 
 
Current practice is to calculate a cost weighted outcome index (CWOI) which 
includes both first and subsequent admissions  
1 1 2 2
1 1
1 1 2 2
jt jt jt jtj
jt jt jt jtJ
x c x c
x c x c
+ +⎡ ⎤+⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+⎣ ⎦
∑
∑        (68) 
If there is efficient allocation ((65) and (66) hold) and if there is no change in health 
effects or in the readmission rate then the CWOI (68) equals the value weighted 
output index  
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∑   (69)   
To show this use (65) and (66) and write the denominator in (68) is 
    ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 1* 1 2 2* 11 o ot t jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jtj x R q q R x q qλπ µ µ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − + + − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑  
          ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 1* 1 2 2* 11 o ot t jt jt jt jt jt jt jtj x R q q x q qλπ ⎡ ⎤= − − + −⎣ ⎦∑  (70) 
which is proportional to the value of period t health output at the period t price of 
health.     Each term in the denominator of  (68) can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 1 2 1 1* 1 2* 11 1 1 11 o ojt jt jt jt jt t t jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jtx c R c x R q q R R q qλπ µ µ+ + + +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ = − − + + − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
which, with the assumption of a constant readmission rate and constant health effects, 
is  
( ) ( ) ( )1 1* 1 2 2* 11 1 1 1 1 1 11 o ot t jt jt jt jt jt jt jtx R q q x q qλπ + + + + + + +⎡ ⎤− − + −⎣ ⎦   (71) 
Hence the numerator in (68) is λt time the value of health output in period t +1 at 
period t price of health.  
               
Thus no adjustment need be made to the cost weighted output index for readmissions 
if there is efficient allocation and if there are no change in health effects or 
readmission rates.  This is just a particular example of the result we noted in section 
2.7.  The conclusion holds if we relax the assumption that the time period between 
first and second admission is very short so that the change in health over this time 
interval can be ignored. It also holds if we allow for a non-zero mortality risk. What 
matters is the assumption, underlying the use of the cost weighted output index, that 
allocation of resources is efficient.   
 
Notice that the conclusion does not mean that readmissions do not affect the quality of 
care, nor does it mean that performance indicators for Trusts based on readmission 
rates do measure anything of interest.  Increases in readmission rates, ceteris paribus, 
reduce welfare.  But on the assumptions made above readmissions are already allowed 
for in the simple cost weighted index. 
 
If health effects change but readmission rates do not, then the quality adjustment of 
the index raises exactly the same issues as discussed in earlier sections. Suppose that 
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readmission rates change but that the health effects 1* 1ojt jtq q− , 2* 1ojt jtq q−  do not, and that 
the assumption of efficient allocation holds.  Is there an adjustment to the CWOI 
which ensures that it also measures the change in the value of health effects?   
 
We require adjustment factors φ which ensure that  
   ( )( ) ( )1 2 1* 1 2* 11 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) 1o ojt jt jt t t jt jt jt jt jt jtc R c q q R q q Rφ φ λπ+ + + + + + +⎡ ⎤⋅ + ⋅ = − − + −⎣ ⎦  (72) 
where the adjustment factors can depend only on variables we know (or assume).  In 
general the adjustment factors will depend on the health effects and, if we are 
unwilling to make any assumptions about them, there is no set of adjustment factors 
depending on cost and readmission rates which will satisfy (72).  But if we are willing 
to make assumptions about 1* 1ojt jtq q− , 2* 1ojt jtq q−  then we can make a little progress.  
Suppose that:  
( ) ( )2* 1 1* 1ˆo ojt jt j jt jtq q k q q− = −  ( ) ( )2* 1 1* 11 1 1 1ˆo ojt jt j jt jtq q k q q+ + + +− = −  (73) 
then by substituting (65) and (66) in the left hand side of (72) we can show that the 
required adjustment factors are  
 1 11 2 1
1
ˆ(1 )
,ˆ(1 )
jt j jt jt
jtjt j jt
R k R R
RR k R
φ φ φ+ +
+
− += =− +     (74) 
Thus for example if ˆ 1jk =  so that readmission treatment has the same health effect as 
the successful first treatment 
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+ + + + + + +⎡ ⎤− − + −⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤− − + −⎣ ⎦
∑
∑  (75) 
and the CWOI with readmission costs scaled by Rjt/Rjt+1 is identical to the value 
weighted health effect index.  The intuition is that if the health gain from readmission 
is the same as the health gain from a successful first admission then the only effect of 
a change in the readmission rate is via the increase in the total cost of readmissions. If 
Rjt+1 < Rjt then output, other things equal, must have increased: the cost saving on 
readmissions can be used to produce more health from a given budget. 
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If we were to take account of readmission rates in our comprehensive index, we 
would require readmission rates Rjt for HRG j in period t. This data is not routinely 
generated and at present is not readily usable in a productivity index in the way 
required for the adjustment in (75) 
 
First, since HRGs are assigned at episode level and having linked episodes into spells 
(CIPS), a spell may have more than one HRG within it. A readmission may or may 
not be related to any of the HRGs which occur in the index admission. There is as yet 
no agreed method for assigning an HRG to a CIPS where there are possibly multiple 
episodes and multiple diagnoses. In the construction of CIPS in this report, we have 
assigned the HRG to the first episode of care in the admission, but as mentioned, a 
readmission may not be related to the first HRG, or any others in the CIP spell. A 
spell-based HRG assignment methodology has been developed for Payment by 
Results which looks for the 'dominant' procedure / diagnosis / HRG across episodes, 
but this is based on a provider spell rather than CIPS and again, the readmission may 
not be linked to the 'dominant' HRG. 
 
Second, it is impossible, with available data, to distinguish between readmissions due 
to poor treatment (the element we wish to capture in the index) and readmissions due 
to patients being generally sick and prone to getting ill. One way of trying to make a 
judgement on this may be to examine whether a readmission is linked to a previous 
discharge, but this will be extremely complex and would need to be considered for 
each HRG. Indeed, the readmission could be related to any of the conditions in the 
spell, not necessarily the HRG coded in the CIP spell. It is possible for a readmission 
to be due to neglect or poor care and yet apparently entirely unrelated to the set of 
HRGs in the index admission.  
 
We conclude that the data do not yet support the kind of adjustment to reflect the 
health effects of treatment considered in this section.  A more fundamental objection 
may be that the method rests on the standard assumption that unit costs are 
proportional to the value of treatments. In the case of readmissions this assumption is 
more than usually questionable.  In the next section we sketch a more ad hoc, less 
theoretically grounded method which might command more support, though it also 
subject to the same data problems. 
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4.9.2 Readmissions (and clinical errors and MRSA) as a deadweight loss  
 
An alternative view of readmissions, which can also be applied to clinical errors and 
MRSA, can in principle be constructed within the confines of the cost weighted index, 
if the extra costs associated with these can be identified. The general principle of the 
cost weighted index is that costs are proportional to benefits. If follows from this that 
if there are some components of cost which are unrelated to benefits, then these 
should be omitted from the index. In other words if the costs of treating MRSA, 
directly associated with readmission as a consequence of plainly premature discharge 
or clinical errors could be identified these should be omitted from the quality-
augmented cost weighted index. 
 
The HRG costs include those elements of cost which are unrelated to benefit but 
which instead arise from poor provision of medical services. This means that in order 
to calculate the change in the value of output at constant prices we should deduct from 
both the numerator and denominator the costs which represent money wasted. If one 
wanted to represent not only the money wasted but also the disutility arising from 
such activity, then these deductions should be augmented. 
 
In this exercise there is a risk of double-counting. If either MRSA or premature 
discharge affects mortality rates, then this is already taken into account. In the quality 
adjusted index. Thus the index set out here can be defended only if one is sure that 
this is not the case.  
 
If we take an output, we then deduct from the value of output in constant prices the 
expenditures on bads arising from poor provision. We assume that bad j has a cost bjtc  
associated with it, and that there are bjtx  examples of bad j. The index then becomes, 
in the example of the survival and life expectancy adjusted index  
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−
∑ ∑
∑ ∑      (76) 
There is an obvious similarity with the cost of death index of section 4.8.4, but with 
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the important difference that the cost of death has to be inferred as best one can from 
information about the value put on life, while the costs associated with poor service 
provision can in principle be identified through cost accounting.    
 
We do not recommend this adjustment given the poor state of the data on 
readmissions, and the costs of associated with readmissions and MRSA.  We do 
illustrate the effect of this type of adjustment in section 5 using data on readmissions 
and MRSA.  We could find no usable data on clinical errors but in principle they 
could be incorporated in the same way.   
 
4.10 Waiting times 
 
Waits for diagnostic tests and treatment may affect individuals in two ways.  First, 
they may dislike waiting per se irrespective of the effect of treatment on discounted 
sum of their quality adjusted life year (qjt). Thus waiting time is regarded as a separate 
characteristic of health care, distinct from its effect on health. Second, longer waits 
can reduce the health gain from treatment and the waiting adjustment is akin to a 
scaling factor multiplying the health effect.  
 
Although currently the data do not exist to provide satisfactory estimates of the first 
type of effect of waiting, section 4.10.1 sets out how such data can be used when it 
becomes available.  We then turn in subsequent sections to consider how estimates of 
the second type of effect can be made with current data.  
 
The total wait is the sum of the wait for a first outpatient appointment after referral 
from a GP, plus possible further waits for subsequent outpatient appointments for 
results of tests, plus the wait from the date the patient is placed on the waiting list for 
inpatient treatment. We ignore these distinct components of the total waiting time 
because currently data do not permit tracking of individual patients in order to 
calculate their total time waited. This limitation is likely to be rectified in future with 
data being collected in order to monitor achievement of the 18 week target for total 
waiting times. But given current limitations, in our empirical analysis we assess 
waiting time after a patient has been placed on the list for an inpatient admission. In 
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section 4.10.5 how to include an outpatient waiting time adjustment. 
 
 
4.10.1 Waiting time as a characteristic 
 
The first way to quality adjust the output index to reflect changing waiting times is to 
use direct monetary valuation of reductions in waiting times.  Let πwjt be the value of a 
reduction of one day in waiting time for treatment j in year t.  The value of the output 
of  j in year t is the sum of the values of its characteristics: health gain (qhjt) and 
waiting time (qwjt = wjt) : 
 ˆ[ ] [ ]jt jt jt jt ht hjt wjt wjt jt ht hjt wjt jty x p x q q x q wπ π π π= = + = −            (77) 
Notice that we assume that the value of a day’s wait depends on the treatment waited 
for so that (77) differs from (10). The value weighted index (12) becomes  
 1 1 1jt ht hjt wjt jtj
jt ht hjt wjt jtj
x q w
x q w
π π
π π
+ + +⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦
∑
∑            (78) 
We report in section 6 calculations of (78) based on estimates of the health effect for a 
small subset of HRGs in a specimen index.  
 
If we make the assumption of efficient allocation we can derive the quality adjusted 
cost weighted index where we take account of both health and waiting time as 
characteristics is a special case of (21) 
   1 11 ht jt wjt jtjt jt jtxqct j
jt jt jtht jt wjt jt j
q wx c x
I
x c xq w
π π
π π
+ ++ ⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦∑ ∑  
         1 1 1 1jt jt ht jt jt jt wjt jt jt jt
j
jt jt jt jt jt jtht jt wjt jt ht jt wjt jt j
x q q x w w c x
x q x w c xq w q w
π π
π π π π
+ + + +⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− −⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
∑ ∑   
         ( )1 (1 ) (1 )ht hjt wjt jt jtxjt qhjt qwjt ctj
jt jt
q w
g g g
p p
π π ω⎡ ⎤= + + − +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑                        (79) 
 
This index requires data on the amount of health gain qjt for each treatment in order to 
calculate the value share /ht hjt jtq pπ  due to health. We do not have such data for all 
HRGs and the survival adjustments considered in section 4.8 are inadequate since 
they used to estimate growth rates not levels of health.  Thus with available data we 
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cannot calculate (79).  The kind of data on health before and after treatment that we 
recommend in section 10 would enable such an index to be calculated.  
 
We have calculated a specimen index for (79) for the small subset of treatments where 
we have snapshot estimates of the health effects (see section 6).  We require the 
monetary value of health ( htπ ) and of waiting times (πwjt) to calculate this index. For 
πht we use the monetary value of the QALY implied by the decisions of public bodies, 
such as the National Institute of Clinical Excellence and the Department for Transport 
(see Devlin and Parkin, 2004; Carthy et al., 1999). We estimate the value of waiting 
time from the studies reported in Ryan et al. (2004).  Note that, even with πwt of the 
order of £10 per day, since waiting times are short compared with the horizon over 
which health gains are enjoyed, the effect of the waiting time adjustment may not be 
large.   
 
It is possible to calculate (79) without data on the magnitude of the health effects if 
we are willing to make further assumptions about the relative importance of health 
and waiting time characteristics.  Thus if we believe that the health effect of treatment 
is say 10 times as important as the waiting time then we can set /ht hjt jtq pπ  = 10/9 
which implies /wt jt jtw pπ  =  1/9 since the sum of the value shares must be 1.  We 
have not done so in this report because we can think of no sensible method of 
estimating the relative importance of health and waiting times characteristics in the 
absence of data on health effects and the relative marginal social values of health and 
waiting times.  
 
 
4.10.2 Waiting time as a scaling factor 
 
Delay may also lead to a reduced health effect qjt from treatment. This can arise 
because (a) the condition of the patient deteriorates whilst they wait; (b) the post 
treatment level of health status may be reduced; and (c) if treatment is delayed the 
time over which the benefits from treatment accrue may be reduced. 
 
Figure 4.5 illustrates the effect of reduction in waiting times on the health effects of 
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treatment.  Initially we drop the subscripts for characteristics (since only health gain 
matters) and for type of treatment.  ho(s) is the without treatment health status at time 
s (time is measured from the date at which the patient begins to wait).  The waiting 
time in year t is wt and the time path of health with the treatment is h*(s;wt). In the 
following year the waiting time falls to wt+1 and the health time path is  h*(s;wt+1). We 
assume that the change in the time path is due solely to the reduced wait for treatment, 
not to changes in technology. The dashed lines show the expected time streams given 
the treatment mortality probability and allow for a possible effect of reduced wait on 
the mortality probability.   In Figure 4.5 the fact that  ho(s) is declining means that 
earlier treatment prevents a deterioration in health.  The fact that h*(s;wt+1) > h*(s;wt) 
implies that earlier treatment leads to better post treatment health. The fact that the 
individual lives for longer post treatment means that they have longer to enjoy their 
improved health.  
 
A recent survey of the literature (Hurst and Siciliani, 2003) found some evidence on 
deterioration and premature death associated with waiting for cardiology treatment 
but little for other procedures.  Clinical reassessment of patients on a waiting list was 
thought to contribute to reduction in adverse outcomes of waiting but there is little 
data on the frequency or efficiency of re-classification of patients on waiting lists.  If 
the NHS begins the routine collection of data on health related quality of life, the 
QALY improvement due to reduced waiting time should be captured by trend changes 
in QALYs.   
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Figure 4.5   Effect of reduced waiting times on time streams of health 
 
 
 
There are two possible ways to measure the effect of treatment and hence of the effect 
of changes in waiting times.  The first is to value treatment at the time the patient is 
placed on the waiting list: health effects are therefore discounted to this date.  The 
second is to value treatment at the date it is actually received: health effects are 
discounted to the date of treatment.  If we do not wish to quality adjust with respect to 
waiting times or if we are dealing with non-electives we do not need to take account 
of the difference between the two approaches.  
 
4.10.2.1 Discounting to start of wait 
 
If the patient is placed on the waiting list at time 0 the expected health gain discounted 
to that date is 
* ( ) *
0 0( ) (1 ) ( ; ) ( )
o
t t t t t t
t
w L w w L wo rs rs o rs
t t t t t twq h s e ds m h s w e ds h s e ds
+ +− − −= + − −∫ ∫ ∫        (80) 
where we subscript time paths to allow for the possibility of technological change 
across periods. *,ot tL L  are life expectancies without and with treatment measured from 
the date of treatment.  Thus ot tL w+ , *t tL w+  are life expectancies measured from the 
date placed on the list.    r is the discount rate applied to health. Collecting terms  
(1-mt)h*(s;wt) 
h*(s;wt+1)
wtwt+1 
ho(s) 
h*(s;wt) 
h 
(1-mt+1)h*(s;wt+1) 
Time since placed on waiting list 
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* ( ) * *(1 ) ( ; ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
o
t t t t
t t
L w w L wrs o rs o
t t t t t t t t t tw wq m h s w e ds h s e ds m q w q w
+ +− −= − − = − −∫ ∫   (81) 
which is similar in form to the expression (26) for the health effect in the discussion 
of quality adjustment by mortality. 
 
In general we will be unsuccessful in seeking a simple method of quality adjusting for 
changes in survival and in waiting times which is equivalent to the quality adjustment 
for survival derived in section 3.1, even with the assumption about unchanging 
technologies employed to construct the survival quality adjustment.  The reason is that 
the survival probability enters the expression for health gain linearly but this is not 
true for the waiting time, as inspection of (80) reveals.   
 
Only if further assumptions are made about the shape of the time paths of health status 
with and without treatment is it possible to derive a simple quality adjustment 
reflecting both survival and waiting times.  The non-linearity of the waiting time 
adjustment also raises questions about whether the adjustment should be made on the 
basis of average waiting times applied to all cases of a particular type or whether we 
should use make the adjustment for each case separately and sum over the cases 
within each treatment type.  We discuss this point further in section 4.10.4.    
 
To get a reasonably simple expression for the waiting time adjustment, suppose the 
time paths *,ot th h  are constant with respect to elapsed time after the patient is placed 
on the waiting list, are unaffected by waiting time, do not change from one year to the 
next, and that total life expectancy is unaffected by treatment and waiting time: 
o
t tL w+  *( )t tL w w= + . (Remember that *,ot tL L  are life expectancies without and with 
treatment measured from the date of treatment.)   To simplify notation in this case 
where life expectancy from date of treatment is unaffected by treatment we use otL  
*
tL=  = Lt .  Figure 4.6 illustrates. 
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Figure 4.6 Health gain and waiting time – simple case 
 
 
 
The health gain from treatment in Figure 4.6  
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 * *( ) jt jt jtjt jt
jt
rw r L w
w Lo rs o
jt t jt jt jt jt jt jtw
e e
q w a h h e ds a h h
r
− − +
+ − −= − = −∫  
       ( ) ( )* 1jt jtrw rLojt jt jt e ea h h r
− −−
= −                             (82) 
Waiting has a cost, in units of health, which increases with the length of the wait but 
at a decreasing rate: an extra day after a long wait costs less than an extra delay after a 
short wait. The cost of a positive wait measured in terms of QALYs can be defined as 
this formula as 
 ( ) ( )*1 1 1( ) (0) ( ) 1 1t to rw rLt t tt t t t t a h hw q q w e erκ − −⎛ ⎞−⎡ ⎤= − = − −⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠          (83) 
 
The discounted health effect (82) is convex in the waiting time: increases in the wait 
reduce the quality of care but do so at a decreasing rate.  Thus the gain from a 
reduction in the waiting time from 40 weeks to 39 weeks is less than the gain from a 
reduction from 10 to 9 weeks.  It has been suggested (Atkinson, 2005; 119) that the 
value of waiting time is more plausibly concave in the waiting time: the value of 
reductions is greater the longer the wait.   
(1-m)h*(s;wt) 
h*(s;wt+1) 
wtwt+1 
ho(s) 
h*(s;wt) 
h 
(1-m)h*(s;wt+1) 
Time since placed on list 
 88
The convexity of the health effect in the waiting time implies that an increase in the 
dispersion of waiting times, holding the mean wait constant, increases the average 
value of treatment.  This seems counter-intuitive.6 
 
The quality adjustment factor is 
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and the cost weighted index with a waiting time adjustment is  
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The use of the adjustment factor (84) requires estimates of life expectancy for 
patients. If we do not wish to use such estimates because we feel they are unreliable 
we can instead use  
1
*
1 ( )1
*
(1 ) /
(1 ) /
t t
o
t r w wt
o
t t
m h hq e
q m h h
++ − −+ ⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦
             (86) 
1 /t trw rwe e+− −  will have the same sign as ( ) ( )1 11 / 1t t t trw rL rw rLe e e e+ +− − − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ .  If life 
expectancy increases from t to t+1 then the adjustment using only 1 /t trw rwe e+− −  will 
understate growth and will overstate growth if life expectancy falls. Using only 
1 /t trw rwe e+− −  and ignoring life expectancy is equivalent to assuming that life 
expectancy does not change.  
 
 
Given the general lack of information on health with and without treatment we can 
use an estimate of the mean value of */oj jh h  (k) from a small sample of treatments (see 
                                                 
6 Although the conclusion that a mean preserving increase in dispersion is welfare increasing is 
counter-intuitive, similar conclusions hold in other contexts. For example, a mean preserving spread in 
the distribution of prices of a good faced by a consumer who is risk neutral towards income will, if the 
consumer observes the price before buying the good, reduce expected utility.  It is essential to specify 
the decision context carefully and in particular whether uncertainty is resolved before or after decisions 
are taken.  In the case of consumer price uncertainty, it can be shown that if the consumer decides on 
consumption before the price is revealed and if she is averse to income risk then she is made worse off 
by a mean preserving increase in the dispersion of prices.  
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section 4.8.2).  If we feel that this estimate is too unreliable we can set */oj jh h  = 0 in 
the index (85)  and apply the adjustment for waiting with a pure survival adjustment.  
 
Notice that we have applied the same discount rate to all types of treatment. The 
formulation of the health gain as having the same value whatever the type of 
treatment which underpins xawctI implies that the same discount rate should be applied 
to waits for heart bypass operations [HRG E04] as for varicose vein stripping [HRG 
Q11].  The differences in the health gains from the two treatments is already reflected 
in the index because it is in the cost weights which we have assumed are identical to 
the value weights.  If we think that the assumption of proportionality of unit costs and 
marginal social values (30) is incorrect we could argue for using a higher discount 
rate for heart bypass waits than for varicose vein waits.  However, this would be an ad 
hoc adjustment to a problem ( jt t jtc pλ≠ ) which is better tackled more directly by 
adjusting the weights rather than the discount rates.  
 
Because we treat waiting times as delaying health improvement we have also applied 
the same discount rate to waiting times and life expectancy.  It is possible that people 
may feel differently about future health whilst waiting for treatment and when they 
have been treated and apply a discount rate whilst waiting for treatment of rw but a 
rate of rL < rw after treatment .   The health effect would be  
          1' *
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jt jt jt jt jtw L L
jt
w w L w Lr s r s r so o
jt jt jt jtw
q h e ds a h e ds h e ds
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         ( ) ( )* 1(1 ) (1 ) L jt L jtw jt L jt r w r Lr w r wo ojt jt jt jt
w L L
e ee eh a h h
r r r
− −− − −⎡ ⎤− −= − + −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
    (87) 
 
 
4.10.2.2 Discounting to date of treatment with charge for waiting 
 
We measure activity when it takes place which suggests that we should measure the 
benefit from treatment at the time it takes place. This is what we did in section 4.8.3 
when discussing life expectancy and health effects.  But with such assumption the 
discounted sum of QALYs, is, continuing with the simple assumptions about the time 
streams of health used in the previous section and in section 4.8.3, just  
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To capture the welfare lost as a result of having to wait for treatment we use a charge 
for waiting which is offset against (53) which captures only the benefit for the life 
span from date of treatment. As with any cumulating debt, interest is charged on the 
cost of waiting:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )*2 * 0 1jt jt
o
w jt jt jt rwo rs
jt jt jt jt
a h h
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r
κ −= − = −∫                                     (88) 
The effect of treatment after adjustment for waiting time is now 
( ) 02 * 0 jt jtjtL rwo rsjt jt jt jt wq a h h e ds e−− −⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫  
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o
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−− ⎡ ⎤= − −⎣ ⎦        (89) 
 
2
jtq  is decreasing and convex in the waiting time so that an increase in an already long 
wait has a greater effect than the same increase in a short wait.  Moreover an increase 
in the dispersion of waits reducing the expected value of treatment and there is  a non-
trivial cost of waiting even for the very young.   
 
We can also allow for the possibility that the interest charge on waiting time differs 
from the interest rate on future QALYs:  
( ) 02 * 0 jt w jtL jtL r wr sojt jt jt jt wq a h h e ds e−′ − −⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫  
           ( ) ( ) ( )* 1 1L jt w jtr L r wojt jt jt
L w
e e
a h h
r r
−⎡ ⎤− −⎢ ⎥= − −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
         (90)  
 
A difficulty with (89) is that it is theoretically possible for 2jtq  to be very small or even 
negative (if 2jt jtrw rLe e−> − ) even if * ojt jt jta h a−  is positive.  The same possibility arises 
with (90).  However, this will only be a problem when the waiting time is similar to 
life expectancy.  Table 4.5 has illustrative calculations for an example in which the 
health effects and life expectancy do not change from period t to period t+1illustrates 
for examples.  Only in the three italicised cells where life expectancy and the waiting 
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times are similar do we observe nonsensical results where a reduction in waiting time 
leads to a very large or a negative adjustment.  Otherwise the results are in line with 
intuition: the effect of a reduction in waiting time is greater at higher waits and for 
shorter life expectancy.   
 
For all except the very shortest life expectancies a given percentage reduction in the 
waiting time implies a smaller percentage increase in quality adjusted output. The 
reason is that the waiting time is in general small relative to the length of time over 
which any health improvement will be enjoyed.  The reductions are however in 
general not trivial. For example, reductions in waiting time from 120 to 90 days 
increases the growth rate by between 1.8% for life expectancy of 5 years and 0.35% 
for life expectancy of 30 years.   
 
Table 4.5 (a)  Waiting time adjustment qjt+1/qjt: discounting to date treated with a 
charge for waiting (rw = rL = 1.5%, no change in health effects and life expectancy 
between period t and t+1) 
Life expectancy (years) Reduction in 
wait  (days) 0.5 1 2 5 10 20 30 
10 to 0 1.0582 1.0284 1.0141 1.0057 1.0030 1.0016 1.0011 
30 to 10 1.1319 1.0602 1.0290 1.0116 1.0060 1.0032 1.0023 
60 to 30 1.2469 1.0995 1.0456 1.0177 1.0090 1.0048 1.0034 
90 to 60 1.3283 1.1106 1.0478 1.0180 1.0091 1.0048 1.0034 
120 to 90 1.4897 1.1245 1.0503 1.0184 1.0092 1.0049 1.0035 
150 to 120 1.9621 1.1424 1.0530 1.0188 1.0093 1.0049 1.0035 
180 to 150 27.2659 1.1663 1.0561 1.0191 1.0094 1.0049 1.0035 
365 to 150 -0.1686 -38.6866 1.6183 1.1563 1.0719 1.0366 1.0257 
 
Table 4.5 (b) Waiting time adjustment qjt+1/qjt: discounting to date treated with a 
charge for waiting (rw = 10%, rL = 1.5%, no change in health effects and life 
expectancy between period t and t+1) 
Life expectancy (years) Reduction in 
wait (days) 0.5 1 2 5 10 20 30 
10 to 0 1.0583 1.0284 1.0141 1.0057 1.0030 1.0016 1.0011 
30 to 10 1.1326 1.0605 1.0292 1.0116 1.0060 1.0032 1.0023 
60 to 30 1.2503 1.1006 1.0461 1.0179 1.0091 1.0049 1.0035 
90 to 60 1.3376 1.1129 1.0488 1.0184 1.0093 1.0049 1.0035 
120 to 90 1.5161 1.1285 1.0517 1.0189 1.0094 1.0050 1.0036 
150 to 120 2.0850 1.1488 1.0550 1.0194 1.0096 1.0051 1.0036 
180 to 150 -10.6470 1.1766 1.0587 1.0199 1.0098 1.0051 1.0036 
365 to 150 -0.1420 -9.6840 1.6882 1.1679 1.0768 1.0390 1.0274 
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4.10.3 Optimal waiting times 
 
All the waiting time adjustments considered above assume that a reduction in waiting 
time is always of value – shorter waiting times are better than longer.  It has been 
suggested that to us that the assumption may not be valid for very short waiting times 
because some patients find treatment at very short notice to be inconvenient.  It would 
be possible to conduct patient surveys or stated preference experiments to determine 
optimal waits and the costs associated with departures from them.  But in the absence 
of such data we have to fall back on some crude assumptions which nevertheless 
enable us to determine how much impact such consideration might have.  We have 
therefore investigated the implications of replacing the measure of waiting time wjt in 
the waiting time adjustments considered in previous sections with ˆ jtw  = min(wjt – 
w*,0).  This has the effect of increasing the proportionate effect of a given reduction in 
wjt if wjt exceeds w* and reducing it to zero if wjt < w*.  Another possibility would have 
been to define ˆ jtw  = (wjt – w
*)2  but we felt that the implication that a reduction in wjt 
below w* reduced quality adjusted output was likely to prove difficult to justify.   
  
 
4.10.4 Distribution of waiting times 
 
We need to consider what waiting time measure should be used in the waiting time 
quality adjustments.  Patients within an HRG do not have the same waiting times. 
This raises the question of how we take account of the variability of waiting times.   
 
Variations in waiting times across patients for a given treatment are due to a 
combination of prioritization of patients so that different types have different expected 
waits and random factors so that patients of given types have uncertain waiting times.  
We will not be able to observe all the factors which are used in prioritisation so that 
the distributions of realised waiting times conditional on variables, such as age and 
gender, which are observable for individual patients in routine data, will overstate the 
amount of uncertainty for individual patients.   
 
Suppose that treatment has the effect on health shown in the simple case in Figure 4.6.  
Then, assuming that all patients have the same life expectancy, the average health 
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gain for a patient, is discounting to the date of treatment as in section 4.10.2.2, 
2 * 1( ) 2 t trL rwot t t tEq w a h h e Ee r
− −⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦                   (91) 
where rwEe  is the average of erw over realised w.  Since Eerw < rEwe  the waiting time 
adjustment factor 12 t trL rwe Ee r− −⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦ , using the mean wait to quality adjust the 
output for a particular HRG will lead to an overestimate of the mean quality adjusted 
output in a particular year.  But what matters for the calculation of the output index is 
the ratio of the quality adjustment factors for consecutive years and in general  
1 12
2
t t
t t
rL rEw
rL rEw
e e
e e
+ +−
−
− −
− −             (92) 
may be less than or greater than  
1 12
2
t t
t t
rL rw
rL rw
e Ee
e Ee
+ +−
−
− −
− −                (93) 
  
There are two possible ways of allowing for the distribution of waiting times in the 
waiting time adjustment. We can write Eerw as 
2 2 3 3
0
( ) ( )( ) 1
2! 3!
rw rw r E w r E wEe e f w dw rEw∞= = + + + +∫ L                    (94) 
or as the moment generating function for the distribution of waiting times.  If the 
distribution is exponential (which it would be a random selection of patients was 
drawn from the waiting list each day) then 
i
i
rw
w
E e = µi/(1-r) where 1/µi is the mean 
waiting time and the variance of waits is 1/ 2iµ . Similarly if the distribution is uniform 
on [0,bi] then 
i
i
rw
w
E e = ( 1ib re − )/bir. Thus if the distribution of waiting times has a 
tractable distribution and we know its parameters we can allow for the uncertainty in 
waiting times without requiring individual level data.  After inspection of the 
empirical distributions so we decided not to pursue this approach as there is 
considerable disparity in the empirical distributions and few seem to be approximated 
by tractable theoretical distributions.   
 
If individuals have uncertain waiting times and have a utility function which is 
decreasing and convex in waiting time then taking the mean of the actual waiting 
times will understate the costs of waiting.  One way to allow for a cost of the risk of 
having very long waits is to not to use the mean or median of the distribution of waits 
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but the “certainty equivalent” wait wc : the mean wait plus a waiting time “risk 
premium”.  The certainty equivalent waiting time is  
  ( ) ( ) ( ( ) )cEU w u w u E w RP= = +                 (95) 
where RP is risk premium and u(.) is a utility function. 7  We take the specification of 
the benefits from treatment when there is a positive waiting time in section 4.10.2.2 as 
the utility function.  The standard approximation to the risk premium (Pratt 1964) is  
 2 / 2wRP Aσ= −             (96) 
where /A u u′′ ′= −  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and 2wσ  the variance of 
waiting times.   With the specification in section 4.10.2.2, the coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion is r−  so that  
 2 / 2wRP rσ=               (97)  
 
Table 4.6 shows, for different rates of discount, the proportion of elective cases 
admitted in 2002/3 in HRGs where the distribution of waiting times implies a 
certainty equivalent wait greater than various percentiles of the distribution. 
 
                                                 
7 Since u is decreasing in the waiting time we have defined the risk premium as an addition to the mean 
by contrast to the usual case where u is increasing in a risky variable such as income.  Hence the minus 
sign in the definition used here.  
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Table 4.6 Number of elective HRGs and proportion of total elective admissions 
in HRGs where the certainty equivalent waiting time wc exceeds particular 
percentiles of the distribution of waiting times in 2002/3 
Certainty equivalent wait 
greater than 
 70th 75th 80th 85th  90th 
r = 0.01  
Number HRGs 214 152 152 95 32
Prop cases 0.109 0.057 0.057 0.032 0.005
r = 0.015  
Number HRGs 222 156 156 97 32
Prop cases 0.138 0.069 0.069 0.038 0.005
r = 0.03  
Number HRGs 241 170 170 107 34
Prop cases 0.235 0.153 0.153 0.116 0.005
r= 0.05  
Number HRGs 258 185 185 112 38
Prop cases 0.292 0.205 0.205 0.123 0.006
r = 0.1  
Number HRGs 292 211 211 127 42
Prop cases 0.314 0.224 0.224 0.130 0.008
r = 0.15  
Number HRGs 320 233 233 144 52
Prop cases 0.375 0.241 0.241 0.141 0.013
r = 0.2  
Number HRGs 340 250 250 154 56
Prop cases 0.392 0.258 0.258 0.142 0.014
 
The table suggests that using the extreme top end of the distributions as certainty 
equivalent waiting times is likely to overstate the cost of risk arising from the 
distribution of waiting times.  In our calculation of the indices with waiting time 
adjustments in section 5 and 6 we compare the effects of using the 80th percentiles as 
the certainty equivalent wait compared with the mean wait at rates of interest between 
1.5% and 10% 
 
The alternative approach is to use individual level data from HES on the waits 
experienced by each elective patient.  Given the number of electives this is fairly 
cumbersome since each calculation of an index takes around four hours with 
individual data. We do however report in section 5 the results of some calculations of 
indices to show the sensitivity of indices to the use of individual rather than a 
certainty equivalent wait.  
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4.10.5 Outpatient waits 
 
Table 4.7 highlights the mean waiting times in weeks for a select number of key 
specialties. In most specialties waiting times have fallen. 
 
Table 4.7   Outpatient waiting times in weeks, selected specialties, 1999/00-
2003/04 
Code Specialty  1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04
100 General Surgery  7.448 7.398 7.495 6.787 6.377 
120 ENT 11.798 11.261 10.764 9.871 9.258 
140 Oral Surgery 9.789 9.451 9.707 9.029 8.653 
150 Neurosurgery 10.546 10.781 10.812 10.019 9.251 
160 Plastic Surgery 12.370 12.352 13.023 10.300 9.233 
170 Cardiothoracic Surgery 3.865 4.162 4.150 4.194 4.503 
300 General Medicine 8.799 8.877 9.066 8.099 7.392 
310 Audiological Medicine 13.815 13.175 13.813 10.986 9.351 
340 Respiratory Medicine 6.580 6.986 7.415 6.953 6.369 
350 Infectious Diseases 5.978 6.491 6.583 5.232 4.949 
360 Genito-Urinary Medicine 2.342 2.316 2.483 2.214 2.048 
370 Medical Oncology 3.535 3.597 3.208 3.559 3.851 
400 Neurology 13.072 12.814 13.378 11.324 10.038 
420 Paediatrics 6.680 6.758 6.756 6.639 6.582 
430 Geriatric Medicine 4.975 5.170 5.344 5.340 5.232 
 
Ideally, because of the non-linearity of the effect of waiting time on the value of 
activity, we require information on the total time that each individual waits for 
treatment.  However, individual HES records of inpatient waiting times are not linked 
to individual outpatient data and indeed outpatient data is available only aggregated to 
specialty level which cannot be linked satisfactorily to inpatient data aggregated to 
HRG level. 
 
 If we wanted to discount health effects to date of treatment (as in section 4.10.2) we 
require an estimate of trwe l  where twl  is individual l ’s total wait for treatment which 
is the sum of her outpatient and inpatient wait:  Otwl  + 
I
twl . We do not have such 
linked individual level outpatient and inpatient data. If we could group outpatient data 
to the same HRGs or specialties as inpatient data we could use the average wait for 
outpatient treatment for each group to calculate ( )
O I
t tr w we + for a specialty or HRG.  But 
this is not feasible.  In the future it will be possible to use HES to get total waiting 
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times for individuals across outpatient and inpatient care.  But for the moment we 
require a means of incorporating a quality adjustment for outpatient waits. 
 
There is data on first outpatient visits, follow up visits, HRG outpatients, and 
maternity outpatients but only data on the wait for the first visit.   The data on the 
HRG outpatient and maternity outpatients do not have speciality codes that we can 
match to the speciality codes for the first and follow up visits.  We propose to use the 
waiting time adjustments from section 4.10.2.2 but to apply the waiting time for first 
visits to both first and follow up visits.  It can be argued that a reduced first outpatient 
visit wait reduces the delay until the value of the whole course of visits is realised.  
Second, less plausibly, it could be argued that, regarding first and follow up visits as 
having different values, reductions in waits for first visits also indicate that waits for 
follow up visits have fallen and that this increases the value of follow up visits as 
well.    
 
4.10.6 Waiting time adjustment: conclusion 
 
In this sub section we have  
• shown how data on waiting times can be used to quality adjust the cost 
weighted output index in addition to the survival based adjustments considered 
in sections 4.7 and 4.8. 
• regarding waiting time as a characteristic separate from the health 
effect of treatment, yielding an adjustment which is additive the health effects 
• regarding waiting time as delaying the health effect of treatment, 
yielding adjustments which act as scaling factors on the health effects 
• concluded that calculation of an index based on the value of the health and 
waiting time characteristics, as in section 2.4 and section 4.10.1, is not 
currently possible because of the lack of health effects data. We have 
constructed waiting time quality adjustments which can be applied to all 
elective HRGs with existing data and which rest on different assumptions 
about whether one should discount to the date the patient is placed on the 
waiting list (section 4.10.2.1) or to the date of treatment (4.10.2.2,).   
• suggested that an adjustment based on discounting to the date of treatment are 
preferable since they imply that increased dispersion of waiting times would 
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reduce quality adjusted output, whereas discounting to date placed on the list 
implies that patients would prefer increased dispersion.  
• suggested that the dispersion of waiting times should be reflected in the 
waiting times adjustment by calculating the adjustment using, not the mean or 
median wait, but the 80th percentile waiting time which can be interpreted as 
an estimate of the “certainty equivalent” wait. 
As with the health effects adjustments a final view on the preferred adjustment 
depends on the plausibility and lack of volatility of the adjustments when confronted 
with the data in sections 5 and 6. 
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Table 4.8  Summary of waiting time quality adjustments 
 
 
Quality adjustment Wght Form Rationale Results Assumptions Comments 
Survival. Uniform 
health effect. Life 
expectancy. 
Discounting to date on 
list.  
Cost  ( )
( )
1 1
1
1
1
1
jt jt
jt jt
rw rL
jt j
jt jt rw rLj
jt j
jt jtj
e ea k
c x
a k e e
c x
+ +− −
+
+ − −
⎛ ⎞−⎛ ⎞− ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑
∑  
4.10.2.1 Sec 5.5,  
Sec 6.3. 
With 
“optimal” 
wait 
adjustment 
Sec 5.5 
Efficient allocation. 
Constant health status. No 
effect of treatment on life 
expectancy.  kj equal for all 
j in Sec 5.5. kj varying 
across j in secs 6, 7 
Adjustments have 
more effect with 
more costly 
treatments. Also 
calculated with 
different discount 
rates for w and L 
Survival. Uniform 
health effect. Life 
expectancy. 
Discounting to date 
treated, with charge 
for wait. 
Cost 1 1
1
1
2
2
jt jt
jt jt
rw rL
jt j
jt jt rw rLj
jt j
jt jtj
a k e ec x
a k e e
c x
+ +−+
+ −
⎛ ⎞− ⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− − −⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  
4.10.2.2 Sec 5.5, 
Sec 6.3 
Efficient allocation. 
Constant health status. No 
effect of treatment on life 
expectancy.  kj equal for all 
j in Sec 5.5.  kj varying 
across j in secs 6, 7 
Adjustments have 
more effect with 
more costly 
treatments. Also 
calculated with 
different discount 
rates for w and L 
Health and waiting 
time characteristics 
Value ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1* 1
1 1 1
* 1
1
1
jt
jt
rLo
jt ht jt j j wt jtj
rLo
jt ht jt j j wt jtj
x a h h e r w
x a h h e r w
π π
π π
+− −
+ + +
− −
⎡ ⎤− − −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− − −⎣ ⎦
∑
∑  
 
2.7, 4.10.1 Sec 6.5 Constant health status. No 
effect of treatment on life 
expectancy.  Value 
additive in health and 
waiting time.  
 
cjt unit cost, volume xjt volume;  ajt. mjt proportion patients alive, dead on discharge (or after 30 days);  ; k estimate of proportionate effect of treatment on quality adjusted life 
years (QALYs); Ljt life expectancy at mean age of patients treated; r discount rate on QALYs/waits; πht value of QALY (£s), πwt value of day’s wait, h*, ho estimates of health 
with and without treatment. 
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4.11 Patient satisfaction 
 
The indices we have set out above are all variants on cost weighted aggregates built 
up from FCE data. There are however some attributes which the Department may 
wish to see reflected in an output index which are not covered by the data discussed 
so far. Prominent among these are patient views on cleanliness, food quality and 
satisfaction with non-curative aspects of treatment (such as the behaviour of nurses 
and doctors).  
 
Our analysis in this section is based on the assumption that these variables cause 
patient disutility because they are seen as indicative of poor treatment quality.  For 
this part of our work then, we introduce these to our index is by identifying indicators 
(such as aggregates constructed from responses to surveys of patient opinion). We 
then calculate the growth rate of our comprehensive index, ItComp as the weighted sum 
of the growth rate of one of the quality adjusted output indices we have described 
earlier (call it It0)  and the growth rates of the other indicators. We denote the growth 
rate of indicator k by Itk. If there are n such indicators, and the relevant weights are 
denoted by ωk then the overall index is given by 
 
0
 
n
Comp k
t k t
k
I Iω
=
=∑         (98) 
In some circumstances we may be able to deduce appropriate values for the ωk. For 
example we know the total value of expenditure on cleaning and this therefore gives 
us the basis for a weight on a cleanliness measure. In other cases the choice has to be 
purely arbitrary. We do not know what costs, if any, are involved in persuading 
doctors and nurses to be polite to patients, so there is little we can do except to invent 
a weight. 
 
The NHS Patient Survey Programme covers Acute Trusts, Primary Care Trusts, 
Mental Health, Ambulance Trusts and others. In addition, there are plans for surveys 
focusing on the National Service Frameworks for coronary heart disease, mental 
health, older people, diabetes, etc. There are a number of issues that make the 
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incorporation of patient satisfaction into our measure of NHS output difficult, some 
theoretical and some practical. 
From a theoretical standpoint, there are at least three reasons why measures of patient 
satisfaction should be treated with caution. The first is that patient satisfaction is not 
independent of the level of output, xj, or other characteristics qk. For example, if we 
include a measure of waiting times in our set of characteristics, it is likely that patient 
satisfaction, not only with the time they had to wait, but also other aspects of the 
service they have received, will be correlated with this. Because of this, there is the 
likelihood of ‘double-counting’ output. 
Second, patients’ reports of satisfaction will depend on the levels of service they 
expect. Certain sections of the population may have lower expectations than others, as 
noted in the First Interim Report (Dawson et al., 2004a). These expectations may vary 
systematically across the population, introducing bias to our measure of output. 
Third, satisfaction is a multidimensional concept. There may be a number of 
orthogonal aspects to satisfaction, beyond total satisfaction, that should be considered 
as separate characteristics in themselves and aggregated using their social valuations. 
For example, patients’ satisfaction with the hotel services aspect of an inpatient stay 
may be largely independent of their satisfaction with the medical aspects. Eliciting 
these different dimensions of satisfaction with single instruments is extremely 
difficult, if not practically impossible, which leads us to the empirical obstacles to the 
inclusion of a measure of patient satisfaction into the index. 
The practical question arising from the use of patient satisfaction data is the 
construction of appropriate growth indicators, Itk  In our analysis we make use of 
qualitative surveys carried out for the Health-care Commission. The results of these 
surveys show what proportion of patients gave answers in particular categories to 
each question.  
 
We constructed aggregates using the same approach as the Health-care Commission. 
For each relevant question (i.e. those questions which were asked in more than one 
survey round without changes likely to influence results), we gave a weight of 100 to 
the most favourable answer, a rate of 0 to the least favourable answer and weights to 
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intermediate categories based on the number of possible choices. Thus if there was 
one intermediate category it was given a weight of 50, if there were two the more 
favourable was given a weight of 67 and the less favourable a weight of 33 and so on. 
These weights were applied to the proportion of respondents in each category in order 
to give us an overall score. For a group of overall questions (cleanliness, food quality 
or other aspects of satisfaction) we took the arithmetic average of the individual 
scores in order to produce an overall indicator. 
 
This quantification appears arbitrary and one might be concerned that it does not 
really identify the latent variables which underlie the reported categorical responses. 
However the indices produced in this simple manner were very strongly correlated 
with indices derived from assumptions about the density function of the underlying 
latent variables. Thus we are reasonably happy with their use.  
 
There are a number of questions we have not used in our analysis. Some of these 
collected information in both years but did not invite observations on service quality 
(e.g. What age group do you belong to?). Others we have rejected because there were 
small but possibly important changes to the questions between the years (e.g. in 2002 
“Were you in a mixed-sex room or ward?” and in 2004 “Were you in a mixed-sex bay 
in a room or ward?”, or because they do not actually convey what is needed to assess 
patient quality. Thus the question about the time people have waited to see GPs does 
not identify patients who have been unable to see their GPs because the GPs only 
make appointments for the day that they will see the patients.  
 
The outpatient questionnaire includes one question about the time the patient has had 
to wait for an appointment once they knew they needed it. We have counted waiting 
time elsewhere and therefore leave that question out of our assessment. A second 
question asks how long the patient has waited relative to the time of their 
appointment, inviting categorical answers. By making the assumption that the mid-
point of each category is relevant to all patients in that category and a plausible 
assumption for the final category (two and a half hours for a wait of more than two 
hours) we can estimate a mean waiting time and measure the percentage change in 
this. This can be combined with other score variables for outpatient treatment.  
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These indicators are measured on a per-patient basis. To give an overall change in the 
“volume of quality”, it is necessary to add to each indicator the growth in the volume 
of treatment. Our own view is that this is not measured exactly by the cost weighted 
index, since non-medical quality matters whether a patient is given a cheap or an 
expensive treatment. The measure we use is number of inpatient spells. For 
outpatients the appropriate volume indicator is the number of outpatient consultations 
and the same is true for primary care. We discuss this further in section 5. The 
percentage change in the volume component has to be added to the percentage change 
in quality to give the change in the overall volume of quality, i.e. the relevant Itk. 
 
The quantified data, for the relevant questions are shown in tables A1 to A4 in 
Appendix A.  
 
4.12 Discount rate on health 
 
There is little agreement on the appropriate discount rate to use when health gains 
accrue over time.  Cairns (1994, 1997) examines evidence on individuals’ time 
preferences for social health gains, such as saving lives of other people at different 
points in the future.  Discount rates for saving lives fall from 41% where the delay is 
only two years to 16% where the delay is nineteen years.  Gravelle and Smith (2001), 
using a social welfare framework, point out that if the value of health is increasing 
over time, estimates of the volume of health benefits must take this into account.  The 
volume of health effects can be adjusted directly by the rate of growth in the value of 
health. An indirect method is to reduce the discount rate on health effects relative to 
the discount rate applied to costs.  The size of the adjustment depends on estimates of 
the rate of growth of the value of health which itself is a function of the rate of growth 
of the direct utility effect of health and the rate of growth of income.  If the indirect 
method of allowing for growth in the value of health by means of a lower discount 
rate on health effects is used, the discount rate on health effects will be 1-3% less than 
the discount rate on costs depending on the assumptions made about key variables.  
The Department of Health currently discounts health benefits at 1.5% p.a. and costs at 
3.5% p.a. (Department of Health, 1996;, HM Treasury, 2003). We take 1.5% as our 
base case in discounting life expectancy but also consider higher rates to investigate 
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the sensitivity of the index to the discount rate.    
 
The formulations for the waiting time adjustment allow for the possibility that 
different discount rates could be applied to the period whilst waiting and the post 
treatment period.  It could be argued that a higher rate of discount should be applied to 
the waiting period since there is a cost to waiting over and above the delay in getting 
treatment.  Unlike the discount rate applied to health effects post treatment there is no 
obvious higher rate to use for waits.  We suggest that the direct disutility from 
waiting, over and above the delay in getting treatment, is best dealt with by treating it 
as a separate characteristic.  Thus when the data become available to support a value 
weighted index waiting time could be included both as a determinant of the health 
effect and as a separate characteristic if patient preference studies suggest that this is 
appropriate.    
 
We have included in Sections 5 and 6 illustrative calculations of the scaling effect of 
waiting time using different discount rates for health and waiting time.  Since the rates 
applied to waiting time are arbitrary and in the absence of any contrary indication we 
prefer on balance to use the same rate for waits and health effects. 
  
4.13 Quality adjustment for general practice 
 
Until recently routine data on the quality of general practice has been virtually non-
existent because information on general practice has been collected with the aim of 
paying GPs and until April 2004 the General Medical Services contract paid little 
explicit attention to quality.  GPs received bonus payments linked to the proportion of 
eligible women receiving cervical screens, and of children vaccinated.  Cervical 
screening activities were included in the old Cost Weighted Activity Index as volume 
measures of activity so that to this extent the CWAI had a small quality component.  
From 1998/9 onwards GPs have been able to opt for Primary Medical Service 
contracts negotiated with their Primary Care Trusts under which they are meant to 
deliver an enhanced package of services.  By April 2004 around 35% of practices had 
switched to PMS. Since PMS contracts are locally negotiated, the central reporting of 
the activities targeted under the GMS contract is patchy.    
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There are a number of validated measures of general practice quality - such as the 
proportion of patients with coronary heart disease whose blood pressure is controlled. 
The Department of Health is investigating the use of the QRESEARCH database 
extracted from a large (around 500) sample of GP electronic record systems to 
measure the quality of care in general practice using these types of indicators 
(Simkins, 2005).    
 
The new General Medical Services contract of April 2004 contained financial 
incentives linked to achievement against a large basket of quality indicators in the 
Quality and Outcome Framework (QOF) (Department of Health, 2003a; Roland, 
2004). PMS practices were also required to join the QOF and returns for all practices 
are centrally collected and available via the Quality, Prevalence and Indicator 
Database QPID run by the DH’s Health and Social Care Information Centre.    
 
It is possible to calculate a subset of the quality indicators in the QOF for the practices 
in the QRESEARCH database over a number of years prior to the introduction of the 
QOF for all practices in April 2004.  This series can then used to quality adjust the 
past volume series of general practice consultations.    
 
In principle the quality indicator series can be calculated in future years for the 
practices in QRESEARCH and, for all practices.  There are potential difficulties in 
constructing a quality adjusted series which covers the periods before and after 
2004/5.   GPs are partially altruistic: their actions are guided by a professional concern 
for their patient’s well being and by a concern for their income and effort.  The 
introduction of the QOF in April 2004 changed the relative importance of the 
professional and personal incentives.  For aspects of quality covered by the QOF GPs 
now have both financial and professional incentives.  For aspects of quality which are 
outside the QOF they now only have professional incentives.  The QOF may therefore 
lead to increased activity in the areas covered by the QOF and reduced activity in 
those outside it.  Hence the changes in QOF activity may provide a misleading guide 
to changes in overall quality of care since the unremunerated and therefore not 
centrally notified activities may have declined, or not increased to the same extent. 
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The data produced by the QOF is likely to be a fruitful source of quality adjustment of 
general practice activity in future years. Some of the indicators can be translated into 
health impacts, for example from studies of CHD event risk factors including blood 
pressure.  But the interpretation of trends in quality indicators will require empirical 
modelling of the responses of practices to changing financial incentives and their 
impact on unremunerated quality indicators.   Such modelling should be possible 
using QRESEARCH or a similar database.  
 
The QOF also has an incentive for GPs to undertake surveys of their patients, though 
the reward is for carrying it out and acting on the results, and is not linked to the 
actual patient responses.  If the QOF is adjusted to link payment to responses, for 
example on satisfaction with particular aspects of the practice then this will be a 
potentially fruitful source of data on the patient experience in general practice.  We 
discuss in section 4.11 how such data could be used as a quality adjustment to an 
output index.  
 
It has been suggested that admission rates for ambulatory care sensitive conditions 
(ACSCs) can be used as a measure of the quality of general practice.  ACSCs are 
conditions which can be controlled in a good quality general practice and which 
should not result in a hospital admission.  The usual examples include asthma, 
diabetes and epilepsy and ACSCs for these conditions have been used by the DH and 
the Commission for Health Improvement as primary care performance indicators.  
They have also been used extensively in the US, New Zealand and Australia 
(Giuffrida et al., 1999; Jackson and Tobias, 2001; Victorian Government, 2004).   
Even if ACSC admission rates affected by the quality of general they are also strongly 
influenced by factors outside the control of GPs, including the availability and 
admission criteria of hospitals (Giuffrida et al., 1999).  ACSCs admissions are an 
imperfect proxy for the health of the relevant population.  We do not recommend their 
use as a means of quality adjusting measures of national general practice output. 
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4.14 Atkinson principles and quality adjustment 
 
The Atkinson Review published its final report in January 2005 setting out 
recommendations for improving the measurement of government output and 
productivity (Atkinson, 2005).  
 
Atkinson paid particular attention to the Eurostat (2001) Handbook on price and 
volume measures in National Accounts.  The Handbook made important 
recommendations on the methods to be used to measure output and the implications 
for the measurement of non-market output.   
 
Eurostat distinguished between activities, outputs, and outcomes.  For purposes of 
national accounting it is preferable to measure outputs (treatment received by a 
patient) rather than activities (number of operations or prescriptions). Outcomes 
should be used to quality adjust outputs.  Eurostat “graded” the methods that 
governments use for measuring non-market outputs into A, B or C. 
 
A. Preferred method: 
i) use output indicators (rather than activities) 
ii) all services should be covered, as detailed as possible 
iii) outputs should be quality adjusted 
iv) outputs should be cost weighted 
 
B. Less satisfactory but acceptable method: 
i) use output indicators but the detail needs to be improved 
ii) no account is taken of quality change 
 
C. Unacceptable method: 
i) use of inputs instead of activities or outputs  
ii) coverage of output not representative 
 
In discussing Group A methods, counting inpatient activity by DRG is accepted as a 
way of measuring output but this appears inconsistent as it is only a more 
disaggregated way of counting activities.  Atkinson acknowledges the difficulty of 
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quality adjusting by DRG activity.  Atkinson says that ideally output should be 
measured as the whole course of treatment for an illness rather than just counting 
activities (by DRG or HRG).  This would make it possible to take better account of 
the quality of care.  The report notes that it “would be very helpful to be able to base 
quality adjustments for NHS output on a data set which measures the health outcome 
achieved as a result of treatment, collected annually by all or part of the NHS for most 
aspects of health care.”  In the short-term attention could be focused on a few disease 
groups for which data on outcomes is available. 
 
In the general discussion of methodology, Atkinson points to the distortion in output 
indices that are weighted by average costs.  Different outputs should be weighted by 
the marginal value of the outputs to individuals and there is no reason to believe this 
corresponds to marginal or average cost. 
 
In major respects Atkinson (2005) recommended a methodology for measuring NHS 
output growth advocated in our earlier reports: 
• Units of output should relate to patient journeys (courses of treatment) rather 
than activities (tests, procedures, consultations, drugs prescribed). Until a 
patient identifier permits linking the various services delivered to a single 
patient, output will still have to be measured as the sum of activities. 
• The quality of outputs should be incorporated into output indices.  
• Quality measures should reflect the attributes of output valued by individuals.  
Atkinson initially identifies relevant attributes as those recognised by current 
objectives of government health policy.  We suggest, since individuals may 
value other attributes than those targeted by the policies of any particular 
government, and may value them differently, that further research is required 
on the attributes valued by individuals. 
• In order to generate a single index of output, weights must be attached to the 
multitude of NHS activities.  Weights should reflect the marginal social value 
of the activities.  At present relevant data does not exist and ONS will continue 
to use cost weights. Atkinson acknowledges the distortions introduced by the 
use of cost weights—a relative increase in expensive treatments appears to 
increase NHS output while a relative increase in cost reducing treatments with 
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the same or better health outcomes will appear to reduce NHS output. 
 
If we had routinely collected data on health outcomes and these data were used to 
weight the activities of the NHS, it would not be necessary to make a separate quality 
adjustment to an index of NHS output. In the short term Atkinson suggests an 
alternative approach.  Changes in quality which are currently measurable should be 
used to augment cost weighted output indices. We suggest that for health care, 
currently available data permit quality adjustment in respect of two attributes: waiting 
times and survival rates.  Following the Atkinson (2005) approach requires that we 
find a basis for determining the relative value of changes in these two attributes of 
health care and use the resulting estimate of the rate of change in quality to quality 
adjust the cost weighted output index.  
 
Atkinson (2005) stresses the need to measure the value added by public services.  This 
is particularly important in health care where individuals may be healthier or living 
longer for reasons unrelated to the availability and quality of health care. What is 
required are measures of the marginal effect of the NHS in producing outputs of value 
to patients. Given the difficulties in estimating production functions, rough and ready 
judgements will be required when attributing improvement in health outcomes to 
health care.  
 
Atkinson (2005) discusses the “complementarity” between public and private output. 
As economic growth leads to higher standards of living, the relative valuation of 
different goods and services will change.  This will affect the weights to be attached 
to the various activities in an output index.  If people are living longer the value of a 
hip replacement may increase as the present value of the benefits are estimated over a 
longer period of time.  We argue that such changes in value arising from factors 
outside the control of the NHS should not be counted in measuring the quality 
adjusted growth rates of different types of NHS output. Instead they should be 
included in the weights to be applied in calculating the weighted average rate of 
growth of NHS output (the output index).   Changes in the value of a hip replacement 
arising from factors outside the control of the NHS should influence decisions on how 
to allocate NHS resources across different activities but not in assessing the rate of 
growth of the output of hip replacement activities. 
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5 Experimental indices of NHS output  
5.1 General trends, index form and data sources 
 
This section demonstrates the impact on a cost weighted output index of adjustments 
for a number of quality dimensions. Prior to presenting results, however, it is useful to 
highlight some salient features of the data. 
 
Our starting point is the dataset used by the DH in its cost weighted output index 
(CWOI).  For inpatient hospital care, the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) are used 
(data on non-elective, elective and day case activity). The main quality adjustments 
discussed in this report are for survival and waiting times. Mortality rates are only 
available for HES activity (non-elective, elective and day case hospital activity). 
Waiting times are available for electives and day cases and some outpatient activities.    
 
In 2002/03 the data consisted of 1913 groups of activities. Table 5.1 gives a summary 
of the main divisions of this dataset. In this chapter we focus on the quality 
adjustments to the HES data, which apply to 47% of the activity currently included in 
the CWOI. In chapter 6 we examine the effects of different quality adjustments to 
output indices for our small specimen set of HRGs for which we have health effects 
data.  In the light of the results in this chapter for the HES set of hospital activities  
and the specimen set in chapter 6, we set out our preferred quality adjustment variant 
in chapter 7, for the set of HES hospital activities, for a broader set of hospital 
activities including outpatient treatments, accident and emergency, and for all NHS 
activity. In chapter 9, the output indices from chapter 7 are combined with the input 
indices from chapter 8 to yields estimates of various types of productivity growth.  
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Table 5.1 Activities and cost shares 2002/3   
 Number of activities 
(millions) 
Cost shares1 
 
Electives+ day cases 5.58 13.38 
Non-electives 5.96 22.1 
Outpatients 53.43 11.15 
Other activities2  53.37 
Total  100 
Notes: 1. Derived by multiplying activities by unit costs; 2.These activities are measured in non-
comparable units so total numbers of activities are meaningless. A division of cost shares with this 
category is shown in Table 3.1. 
 
In order to highlight the impact of quality adjustment for the activities where the data 
permit adjustment, in sections 5.4 and 5.5 we compare our quality adjusted indices to 
an unadjusted index restricted to the same set of activities.  In the tables this truncated 
version of the CWOI is labelled “unadjusted”.  In Section 7 we examine how quality 
adjusting for this subset of activities affects the value of the complete CWOI. 
 
 
5.1 General trends and data 
 
The HES data are grouped according to procedures comprising 574 Healthcare 
Resource Groups (HRGs), with an additional separation into electives and day cases 
and non-electives (Appendix B). Figure 5.1 graphs the number of episodes for each 
year from 1998/99 to 2003/04. It shows little change in electives up to 2001/02 with 
some growth thereafter. Non-electives show more significant growth, with very high 
growth in the final year.  
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Figure 5.1 Number of FCEs, electives+day cases (elip) and non-electives (nelip), 
1998/99 – 2003/04 
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Within these broad categories there is considerable variation in number of procedures 
and in growth by HRG. For example, comparing 2002/03 with 2001/02, the arithmetic 
mean growth in episodes for elective HRGs was 3.8% but with a standard deviation of 
15.9% – growth across HRGs was even more variable for non-electives. Partly this 
reflects substitution across treatments but nevertheless the variation is large.  
 
Unit costs from the Reference Costs database are employed to aggregate these diverse 
activities. The unit costs also show considerable variation across procedures, from 
over £20,000 for transplant procedures to under £500 for ophthalmic and ear 
procedures. In 2002/03 the mean unit cost across HRGs for electives was about 
£1,700 with a standard deviation of £2,220, with figures of £2,200 and £2,600, 
respectively, for non-electives.  
 
The cost weighted output index combines activity growth by weighting by unit costs, 
equivalent to multiplying the ratio of activities by cost shares. Cost shares are 
concentrated in a few HRGs. Treating electives and non-electives as separate sets of 
 113
activities, in 2002/03, 25% of expenditure was accounted for by only 20 HRGs with 
50% accounted for by 74 HRGs, as illustrated by the cumulative expenditure share 
chart below. The top expenditure categories include HRGs where activity rates are 
very high such as maternity care for normal deliveries or hip replacements and which 
are not typically life threatening. But it also includes HRGs where mortality rates are 
very high such as heart procedures and complex procedures involving the elderly.  A 
high cost share on this latter group turns out to be important in the adjustments for 
survival discussed below.  
 
 
Figure 5.2 Cumulative expenditure shares, FCEs (537 elective, 537 non-elective 
HRGs) 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Index form 
 
Table 5.2 compares the Laspeyres (base period weighted) index with the Paasche 
(current period weights) index and the Fisher index which is the geometric mean of 
the Laspeyres and Paasche indices. The index number formula used does have a small 
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but significant impact on the indices, as shown for episodes for selected years. In this 
report we follow ONS in reporting Laspeyres indices.  
 
Table 5.2 Impact of index number formula on CWOI index, FCEs based 
 1999/00-2000/01 2000/01-2001/02 2001/02-2002/03 
Laspeyres 0.90% 0.93% 4.41% 
Paasche 0.71% 0.82% 4.47% 
Fisher 0.81% 0.87% 4.44% 
Note: the reference costs for 1998/99 were considered unreliable so the index for the comparison 
between 1998/99 and 1999/00 use 1999/00 unit costs in the numbers reported below. 2003/04 unit 
reference costs on a comparable basis were not available. 
 
 
5.3 Spells versus episodes 
 
We discussed the choice between measuring hospital output in finished consultant 
episodes (FCEs) and continuous inpatient spells (CIPS) which consist of sets of 
consecutive FCEs in section 4.2 (see also Appendix B).  We argued that CIPS were a 
better approximation to the patient journey and therefore a more appropriate measure 
of output.  We use CIPS for our calculation of the effects of quality adjustments. 
 
Although there are around 8% fewer CIPS than FCEs this should have essentially no 
effect on the calculation of a cost weighted output index since we constructed our unit 
costs for CIPS from the underlying FCE unit costs.  Table 5.3 compares FCE based 
and CIPS based CWOIs as a check on our calculations of unit costs of spells.  The 
only reason for a divergence between the two indices is that some of the FCEs 
assigned to a particular year in the FCE index may be assigned to a different year in a 
CIPS index since a CIPS is assigned to a year only if its last FCE finished in that year.  
 
We would however expect to see differences in FCE and CIPS based indices once the 
outputs are adjusted for survival and mortality since these adjustments are applied to 
the different distributions of HRG types generated by the FCE and CIPS volume 
measures.  
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Table 5.3 Comparison of cost weighted output indices for hospitals based on 
finished consultant episodes and continuous inpatient spells  
 
 CWOI index 
 Episodes CIPS pp diff 
1998/99-1999/00 1.84 1.87 -0.03 
1999/00-2000/01 0.90 0.91 -0.01 
2000/01-2001/02 0.93 0.95 -0.02 
2001/02-2002/03 4.41 4.44 -0.03 
2002/03-2003/04 5.75 5.81 -0.06 
  
Average 2.75 2.78 -0.03 
 
5.4 Survival adjustments: hospital output 
 
5.4.1 Simple survival adjustment 
 
This section considers the results of applying the survival adjustment formula in 
section 4.8.1 to HES data. There are two choices of death rates that can be used in the 
calculations, those that occur during the hospital stay or in-hospital deaths together 
with those occurring within some period following discharge from hospital. In-
hospital deaths are those most directly attributable to the NHS but are likely to 
underestimate survival changes due to medical treatment since many patients die 
within a short time after discharge. However using mortality rates after discharge runs 
the risk of attributing deaths from extraneous influences to the NHS. On average in 
the period under consideration 30 day mortality rates were about 25% higher than in-
hospital deaths (Table 5.4). Both indicators show a downward trend with similar rates 
of decline.  
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Table 5.4 Mortality rates, (deaths/CIPS), 1998/99-2003/04  
 In-hospital 30 day 
1998/99 0.0239 0.0308 
1999/00 0.0238 0.0306 
2000/01 0.0229 0.0293 
2001/02 0.0236 0.0299 
2002/03 0.0228 0.0286 
2003/04 0.0222 0.0276 
 
Death rates vary enormously across procedures. Death rates are considerably higher 
for non-elective procedures than for electives. Although the rate of decline is greater 
in the latter - on average elective mortality rates declined by 5.9% from 1998/99- 
2003/04 against decreases of 2.1% for non-electives - aggregate trends are dominated 
by those for non-electives given their greater weight (Figure 5.3).   
 
 
Figure 5.3 30 day Mortality rates, electives and non-electives 
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Figure 5.4 Plot of mortality rates 2002/03 
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Table 5.5 reports calculations of the pure short term survival adjusted cost weighted 
output index (section 4.8.1) 
 
1
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where a is the survival rate. 
 
The first column of results is the unadjusted CWOI.  The second and third columns 
are the survival adjusted indices calculated with 30 day and in-hospital death rates. 
The adjustments are non-trivial, though generally quite small in percentage point 
terms. These adjustments are generally larger in the final two years than in the 
beginning of the period. The use of 30 day mortality rates yields a higher adjustment 
than in-hospital deaths in all but the first year. 
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Table 5.5 Laspeyres CWOI index, CIPS, adjusted for survival  
 Laspeyres CWOI 
 Unadjusted Adjusted for survival (1-m) 
  30 day In-hospital 
1998/99-1999/00 1.87 1.27 1.37 
1999/00-2000/01 0.91 1.16 1.08 
2000/01-2001/02 0.95 0.89 0.86 
2001/02-2002/03 4.44 5.37 5.14 
2002/03-2003/04 5.81 6.37 6.22 
  
Average all years 2.78 2.99 2.91 
 
 
The impact of the survival adjustment depends on both the rate of change of survival 
across HRGs and their cost shares. The latter turn out to have a large impact since, as 
stated earlier, the majority of procedures show little change in survival but these tend 
to be concentrated in low cost procedures. To illustrate this point Figure 5.5 shows the 
change in average (unweighted) mortality rates (from Table 5.4) and the change in the 
CWOI adjusted for survival minus the unadjusted CWOI (the second column in Table 
5.5 minus the first column in Table 5.5), both indexed at 1998 =1.  The mortality rate 
shows a relatively smooth pattern, generally declining but with a small upward shift 
comparing 2000/01 and 2001/02. In contrast the impact on the CWOI is much more 
variable, and not always in the inverse direction to the change in the mortality rate. 
 
Figure 5.6 plots changes in survival rates against unit cost for one of the growth 
periods, 2001/02-2002/03. Most changes in survival are small, ranging around the 
value 1 on the y-axis and the majority of these are in the lowest unit cost range.  Year 
on year changes in the CWOI are driven largely by variations in survival rates in the 
relatively few procedures with very high unit costs, plus a few cases where changes in 
survival rates are very high in the low unit cost range. 
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Figure 5.5 Mortality rates and the impact of the survival adjustment*, Index 
1998/99=1 
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* calculated as the difference between the 30 day survival adjusted CWOI and the unadjusted CWOI 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Growth in survival (ratio) and unit costs, 2001/02-2002/03,  
(electives and non-electives) 
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To understand the sensitivity of the results to cost shares we estimated the change in 
the index when survival was assumed unchanged for the top 25 high cost share HRGs, 
which represented just over 30% of total expenditure. The impact of this was to 
reduce the 30 day survival adjustments by about 60%. Thus the calculations depend 
heavily on the survival rates of a small number of HRGs. Within this high cost share 
group, comparing 1999/00 with 1998/99, 17 of the 25 HRGs showed reductions in 
survival rates and these are responsible to a large extent for the big negative impact of 
the survival adjustment on the CWOI in that growth period. In contrast in the final 
two growth periods the majority of high cost share HRGs witnessed increases in 
survival rates – 19 HRGs in 2001/02-2002/03 and 20 HRGs in 2002/03-2003/04.  
 
 
Over time, both the number of HRGs with positive growth in survival rates and the 
share of expenditure accounted by these procedures have increased as shown in Table 
5.6. If the percent of HRGs with increases in survival rates is lower than the 
cumulative expenditure share (in percent) of these procedures, then increased survival 
is concentrated in relatively high cost procedures. Table 5.6 shows that this is the case 
in each growth period except the first and that the discrepancy has increased through 
time.   
 
 
Table 5.6 Changes in 30 day survival rates and expenditures shares 
 
Percent of 
procedures* with 
change in survival 
rates >1  
Expenditure shares 
of procedures* with 
change in survival 
rates >1  
1998/99-1999/00 42.8 37.8 
1999/00-2000/01 55.5 62.0 
2000/01-2001/02 49.5 50.7 
2001/02-2002/03 62.9 75.4 
2002/03-2003/04 63.0 77.7 
* Total number of procedures = 1148, with electives and non-elective HRGs treated as separate 
procedures.  
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We suggested in section 4.8.1 that a simple survival estimate would be likely to be a 
conservative estimate of the effect of the growth in the health effect of treatment and 
we now consider how making strong assumptions about the health effect alters the 
results. 
 
5.4.2 Survival and estimated health effects adjustment 
  
We consider the survival and health effects adjusted index of section 4.8.2 
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 where kj = */ojt jtq q  is an estimate of the proportionate effect of treatment conditional 
on survival to no treatment which, in the absence data on actual health effects, we 
assume is constant over time.  ( *jtq  is the sum of discounted quality adjusted life years 
accruing to patients who survive treatment. ojtq  is the sum of quality adjusted life 
years for untreated patients). With k = 0 which implies that the patient would have 
zero quality adjusted life years if not treated we have the pure survival adjusted index.   
We examine the impact of assuming that k is positive.   As noted in section 4.8.2, the 
rather sketchy available evidence suggests a value of around k = 0.8 for non life 
threatening procedures. When the treatment has a high mortality we set k = 0. If we 
used m = 0.2 for the cut-off mortality rate for setting k = 0 this would ensure that term 
a – k is never negative which would correspond to treatment having a negative effect 
on health. But as we noted in the simulations in section 4.8.2 this would make the 
index very sensitive to change in mortality when the rate is close to 0.2.  We therefore 
set the cut off value for mortality which leads to k = 0 so that a – k is never smaller 
than 0.05. Thus for HRGs with high mortality we adjust only by the survival rates, not 
by the survival rates and the assumed health effect. 
 
Table 5.7 shows that including the crude health effects adjustment via k = qo/q* 
generally increases the growth rate compared with no adjustment (first column) and 
with a simple survival adjustment (Table 5.5).  The greatest impact is the third 
column, in particular for the final two periods. The results in general suggest that 
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adjusting for survival adds about two percentage points to the growth rate in 2002/03 
and 2003/04.   Averaged across the five yearly growth rates, the impact ranges from 
adding about 1.0 to 0.4 percentage points to the growth rate. Contrast this with an 
average impact of 0.22 for the simple survival adjustment using 30 day survival rates. 
Thus a survival adjustment which incorporates crude but not implausible adjustments 
for health effects is capable of significantly adding to the growth rate of hospital 
output. Note, as with the simple survival adjustment, much of the impact is due to the 
behaviour of survival rates in the high cost share HRGs. For example in the case 
where k=0.8 with cut off = 0.10, nearly 70% of the adjustment can be attributed to the 
25 HRGs with the highest cost shares.  
 
 
Table 5.7 CWOI index, CIPS, adjusted for survival, 30 day mortality rates 
 
 
 
 
Unadjusted 
q0/q*=0.8 
if m<0.10,   
q0/q =0 
otherwise 
q0/q*=0.8 if 
m<0.15,      
q0/q =0 
otherwise 
q0/q*=0.7 
if m<0.15,   
q0/q =0 
otherwise 
q0/q*=0.7 
if m<0.10,   
q0/q =0 
otherwise 
q0/q*=0.9 
if m<0.05,   
q0/q =0  
otherwise 
 
1998/99-1999/00 1.87 0.78 0.09 0.73 1.02 1.26 
1999/00-2000/01 0.91 1.58 1.97 1.51 1.36 1.54 
2000/01-2001/02 0.95 0.91 1.01 0.93 0.90 1.01 
2001/02-2002/03 4.44 6.59 7.72 6.34 5.97 6.27 
2002/03-2003/04 5.81 7.15 8.04 7.10 6.76 7.09 
       
Average all years 2.78 3.36 3.77 3.28 3.20 3.43 
 
 
 
5.4.3 Survival adjustments with health effects and life expectancy 
 
In section 4.8.3 we suggested that including a term reflecting life expectancy of 
patients treated would be a way of improving the crude adjustment for the health 
effect and proposed the index 
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where Ljt is the life expectancy at the average age of patients getting treatment j and r 
is the discount rate on quality adjusted life years (the units in which health effects are 
measured).  Table 5.8 reports the results of calculation of this index with a discount 
rate on remaining life equal to 1.5% for the simple survival adjustment and with our 
central case value of k = 0.8 with a mortality cut off of either 0.15 or 0.10.  
 
Table 5.8  CWOI index, CIPS, adjusted for survival, life expectancy, 30 day 
mortality rates, r=1.5  
 
  
 Unadjusted 
q0/q*=0.8 if m<0.10, 
q0/q =0 otherwise 
q0/q*=0.8 if m<0.15, 
q0/q =0 otherwise 
 
1998/99-1999/00 1.87 1.12 0.74 
1999/00-2000/01 0.91 1.37 1.76 
2000/01-2001/02 0.95 0.76 0.89 
2001/02-2002/03 4.44 6.31 7.44 
2002/03-2003/04 5.81 7.13 8.03 
   
Average all years 2.78 3.30 3.72 
 
The growth is higher with either of the adjustments than without them, more markedly 
for the variant with the more generous cut off which leaves more HRGs being 
adjusted by the ratio of health effects than by the simple survival ratio. The effect of 
the life expectancy adjustment is to reduce the growth compared with the 
corresponding case in Table 5.7 in all years except the first and reflects the increasing 
age of patients treated by the NHS. 
 
5.5 Waiting time and survival adjustments: hospital output 
 
This section considers additional impacts on the indices from taking account of 
changes in waiting times. It shows results for a number of variants based on the 
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formulae in section 4.10. We calculated the mean wait after truncating very long waits 
to four years and the “certainty equivalent” wait which was the mean plus a “risk 
premium” to reflect the disutility from the risk of long wait relative to the mean.  We 
used the rule of thumb that the certainty equivalent wait for a treatment was at the 80th 
percentile wait for that treatment (see section 4.10.4).   
 
Table 5.9 shows mean waits across all patients and the mean 80th percentile wait 
across HRGs for electives in the period under study. This shows a decline in average 
waiting times using both measures since 1998/99. However this is mainly due to a 
large drop between 1998/99 and 1999/2000. Starting in the latter year mean waiting 
times increased up to 2002/03 but declined marginally in the final year.   
 
Table 5.9 Trends in waiting time, days, averages across HRGs  
 Mean  Per cent HRGs with decline in 
waiting times 
 Truncated mean 80th percentile Truncated mean 80th percentile 
 
1998/99 88.7 132.2 
  
1999/00 80.8 117.7 62.3 55.1 
2000/01 82.3 119.0 32.4 34.2 
2001/02 85.2 124.4 31.9 33.9 
2002/03 88.5 128.9 32.3 29.9 
2003/04 85.9 126.8 63.4 51.5 
 
 
The third and fourth column of Table 5.9 summarise the variation across HRGs in 
terms of waiting time experience by showing the percent of HRGs that show declines 
in average waiting times. Only in the first and last growth period do the majority of 
HRGs show decreasing waits with increases in the majority in the intervening years. 
The overall mean measures of waiting times are affected by the extent to which 
activity moves between procedures. Although substantial proportions of HRGs record 
reductions in waits in any one year this does not imply a substantial reduction in 
waiting times. Indeed if yearly waiting times were symmetrically randomly 
distributed around an unchanging mean for each HRG then 50% would have 
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reductions in any given year but there would be no overall downward trend in waiting 
times.  The first two columns of Table 5.9 suggest that adjustments for reductions in 
waiting times are likely to have a small effect because the measures of waiting time 
that we use did not change very much.    
 
5.5.1 Effect of waiting time adjustments 
 
The last point above is confirmed when we consider variations in quality adjustments 
to take account of changes in waiting times within the framework of a cost weighted 
output index. Tables below show the results of using various scaling factor waiting 
time formulae from sections 4.10.2, with the two measures of waiting time and 
different discount rates.   The first column of figures in each panel shows as the base 
case the survival adjustment variant with k = q0/q*=0.8 and the mortality cut off set to 
m = 0.10 as a point of comparison.  We found that other survival adjustments made 
little difference to the effects of the waiting time adjustments. 
 
Table 5.10 reports results from the adjustment with discounting to date of treatment 
with charge for wait (section 4.10.2.2) 
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∑   (102)               
where wjt is the waiting time measure for HRG j, rw is the discount rate on waiting 
times and rL is the discount rate on QALYs.  Note this formula differs from that in 
Table 4.8 due to different discount rates on waits and QALYs – if the two discount 
rates are equal the formula reduces to that in Table 4.8. The panels differ in the 
measure of waiting time adopted (mean wait or 80th percentile). 
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Table 5.10 Laspeyres CWOI index, CIPS, adjustments for changes in waiting 
times  
 
Discount to date of treatment with charge for wait (based on mean wait variable) 
 
Survival 
adjustment 
only 
rw = rL = 
1.5% 
rw = rL = 
5% 
rw =10%, 
rL =1.5% 
rw =50%, 
rL =1.5% 
1998/99-1999/00 1.12 1.16 1.08 1.16 1.16 
1999/00-2000/01 1.37 1.35 1.46 1.35 1.34 
2000/01-2001/02 0.76 0.75 0.79 0.75 0.75 
2001/02-2002/03 6.31 6.31 6.40 6.32 6.32 
2002/03-2003/04 7.13 7.20 7.26 7.20 7.21 
Average 3.30 3.32 3.36 3.32 3.32 
 Discount to date of treatment with charge for wait (based on 80th percentile wait 
variable) 
 
Survival 
adjustment 
only 
rw = rL = 
1.5% 
rw = rL = 
5% 
rw =10%, 
rL =1.5% 
rw =50%, 
rL =1.5% 
1998/99-1999/00 1.12 1.18 1.13 1.19 1.21 
1999/00-2000/01 1.37 1.34 1.44 1.34 1.33 
2000/01-2001/02 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.75 0.75 
2001/02-2002/03 6.31 6.34 6.44 6.35 6.38 
2002/03-2003/04 7.13 7.24 7.31 7.25 7.30 
Average 3.30 3.33 3.38 3.34 3.36 
Note: All columns have the same survival adjustment: k = 0.8 if m < 0.10, 0 otherwise 
 
 
We also considered a number of variations in quality adjustments to take account of 
changes in waiting times based on use of additional formula or different ways of 
measuring waiting times. The first reports the results for waiting time adjustment with 
discounting to the date placed on the list (section 4.10.2.1):  
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where the waiting time adopted is the  80th percentile. 
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The second is based on the use of individual data to measure mean waiting times. 
Since the waiting times and life expectancy factors are non-linear and there is a 
variation in waiting times and in ages within an HRG in a given year it is possible that 
our use of a single waiting time and life expectancy estimate for each HRG may lead 
to misleading results.  We therefore computed the equivalent of the waiting time 
adjustment with discounting to date of treatment with a charge for waiting with 
individual level data. 
 
Thirdly we were asked to consider how an adjustment for waiting times could allow 
for optimal waiting times – it was suggested that some patients might find too short a 
wait inconvenient.  In the absence of any information on what an optimal wait might 
be we investigated the implications of assuming that the effect of an optimal waiting 
time w* was to replace the actual wait in our waiting time adjustments with the wˆ  = 
w – w* if w > w* and 0 otherwise.  Thus reductions in waiting time below w* would 
have no effect whereas the proportionate effect of reductions above w* would be 
increased. We experimented first with w*  = 30 days but found that this resulted in a 
large number of HRGs where wˆ  = 0, therefore we opted to use a value of w = 15 
days. 
 
Table 5.11 shows the impact on the CWOI of these three variants, where the first 
column shows the calculations in Table 5.10, discount to date of treatment with 
charge for wait (based on 80th percentile wait variable) for comparable discount rates. 
Discounting to date on list lowers the average growth rates, mainly through reductions 
in the first and last years. The use of individual data has a greater effect in raising the 
growth rate, although this is concentrated in the first few years. The use of optimal 
waits has little impact on the average growth rates, with only a discernible impact in 
the final year. 
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Table 5.11 Laspeyres CWOI index, CIPS, adjustments for changes in waiting 
times, rL =rW=1.5%    
 
 Discount to date 
of treatment with 
charge for wait, 
80th percentile 
wait variable  
Discount to 
date on list,  
80th 
percentile 
wait  
Using 
individual 
data,  
discounting to 
date of 
treatment with 
charge for 
wait 
Optimal 
waits* 
discounting to 
date of 
treatment with 
charge for 
wait,  mean 
wait 
1998/99-1999/00 1.18 0.69 1.30 1.18 
1999/00-2000/01 1.34 1.36 1.59 1.34 
2000/01-2001/02 0.75 0.74 1.05 0.75 
2001/02-2002/03 6.34 6.53 6.41 6.34 
2002/03-2003/04 7.24 7.07 7.24 7.25 
     
Average 3.33 3.24 3.48 3.33 
*Based on 15 day optimal waiting time. 
  Note: All columns have the same survival adjustment: k = 0.8 if m < 0.10, 0 otherwise 
 
 
The results which show small effects of waiting time adjustments are largely driven 
by the lack of change in waiting times rather than the methods used. To see this 
suppose waiting times for the 80th percentile were reduced by 10% for all HRGs 
comparing 2003/04 with 2002/03. Then the discount to date of treatment with low 
discount rates equal to 1.5% would add 0.16 percentage points. With the same 
discount rates, reducing waits at the 80th percentile by 50% would add 1.12 
percentage points.   The results from the specimen index calculated with a much 
smaller set of HRGs are sensitive to the method of waiting time adjustment and can 
make a difference to estimated growth rates. 
 
In addition the impact of changes in waiting times is dependent on the cost share 
weights. In this case however, large increases in waiting times tend to be concentrated 
in low unit cost procedures. This is illustrated the final two growth periods in Figure 
5.7 and Figure 5.8 but a similar pattern is also apparent for earlier years.  
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Figure 5.7 Percentage changes in waiting times (days) and unit costs, 2001/02-
2002/03 
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Figure 5.8 Percentage changes in waiting times (days) and unit costs, 2002/03-
2003/04 
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Again it is useful to summarise the relationship between cost and changes in waiting 
times by the number of HRGs that show reductions and their expenditure shares. 
Table 5.12 shows that for three of the five growth periods the majority of HRGs show 
increases in waiting times with higher proportions in the first and final period. In 
general the percent of HRGs with reductions in waiting times are about equal to their 
expenditure shares so that reductions tend to be concentrated at the low unit cost end.  
 
Table 5.12 Changes in waiting times and expenditures shares 
 Mean wait 80th percentile wait 
 
Per cent of 
electives* 
with reduction 
in waiting 
time  
Expenditure 
shares of 
electives* 
with 
reduction in 
waiting time 
Per cent of 
electives* 
with 
reduction in 
waiting time  
Expenditure 
shares of 
electives* 
with 
reduction in 
waiting time 
1998/99-1999/00 62.3 68.7 55.1 65.8 
1999/00-2000/01 32.4 37.3 34.2 37.7 
2000/01-2001/02 31.9 30.4 33.9 35.2 
2001/02-2002/03 32.3 33.3 29.9 29.8 
2002/03-2003/04 63.4 63.9 51.5 51.7 
* Total number of electives = 563  
 
We did not estimate the alternative characteristic adjustment set out in section 4.10.1 
for all HRGs because of lack of data on health effects.   However, we report in section 
6 results from using this approach to waiting times with a small specimen set of 
HRGs for which we have better health data. 
 
 
5.5.2 Outpatient waits  
 
Finally we consider outpatient waits. Data on waiting times for first outpatient 
attendances are only available for four of the years considered in this report. Average 
days wait for outpatients were 64 days in 1999/00 and 2000/01 but then declined by 
about 10% in 2002/03 to 58 days and a further 7% to 54 days in 2003/04.  We used 
the discount to date of treatment formula as for electives above, assuming all 
outpatients had remaining life expectancy of 26 years, the average across electives.  
The cost weights for changes in waiting times for outpatients was assumed to be the 
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sum of the cost share of first attenders and follow up appointments to be consistent 
with the spells approach employed in previous calculations. The effect of this 
adjustment was to increase the cost weighted output index for outpatient first 
attenders from 4.47% to 4.59% in 2001/02 and from 6.48% to 6.56% in 2002/03. 
These adjustments become very small when all outpatients including follow-ups are 
included in the index. 
 
5.6 Additional quality adjustments 
 
We also considered the use of data in addition to survival and waiting time in order to 
quality adjust the output index.  These additional adjustments are necessarily 
speculative because of the absence of crucial data so we present them mainly to 
illustrate the application of the methods described in section 4 and to give a very 
rough indication of what are the crucial parameters on which information is required 
Given current data availability we do not recommend they be used to quality adjust 
the NHS output index.   The adjustments are of two types (a) we treat measures of 
readmissions and MRSA as indicators of unnecessary additional expenditure (section 
4.9.1); and (b) we use measures of patient experience as summary indicators of 
characteristics that patients value (section 4.11) . 
 
5.6.1 Adjusting for the costs of poor treatment: readmissions and MRSA 
 
We suggested in section 4.9.1 that one way of accounting for readmissions and 
MRSA was to argue that these led to lost output whose value, in accordance with the 
assumptions underlying the cost weighted index, was their additional cost to the NHS. 
Thus, ignoring other quality adjustments for illustrative purposes, we calculate 
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where xb denotes the number of readmissions or cases of MRSA and cb their costs.  As 
we noted in our discussion in section 4.9.1 (see also Appendix A) the current data on 
the xb are not sufficiently detailed, to enable us to distinguish say between 
readmissions which are the result of poor initial treatment and those which result from 
pre-existing poor health of the patient. In our calculation we therefore use the total 
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number of readmissions and the total number of MRSA cases.  Since we have no data 
on MRSA cases or readmissions prior to 2001/02 we show only the effect from 
2001/02 to 2003/04. 
 
There are also problems in estimating the costs cb if we do not know, for example, 
which readmissions are indicators of poor treatment. We therefore use notional costs 
of a readmission of £500 and of £1000 for an MRSA case at 2002/03 prices, with 
prices in other years estimated using money GDP per capita.   
 
With these data and working from the cost weighted index with no adjustment for 
mortality or waiting time, we can see what effect these have on the estimated growth 
rate. We show three cases in addition to the basic cost weighted index. 
 
Table 5.13   Effects of quality adjustment for readmissions and MRSA on cost 
weighted hospital output 
 
  No. of 
Readmissions
MRSA 
Cases
Hospital 
CWOI* 
Adjusted Indices 
MRSA Charge (£ per case) 0 £1,000 £0 £1,000
Readmission Charge  
(£ per case) 
0 £0 £500 £500
2001/2  476,556  17,933   
2002/3  492,247  18,519 4.44% 4.44% 4.46% 4.46%
2003/4  536,005  19,311 5.81% 5.81% 5.75% 5.75%
Average growth 5.12% 5.12% 5.10% 5.11%
*This is the unadjusted CWOI, for the inpatient hospital sector (see Table 5.3) 
 
The impact of MRSA cases is negligible. The number of cases is very small, 
compared to the number of patients treated in hospitals; a very much higher cost 
would be required for it to have an impact. The effect of readmissions is slightly 
larger (see section 4.9).  However since the growth rate, at 6% p.a. over the two years 
is not very different from the growth rate of the unadjusted impact, the costs 
associated with readmissions (which are regarded as money wasted rather than 
contributing to output) would have to be very large for there to be a substantial effect 
on the overall index.  
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Table 5.14 shows the effect of adding the readmission and MRSA adjustments to the 
survival and waiting time adjusted hospital cost weighted output index. It also further 
clarifies the calculations, in the case where both adjustments are included, by showing 
the shares of total expenditure attributed to each. With such small shares, especially 
for MRSA, it is unlikely that the impact on the overall index would ever be of great 
significance.  
 
Table 5.14 Effects of quality adjustment for readmissions and MRSA on cost 
weighted inpatient hospital output in addition to survival and waiting time 
adjustment 
 
 
Index 
adjusted for 
Waiting and 
Mortality 
Index 
Additionally 
Adjusted for 
Readmissions 
and MRSA 
Growth 
Rate MRSA
Growth 
Rate 
Readmissions
Assumed 
Costs of 
MRSA as 
Proportion of 
Total Costs 
Assumed 
Costs of 
Readmissions 
as Proportion 
of Total Costs
2001/02     0.14% 1.89% 
2002/03 6.35% 6.41% 3.27% 3.29% 0.14% 1.81% 
2003/04 7.25% 7.22% 4.28% 8.89% Combined Growth Rate MRSA/Readmission
Av 03/4 
over 01/02 6.80% 6.82% 3.77% 6.05% 
 
5.90%
Note: The index adjusted for waiting and mortality is the 80th percentile waiting variable with rw=10% 
p.a. and rl=1.5% p.a. in table 5.10.  The adjustments for readmissions and MRSA are incorporated in 
the index by adding to the growth in the index adjusted only for waiting and mortality the growth rates 
of MRSA and readmission weighted negatively by the cost shares for the previous year. 
 
 
These speculative guesstimates suggest that adjusting for readmissions and MRSA in 
this way can have non-trivial effect on the survival and waiting time adjusted hospital 
cost weighted output index.  While we stress the illustrative nature of these figures 
one important policy point does follow from them. Cases of MRSA are rare that costs 
associated with its treatment would have to be a substantial multiple of the £1000 we 
assumed before it could have an important impact on the index. Readmission, on the 
other hand, is of material importance. If the DH wishes to use our approach to adjust 
the CWOI we recommend that it should focus initially on quantifying the costs of 
MRSA cases and the proportion of readmissions which are avoidable or harmful.  
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5.6.2 Patient satisfaction  
 
As we note in our discussion in section 4.11, there are theoretical arguments against 
using such data, not least that it may simply be double counting aspects of quality, 
such as health effects and waiting times, which can be captured by other more direct 
means. On the other hand if one believes that satisfaction survey response measure 
characteristics of NHS care which are of value to patients and are not already 
reflected in other quality measures then we have suggested in section 4.11 a method 
of incorporating such data.  The data are described in Appendix A.   
 
Since patient satisfaction data only permit comparison of 2004 or 2004/05 with 2003 
we have illustrated our method by examining its impact on the average annual growth 
rate in hospital output between 2001/02 to 2003/04.8 
 
Our method has three main steps. First we quantify the ordered qualitative responses 
to various satisfaction questions by assigning them equally spaced numerical values 
between 0 and 100 for the least to the most satisfied categories.  We construct such 
numerical scores for three aspects of the patient experience: food, cleanliness and 
non-clinical experience (for example whether patients felt they were treated with 
respect and dignity). We have scores from A&E, outpatient, and inpatients surveys. 
There is a residual category of “other” hospital activity, taking up about 25% of costs. 
We have assumed that the surveys do not describe patient satisfaction with the 
services provided by this.  
 
Second, since these scores are in effect estimates on a per patient basis we need to 
scale them by a suitable measure of the volume of such experiences.  We use the 
number of patients for outpatients and A&E and the number of patient spells for 
inpatients.  The reason for choosing patient spells for inpatients rather than the 
alternative of bed-days is that the analogy with hotel services can be taken only so far. 
One can argue that most patients would prefer short stays rather than long stays in 
hospital- that staying in hospital is a necessary evil rather than a hotel service 
consumed with the readiness of a stay in a hotel. For practical purposes, because we 
                                                 
8 We also calculated patient satisfaction adjustments to the volume of patient consultations for the same 
period which had little effect because the patient experience scores changed little over the period 
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feel that, because a stay in hospital is a route to better health rather than a 
consumption good per se, we make the calculation with the volume of treatment 
measured by numbers of consultant inpatient spells.  
 
Third, the scores are incorporated into the output index in two ways.  We use 
expenditure on food and cleaning to weight the food and cleanliness scores, taking 
account of the shares of A&E, outpatients, and inpatients in total hospital costs in 
2001/02.9    We cannot, however find from the expenditure data weights appropriate 
to non-clinical experience. We therefore present results making the assumption that 
either 5% (case A) or 10% (case B) of total expenditure by hospital trusts and that 
these same proportions apply to the three activities covered. It can be doubted whether 
any form of accounting would identify the proportions since the score includes 
measures of politeness and courtesy which cost nothing.    
 
Table 5.15 reports an illustrative calculation of growth rates in the satisfaction scores, 
and the growth in the total volume of quality taking account of the numbers 
experiencing these different aspects of care in the different sectors.  
 
                                                 
9 These weights overstate the importance of the cost of providing the “hotel service” components of 
cleanliness and food quality since they also have medical consequences. But since we do not have data 
on the consequences of medical treatment for quality of life, we are not in fact double-counting. In any 
case, since the cost weights are small, double-counting is unlikely to be a major source of error. 
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Table 5.15 Illustrative indicators of patient satisfaction with hospital services, 
average annual growth rates, 2001/02 to 2003/04  
  
 A&E Outpatients Inpatients
Overall 
Change
Weight in 
overall Trust 
Budget 
   A B 
Food   0.64% 0.64% 0.85% 0.85% 
Cleanliness 
-
1.02% -2.27% -0.63% -1.05% 1.44% 1.44% 
Superficial 
Attention 0.70% -0.10% 0.56% 0.40% 5.00% 10.00% 
Quality Change (A)   0.14%   
Quality Change (B)   0.25%   
Volume Change 4.59% 5.05% 5.12% 5.08%   
Total Change (A)   5.23% 7.29%  
Total Change (B)   5.49%  12.29% 
Weight 4.47% 24.21% 71.32%    
Notes:  
1. The changes in the indicators of food, cleanliness and non-clinical care are the changes in the 
logarithms of the relevant variables. This is also true of the changes shown in tables A1 to A4. 
2. The changes in each indicator for each category of treatment are weighted together using the 
weights in the last row so as to give the overall change in each quality attribute. The food 
indicator is used as it stands because all expenditure on food is associated with inpatients. 
3. The overall quality indicators for each attributed are then weighted using weights (A) or (B) 
shown in the last two columns.  To give the overall quality changes (A) and (B). These growth 
rates are then combined with the overall volume change (calculated as the weighted sum of the 
changes in the individual volumes) to give the total change using weights (A) and (B).  
4. The quality changes for food, cleanliness and non-clinical care are calculated for whatever 
period the data happen to be available. The changes in volume relate to 2003/04 over 2001/02.  
 
 
The overall impact on the overall hospital output index of these adjustments is shown 
in Table 5.16. The effect of the quality terms is further damped because total hospital 
output includes the “other” activities in addition to inpatients, outpatients and accident 
and emergency. We have no quality data on these. But in any case, with the 
MRSA/Readmissions and quality indices both growing at rates not very different from 
the overall quality-adjusted CWOI, it is not surprising that these effects have little 
influence on the overall total.  
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Table 5.16  Illustrative calculations of hospital CWOI with adjustments for 
survival, waiting times, patient satisfaction as measured in patient surveys, 
readmissions and MRSA. Average annual growth rates 2001/02 to 2003/04 
 
Average Growth Rates 2001/2 to 2003/4 % p.a. 
  
Unadjusted CWOI 4.34%
Quality Variant 1 5.74%
With Adjustment for Patient Satisfaction (5% weight on non-clinical 
care satisfaction) 
5.71%
With adjustment for MRSA, Readmissions and Patient Satisfaction 
(5% weight on non-clinical care satisfaction) 
5.71%
With Adjustment for Patient Satisfaction (10% weight on non-clinical 
care satisfaction) 
5.69%
With adjustment for MRSA, Readmissions and Patient Quality and  
Satisfaction (10% weight on non-clinical care satisfaction) 
5.69%
Note: these figures refer to the broader definition of the hospital sector; see Table 9.2 and preceding 
discussion. 
 
5.7 Conclusions 
 
This section has implemented a number of the quality adjustments to hospital sector 
output based on the methods developed in section 4 to make use of currently available 
data.   We found that 
• the pure survival adjustment raises the average annual growth rate of the 
hospital sector between 1999/00 and 2003/04 from 2.78% to 2.99% when 
survival was measured at 30 days. 
• the survival effect has a smaller effect when calculated using in-hospital 
survival (average growth 2.91%). 
• combining the survival adjustment with an assumed uniform proportional 
health effect further increase the average growth rate by around 0.4% to 1.0% 
depending on the assumed value of health effect and the mortality rate cut off 
criteria used to reduce the volatility of the index. 
• adding a life expectancy adjustment to the survival and health effect 
adjustment had little additional effect on the growth rate. 
• combining survival, assumed health effect, waiting time and life expectancy 
adjustments produced estimated growth rates which were very similar to 
estimates with only survival and assumed health effect adjustments.   
• the effect of the waiting time adjustment was insensitive to very large 
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variations in discount rates on waiting times, to the use of individual rather 
than HRG level data, to the form of the adjustment, and to the measure of 
waiting time (mean wait or 80th percentile wait). 
• the small waiting time effects are due to the small changes in waiting times 
over the period rather than to the form of the waiting time adjustment and the 
particular parameter values used. 
• a crude illustrative adjustment readmissions and MRSA (all that is possible 
with current data) in addition to the survival, assumed health effect, life 
expectancy and waiting times adjustments, had no perceptible effect on the 
average annual growth rate (2001/2 to 2003/4). 
• a similarly crude illustrative adjustment for patient satisfaction with food, 
cleanliness and non-clinical care reduced the growth rate very slightly, (2001/2 
to 2003/4) by less than 0.1 percentage point. 
 
 
 
6 Specimen output index   
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In Section 2.4 we set out our preferred index of NHS output, a value weighted output 
index.  It is not possible to estimate a comprehensive value weighted index because of 
a lack of data on the most important characteristic: improvement in health for patients 
who survive treatment. In Sections 2.7 and 4.6 we examined the stringent assumptions 
necessary to justify using cost weights in the output index.  In Section 4.8.2 we looked 
at the sensitivity of the output index to an estimate of health gain based on the 
assumption that health gain was constant across all activities and did not vary over 
time. 
 
In this section we examine the implications of having better health data which permit 
the calculation of our preferred value weighted output index.  We have identified a 
few HRGs where data exist on health outcomes (Appendix C).  The data are similar to 
what would be produced by sampling patients before and after treatment and are used 
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to drop the restrictive assumption that health gain is constant across activities.  While 
the conditions for which we have outcomes data are not representative of all NHS 
activities, we are able to compare a number of “specimen” indices with the equivalent 
cost weighted output index for the same sub-set of conditions.   
 
We use the health data to examine: 
• A value weighted output index assigning monetary weights to improvements 
in health and reductions in waiting times 
• The impact on an index of substituting cost weights with value weights 
• The effect on health effect adjusted cost weighted indices of allowing health 
gain to vary by treatment 
 
In the next subsection we describe the data used in the construction of the specimen 
index. We then estimate the following indices: 
• A Cost Weighted Output Index (CWOI) 
• CWOI with a short-term survival adjustment 
• CWOI incorporating health adjustment 
• CWOI incorporating health and waiting times adjustment 
• A health outcome weighted output index (HOWOI) 
• A HOWOI incorporating waiting times adjustment 
• A Value Weighted Output Index (VWOI) where health and waiting times are 
treated as characteristics 
 
We also explore the sensitivity of results to 
• In-hospital versus 30-day survival rates 
• The measurement of waiting times 
• Discount rate 
• Monetary value of a QALY 
• Monetary value applied to a day spent waiting 
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6.2 Data 
 
The specimen index comprises the HRGs listed in table 6.1 below. For all of these 
HRGs, data on the health outcomes before and after treatment were available, either 
from clinical trials that employed the EQ5D or our analysis of SF36 from BUPA and 
York District Trust. The data derived from these two instruments are converted to a 
common scale. These data are described in greater detail in Appendix C. 
 
Table 6.1 Before and after health outcomes 
 
  
 
  
Health 
outcome 
     
HRG description Source HRG 0jh
*
jh
Intermediate Pain Procedures BUPA A07 0.41 0.57
Phakoemulsification Cataract Extraction with Lens Implant BUPA B02 0.73 0.76
Other Cataract Extraction with Lens Implant BUPA B03 0.70 0.72
Mouth or Throat Procedures - Category 2 BUPA C14 0.87 0.95
Nose Procedures - Category 3 BUPA C22 0.83 0.91
Mouth or Throat Procedures - Category 3 BUPA C24 0.77 0.93
Coronary Bypass BUPA E04 0.50 0.73
Acute Myocardial Infarction w/o cc EQ5D E12 0.68 0.72
Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty (PTCA) BUPA E15 0.54 0.79
Chest Pain >69 or w cc EQ5D E35 0.63 0.69
Inguinal Umbilical or Femoral Hernia Repairs >69 or w cc BUPA F73 0.64 0.69
Inguinal Umbilical or Femoral Hernia Repairs <70 w/o cc BUPA F74 0.74 0.81
Liver Transplant EQ5D G01 0.53 0.59
Biliary Tract - Major Procedures >69 or w cc BUPA G13 0.63 0.66
Biliary Tract - Major Procedures <70 w/o cc BUPA G14 0.68 0.81
Primary Hip Replacement BUPA H02 0.37 0.62
Primary Knee Replacement York H04 0.35 0.54
Soft Tissue Disorders >69 or w cc BUPA H23 0.77 0.84
Soft Tissue Disorders <70 w/o cc BUPA H24 0.72 0.74
Inflammatory Spine, Joint or Connective Tissue Disorders <70 w/o 
cc 
EQ5D H26 0.41 0.53
Complex Breast Reconstruction using Flaps BUPA J01 0.93 0.96
Non-Malignant Prostate Disorders EQ5D L32 0.81 0.85
Upper Genital Tract Major Procedures BUPA M07 0.70 0.80
Threatened or Spontaneous Abortion BUPA M09 0.72 0.83
Psychiatric Disorders EQ5D P18 0.36 0.41
Varicose Vein Procedures EQ5D Q11 0.77 1
Surgery for Degenerative Spinal Disorders BUPA R02 0.37 0.67
Spinal Fusion or Decompression Excluding Trauma BUPA R03 0.36 0.62
Revisional Spinal Procedures BUPA R09 0.32 0.60
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Annual data from 1998/99 to 2003/04 on the following are used in the construction of 
the indices: 
• Activity, measured as continuous inpatient provider spells (CIPS), derived 
from HES. 
• In-hospital and 30-day survival rates, derived from HES. 
• Waiting times, measured as the mean waiting time and the wait at the 80th 
percentile, derived from HES. 
• Life expectancy, derived from life tables and estimated according to the 
average age of those in each HRG. 
 
Raw data for each of the variables used in the indices are provided for each year from 
1998/99 to 2003/04. To give an intuitive sense of the change in these data over time, 
and hence what the various indices will be capturing, some of the data are presented 
in the following tables and figures. 
 
Table 6.2 provides elective and non-elective activity, measured as CIPS, for each 
year. Figure 6.1 shows the amount of activity in each HRG in 1998/99, when the 
series begins, and 2003/04, when the series ends. Figures (a) and (b) show the amount 
of elective CIPS for, respectively, low and high volume HRGs. Figures (c) and (d) 
provide similar information for non-elective CIPS. For the majority of HRGs, the 
number of CIPS in 2003/04 (the darker bars) is greater than the number in 1998/99. 
All else equal, this would be expected to translate into a positive change in the index 
over the full period. 
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Table 6.2 Activity by year 
HRG 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04
A07 85,645 86,770 88,495 93,227 99,493 100,640 1,444 1,048 780 679 679 836
B02 155,929 177,551 212,176 224,247 250,377 282,486 386 392 458 574 608 583
B03 32,040 20,644 13,542 10,648 7,755 5,602 172 110 101 66 34 42
C14 157,225 152,462 143,192 140,591 144,338 145,078 6,648 6,665 6,523 6,134 6,395 6,557
C22 39,451 37,603 37,511 31,858 33,653 33,026 7,639 7,680 6,899 6,773 6,919 6,542
C24 128,004 114,666 101,809 100,901 106,716 101,381 6,652 7,006 7,003 6,936 7,121 7,622
E04 15,215 14,618 14,860 15,046 16,280 15,132 2,267 1,141 1,133 950 1,935 2,074
E12 330 212 228 187 328 332 67,422 58,969 57,130 55,455 63,691 63,900
E15 10,555 11,364 13,178 15,439 17,625 21,490 4,672 4,918 5,066 4,995 8,327 10,488
E35 446 412 506 482 534 530 32,875 34,483 40,355 42,724 47,025 51,843
F73 22,300 21,432 21,886 21,348 22,918 24,405 3,322 3,189 3,105 2,957 3,097 3,217
F74 57,034 54,838 55,927 54,517 58,334 59,413 2,995 2,884 2,847 2,782 2,864 3,070
G01 75 99 57 88 112 141 324 386 302 327 343 298
G13 6,935 6,825 7,439 7,600 8,318 8,910 1,406 1,417 1,497 1,534 1,711 1,824
G14 24,491 24,707 26,169 27,636 31,026 33,125 1,879 1,962 2,196 2,264 2,822 3,157
H02 34,122 34,355 36,100 37,530 41,630 46,126 1,262 1,168 1,154 1,149 1,297 1,157
H04 27,741 28,730 31,685 34,392 41,037 48,916 166 159 182 218 205 255
H23 896 1,153 1,364 1,189 1,487 1,637 8,537 8,876 10,066 10,562 11,793 12,911
H24 2,547 3,121 3,523 3,014 3,330 3,807 11,156 11,877 12,887 13,136 13,740 14,527
H26 14,060 14,281 13,495 15,591 21,146 23,992 7,871 7,735 7,435 7,214 7,980 8,076
J01 1,833 2,020 2,481 2,655 3,095 3,337 21 13 30 22 31 14
L32 2,820 2,603 2,497 2,184 2,382 2,219 2,881 2,975 2,652 2,692 3,032 3,355
M07 67,938 62,433 58,150 55,138 53,764 52,315 11,069 10,239 10,225 9,736 9,742 9,889
M09 4,467 4,864 4,913 5,039 5,629 5,998 53,023 55,123 56,158 59,124 63,393 64,311
P18 3,919 3,378 2,862 3,308 3,816 3,439 219 206 231 192 136 192
Q11 51,872 45,659 43,145 40,306 43,846 41,156 158 150 161 150 104 128
R02 8,921 8,368 8,394 8,150 8,808 9,161 1,867 1,589 1,648 1,457 1,608 1,663
R03 6,249 6,029 6,032 6,329 7,015 7,987 1,022 870 874 792 901 1,044
R09 951 924 940 931 1,142 1,135 163 168 158 133 182 195
Average 33,242 32,487 32,847 33,089 35,722 37,342 8,259 8,048 8,250 8,335 9,232 9,647
Elective Activity Non-elective Activity
 
 
Figure 6.1 Number of elective and non-elective CIPS by HRG, 1998/99 and 
2003/04 
(a) Low volume elective HRGs  (b) High volume elective HRGs 
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(c) Low volume non-elective HRGs  (d) High volume non-elective HRGs 
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There are two available measures of the rates of survival for each HRG – in-hospital 
survival and 30-day survival. Data on survival are provided in Table 6.3. The average 
survival rate among electives was upwards of 99% and around 96% for non-electives.  
 
Table 6.3 30-day and in-hospital survival rates, by year 
 
HRG 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04
A07 99.83% 99.87% 99.85% 99.84% 99.87% 99.89% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
B02 99.51% 99.57% 99.62% 99.67% 99.66% 99.69% 100.00% 99.99% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
B03 99.52% 99.56% 99.59% 99.63% 99.68% 99.77% 99.99% 100.00% 99.97% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
C14 99.94% 99.95% 99.94% 99.93% 99.94% 99.95% 99.99% 99.99% 100.00% 99.99% 100.00% 100.00%
C22 99.93% 99.92% 99.94% 99.95% 99.92% 99.94% 99.99% 99.99% 99.99% 99.99% 99.99% 100.00%
C24 99.88% 99.87% 99.88% 99.90% 99.90% 99.91% 99.97% 99.96% 99.96% 99.97% 99.97% 99.97%
E04 98.07% 98.18% 98.27% 98.21% 98.19% 98.66% 98.28% 98.41% 98.52% 98.53% 98.44% 98.86%
E12 72.49% 74.59% 75.90% 72.68% 79.67% 87.42% 73.96% 77.70% 77.19% 75.26% 82.17% 88.23%
E15 99.52% 99.69% 99.59% 99.63% 99.67% 99.65% 99.77% 99.83% 99.79% 99.82% 99.82% 99.84%
E35 97.32% 98.04% 97.46% 98.96% 97.60% 98.91% 99.33% 99.26% 98.44% 99.38% 99.08% 99.27%
F73 99.47% 99.53% 99.55% 99.56% 99.61% 99.63% 99.87% 99.87% 99.88% 99.86% 99.88% 99.90%
F74 99.92% 99.95% 99.95% 99.93% 99.94% 99.95% 100.00% 99.99% 100.00% 99.99% 100.00% 100.00%
G01 94.52% 93.00% 84.75% 90.59% 92.79% 94.24% 94.52% 93.00% 84.75% 90.59% 92.79% 94.24%
G13 98.77% 99.13% 98.73% 99.13% 99.15% 99.20% 99.09% 99.37% 99.01% 99.26% 99.41% 99.37%
G14 99.94% 99.93% 99.92% 99.94% 99.94% 99.95% 99.98% 99.98% 99.98% 99.98% 99.98% 99.99%
H02 99.22% 99.21% 99.27% 99.31% 99.43% 99.33% 99.55% 99.54% 99.53% 99.54% 99.66% 99.59%
H04 99.30% 99.34% 99.26% 99.41% 99.36% 99.50% 99.61% 99.64% 99.56% 99.62% 99.65% 99.67%
H23 97.99% 98.78% 99.34% 99.58% 99.20% 99.33% 99.33% 99.39% 99.49% 99.92% 99.66% 99.70%
H24 99.96% 99.94% 99.91% 99.83% 99.88% 99.82% 99.96% 100.00% 100.00% 99.93% 99.97% 99.95%
H26 99.87% 99.88% 99.90% 99.94% 99.95% 99.93% 99.94% 99.96% 99.94% 99.99% 99.98% 99.98%
J01 100.00% 99.85% 99.96% 99.85% 99.94% 99.94% 100.00% 99.90% 100.00% 99.92% 99.94% 99.97%
L32 99.65% 99.50% 99.48% 99.50% 99.58% 99.73% 99.89% 99.81% 99.84% 99.91% 99.83% 99.91%
M07 99.82% 99.83% 99.81% 99.79% 99.81% 99.82% 99.90% 99.89% 99.87% 99.86% 99.89% 99.88%
M09 100.00% 99.98% 99.96% 100.00% 99.98% 99.98% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 99.98% 100.00%
P18 99.77% 99.82% 99.79% 99.79% 99.84% 99.83% 99.82% 99.85% 99.82% 99.82% 99.87% 99.94%
Q11 99.95% 99.95% 99.94% 99.95% 99.95% 99.94% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 99.99% 100.00%
R02 99.88% 99.81% 99.81% 99.81% 99.79% 99.82% 99.93% 99.88% 99.89% 99.89% 99.90% 99.90%
R03 99.40% 99.50% 99.58% 99.60% 99.46% 99.64% 99.60% 99.62% 99.75% 99.73% 99.80% 99.75%
R09 99.68% 100.00% 99.89% 99.46% 99.65% 99.64% 99.68% 100.00% 100.00% 99.67% 99.74% 99.91%
Activity weighted 
average 99.71% 99.74% 99.73% 99.75% 99.75% 99.77% 99.90% 99.91% 99.90% 99.91% 99.91% 99.92%
30 days inhospital
Elective survival rate
  
HRG 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04
A07 98.66% 98.53% 98.65% 99.02% 99.01% 99.08% 99.40% 99.35% 99.63% 99.30% 99.29% 99.66%
B02 98.04% 98.79% 99.16% 98.68% 98.10% 98.49% 98.53% 99.51% 99.37% 99.83% 98.89% 99.50%
B03 98.88% 98.21% 98.15% 97.10% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 98.15% 97.10% 100.00% 100.00%
C14 99.46% 99.26% 99.57% 99.47% 99.50% 99.42% 99.71% 99.54% 99.71% 99.66% 99.75% 99.53%
C22 98.86% 98.82% 98.83% 98.68% 98.89% 99.19% 99.63% 99.51% 99.41% 99.35% 99.51% 99.57%
C24 97.59% 97.41% 97.81% 97.41% 97.92% 97.97% 98.35% 98.06% 98.42% 97.98% 98.42% 98.50%
E04 93.52% 92.79% 94.41% 93.74% 95.51% 96.50% 94.11% 93.64% 94.96% 94.22% 95.90% 96.62%
E12 84.34% 84.18% 85.16% 85.43% 87.74% 88.76% 85.69% 85.71% 86.55% 86.76% 88.77% 89.64%
E15 96.52% 96.36% 97.21% 97.48% 97.86% 98.09% 97.09% 96.96% 97.69% 97.95% 98.29% 98.47%
E35 97.44% 97.29% 97.56% 97.43% 97.97% 98.14% 98.62% 98.36% 98.61% 98.42% 98.77% 98.87%
F73 95.65% 95.00% 95.82% 95.44% 95.55% 95.69% 96.62% 96.32% 96.76% 96.05% 96.46% 96.47%
F74 99.77% 99.76% 99.93% 99.86% 99.76% 99.77% 99.93% 99.86% 99.93% 99.93% 99.90% 99.94%
G01 84.85% 90.82% 91.91% 90.35% 91.46% 92.52% 85.15% 91.07% 92.56% 90.35% 91.46% 92.52%
G13 92.21% 90.20% 92.07% 92.23% 93.52% 92.61% 93.42% 91.26% 92.75% 93.07% 93.99% 92.72%
G14 99.31% 99.69% 99.59% 99.47% 99.68% 99.78% 99.47% 99.80% 99.73% 99.51% 99.79% 99.81%
H02 80.81% 78.26% 76.15% 78.98% 78.28% 82.52% 83.70% 80.55% 80.38% 82.16% 80.47% 85.56%
H04 96.25% 94.94% 96.65% 94.05% 96.14% 95.54% 98.13% 96.84% 96.65% 94.93% 96.62% 96.75%
H23 97.31% 97.06% 97.49% 97.44% 97.71% 97.68% 98.51% 98.26% 98.40% 98.51% 98.61% 98.63%
H24 99.73% 99.72% 99.63% 99.62% 99.77% 99.82% 99.87% 99.83% 99.81% 99.82% 99.88% 99.90%
H26 99.33% 99.39% 99.33% 99.38% 99.57% 99.54% 99.50% 99.52% 99.47% 99.53% 99.67% 99.69%
J01 100.00% 100.00% 96.55% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 96.55% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
L32 97.76% 98.22% 97.63% 98.04% 98.35% 98.43% 98.51% 99.36% 98.49% 98.81% 98.75% 99.02%
M07 99.48% 99.43% 99.44% 99.65% 99.63% 99.59% 99.62% 99.56% 99.63% 99.75% 99.71% 99.66%
M09 99.99% 99.99% 99.99% 99.99% 100.00% 99.99% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 99.99% 100.00% 100.00%
P18 99.54% 99.52% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 97.93% 99.54% 99.52% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 97.93%
Q11 98.09% 100.00% 99.38% 100.00% 99.04% 100.00% 99.36% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 99.04% 100.00%
R02 99.11% 98.56% 99.24% 98.66% 98.80% 99.32% 99.37% 99.16% 99.48% 98.91% 99.10% 99.54%
R03 93.14% 93.52% 91.88% 91.89% 95.02% 94.80% 95.86% 96.06% 95.58% 95.33% 95.83% 96.05%
R09 99.42% 98.84% 99.39% 100.00% 100.00% 98.52% 99.42% 99.42% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 99.01%
Activity weighted 
average 94.52% 94.85% 95.37% 95.54% 96.12% 96.52% 95.26% 95.60% 96.06% 96.19% 96.65% 96.99%
30 days inhospital
Non-elective survival rate
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Figure 6.2 shows the change in survival rates for elective CIPS between 1998/99 and 
2003/04 for these alternative measures for low and high volume HRGs. Similar 
information is provided for non-elective CIPS in Figure 6.3. 
 
In general, survival rates have improved for both elective and non-elective patients. 
The most dramatic improvement in survival has been for non-elective acute 
myocardial infarction (E12), where the probability of 30-day survival increased from 
85.69% in 1998/99 to 89.64% in 2003/04. As AMI is also a high volume HRG, this 
improvement would be expected to exert a high degree of leverage on the value of an 
index that included survival. 
 
In-hospital and 30-day survival rates map each other fairly closely, as comparison of 
figures (a) and (c) and of figures (b) and (d) show. Consequently, it would not be 
expected that the index would be particularly sensitive to which measure is adopted. 
 
Figure 6.2 Change in elective survival rates, 1998/99 – 2003/04 
 
(a) In-hospital, low vol elec HRGs  (b) In-hospital, high vol elec HRGs 
Proportionate change in in-hospital survival - low volume elective HRGs
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(c) 30 day, low vol elec HRGs  (d) 30 day, high vol elec HRGs 
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Figure 6.3 Change in non-elective survival rates, 1998/99 – 2003/04 
 
(a) In-hospital, low vol non-elec HRGs (b) In-hospital, high vol non-elec HRGs 
Proportionate change in in-hospital survival - low volume non-elective HRGs
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(c) 30 day, low vol non-elec HRGs  (d) 30 day, high vol non-elec HRGs 
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As discussed in Appendix B, there are a variety of ways of summarising how long 
people have to wait for admission to hospital. In the specimen index we compare two 
summary measures: the mean waiting time and waiting time at the 80th percentile of 
the distribution. Raw data for the waiting time at the mean and 80% percentile are 
provided in Table 6.4. On average, the mean wait fell from 163 days to 134 days over 
the period, while the wait at the 80% percentile fell from 262 days to 213 days. 
 
 
 146
Table 6.4 Mean and 80% percentile waiting time in days, by year 
 
HRG 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04
A07 73 66 68 68 73 77 100 92 96 101 106 112
B02 228 204 193 184 180 153 357 323 310 301 295 248
B03 236 209 197 185 165 161 371 332 329 305 293 261
C14 118 97 82 75 81 90 185 143 117 106 118 142
C22 205 184 177 167 183 173 356 316 309 288 319 294
C24 144 126 109 151 128 115 245 204 167 262 211 194
E04 195 199 215 189 154 106 350 350 373 342 256 175
E12 68 40 66 60 95 88 68 40 66 60 102 91
E15 75 72 83 84 89 92 112 104 128 126 140 152
E35 37 37 40 51 77 84 37 37 40 60 83 94
F73 178 159 161 163 161 144 316 273 271 280 280 245
F74 174 151 146 147 148 139 303 250 235 237 246 232
G01 14 13 11 13 19 23 14 24 17 13 19 23
G13 147 147 151 161 161 145 252 241 265 286 290 257
G14 162 157 163 169 169 154 277 262 279 299 302 263
H02 236 238 250 253 247 225 374 383 402 404 378 340
H04 285 285 294 294 282 252 437 444 458 445 406 354
H23 58 59 56 48 67 93 65 59 56 48 71 102
H24 76 76 64 66 68 77 96 91 72 83 70 79
H26 28 26 27 28 30 35 28 26 27 28 33 43
J01 110 109 101 119 125 122 168 170 152 209 268 254
L32 72 65 68 69 79 70 86 86 91 90 122 95
M07 109 106 99 97 100 96 173 164 150 147 155 153
M09 13 12 11 13 11 11 13 12 11 13 11 11
P18 31 19 21 40 22 18 31 19 26 40 23 27
Q11 251 225 214 211 216 196 408 371 354 352 348 304
R02 110 107 120 122 127 119 173 162 173 196 228 219
R03 165 162 180 184 179 171 304 286 318 331 330 301
R09 136 130 140 143 140 130 227 216 209 234 258 247
Activity weighted average 163 148 144 145 144 134 262 235 229 235 231 213
Waiting time
mean wait 80% percentile wait
  
 
Figure 6.4 shows the change between 1998/99 and 2003/04 in the mean waiting time 
(Figure 6.4 (a) and (b)) and waiting time at the 80th percentile of the distribution 
(Figure 6.4 (c) and (d)). Although waiting times increased between 1998/99 and 
2003/04 for some HRGs, these tend to be low volume activities. For the majority of 
high volume HRGs, waiting times fell. It would be expected that the net effect, 
therefore, of including waiting times in the specimen index would be an increase in 
the index over the period. Figures (a) and (c) and figures (b) and (d) are very similar, 
suggesting that the choice between mean and 80th percentile as a summary of waiting 
time is unlikely to have a dramatic effect on the index. 
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Figure 6.4 Change in waiting time, 1998/99 – 2003/04 
 
(a) Mean wait, low volume HRGs  (b) Mean wait, high volume HRGs 
Proportionate change in mean waiting time - low volume HRGs
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(c) 80th perc wait, low volume HRGs  (d) 80th perc wait, high volume HRGs 
Proportionate change 80th percentile wait - low volume HRGs
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As noted in section 2.7, the use of cost weights presumes an efficient allocation of 
NHS resources. If efficient allocation cannot be assumed, an alternative basis for 
establishing the relative value of activity would be according to the health outcomes 
each produces. The before, 0jh , and after, 
*
jh , measures of the health effect for each of 
the HRGs included in the specimen index are provided in Table 6.1 while unit costs, 
calculated on the basis of CIPS, are presented in Table 6.5. Where relative costs are 
not proportionate to relative health outcomes, the assumption of efficient allocation is 
questionable.  
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Table 6.5 Unit costs based on CIPS, by year 
 
HRG 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04
A07 £384 £384 £395 £422 £466 £466 £1,705 £1,746 £747 £993 £1,050 £966
B02 £628 £628 £624 £673 £682 £682 £1,094 £1,096 £1,116 £1,087 £994 £1,000
B03 £661 £661 £637 £737 £734 £736 £1,299 £1,285 £1,294 £1,580 £1,112 £1,138
C14 £465 £465 £491 £550 £574 £574 £778 £785 £850 £898 £943 £930
C22 £717 £718 £741 £849 £914 £913 £979 £988 £1,171 £1,206 £1,303 £1,307
C24 £639 £641 £679 £769 £807 £806 £948 £984 £1,146 £1,256 £1,251 £1,233
E04 £5,024 £5,121 £5,654 £6,480 £6,507 £6,388 £5,264 £5,426 £5,794 £6,401 £6,973 £6,914
E12 £995 £1,224 £1,588 £1,580 £1,745 £1,687 £1,182 £1,352 £1,484 £1,688 £1,546 £1,625
E15 £2,385 £2,388 £2,421 £2,457 £2,815 £2,820 £2,587 £2,622 £2,824 £3,040 £3,241 £3,227
E35 £812 £838 £803 £1,086 £992 £942 £855 £912 £915 £970 £893 £868
F73 £898 £901 £991 £1,093 £1,148 £1,149 £1,496 £1,521 £1,795 £1,925 £1,919 £1,922
F74 £667 £667 £731 £810 £873 £872 £1,042 £1,047 £1,126 £1,327 £1,368 £1,360
G01 £11,595 £11,839 £14,149 £18,505 £18,961 £19,020 £14,569 £14,612 £18,696 £20,229 £23,179 £23,034
G13 £1,756 £1,780 £1,857 £2,055 £2,117 £2,100 £3,073 £3,202 £3,310 £3,894 £3,802 £3,750
G14 £1,304 £1,306 £1,358 £1,500 £1,564 £1,560 £1,947 £1,961 £2,081 £2,385 £2,465 £2,439
H02 £3,965 £3,993 £4,284 £4,442 £4,763 £4,758 £4,039 £4,172 £4,741 £5,191 £5,658 £5,669
H04 £4,454 £4,471 £4,661 £4,859 £5,294 £5,278 £4,655 £4,772 £4,408 £4,084 £5,477 £5,394
H23 £713 £709 £734 £861 £851 £853 £910 £966 £981 £961 £947 £936
H24 £663 £660 £625 £614 £639 £635 £654 £667 £643 £618 £614 £609
H26 £997 £1,003 £1,051 £978 £907 £902 £1,299 £1,352 £1,448 £1,521 £1,488 £1,473
J01 £3,027 £3,032 £3,346 £3,735 £3,965 £3,971 £2,947 £3,057 £3,480 £3,218 £3,340 £3,340
L32 £481 £491 £526 £628 £653 £646 £1,136 £1,217 £1,303 £1,465 £1,303 £1,285
M07 £1,839 £1,845 £1,912 £2,109 £2,298 £2,294 £1,858 £1,865 £1,818 £2,064 £2,234 £2,228
M09 £282 £282 £305 £349 £405 £405 £325 £325 £351 £400 £399 £399
P18 £641 £644 £732 £784 £783 £783 £778 £774 £589 £2,664 £1,562 £1,451
Q11 £676 £677 £727 £837 £894 £894 £1,373 £1,397 £1,319 £1,487 £1,234 £1,237
R02 £2,311 £2,332 £2,569 £2,706 £2,899 £2,896 £2,854 £2,909 £3,269 £3,649 £3,774 £3,767
R03 £3,407 £3,403 £3,727 £3,893 £4,184 £4,189 £4,813 £4,995 £5,200 £5,764 £5,961 £5,954
R09 £2,497 £2,498 £3,061 £3,178 £3,641 £3,649 £3,007 £3,075 £3,122 £3,816 £4,476 £4,406
Activity weighted 
average £1,069 £1,078 £1,150 £1,261 £1,355 £1,379 £1,077 £1,103 £1,159 £1,251 £1,274 £1,290
Elective unit cost Non-elective unit cost
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 show the relative weight given to each HRG if relative 
values are based on costs or health outcomes, for elective and non-elective HRGs 
respectively. The figures are sub-divided to show low and high volume HRGs 
separately and with cost weights calculated on 1998/99 Reference Costs and 2003/04 
Reference Costs. The health outcome weights are time invariant.  
 
Many of the high volume HRGs appear relatively more “valuable” if value is based 
on health outcome rather than cost (e.g. C24, C22, H26, M09), with the stark 
exception of G01 (liver transplantation). All else equal, if a greater proportion of these 
activities were undertaken in 2003/04 compared to 1998/99, an index in which 
activity is valued according to health outcome would suggest greater output growth 
than an index where relative values are based on costs.  
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Figure 6.5 Cost and health outcome weights, elective HRGs 
(a) 1998/99 costs, low volume HRGs  (b) 2003/04 costs, low volume HRGs 
1998/99 cost and health outcome share - low volume elective HRGs
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(c) 1998/99 costs, high volume HRGs (d) 2003/04 costs, high volume HRGs 
1998/99 cost and health outcome share - high volume elective HRGs
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Figure 6.6 Cost and health outcome weights, non-elective HRGs 
(a) 1998/99 costs, low volume HRGs  (b) 2003/04 costs, low volume HRGs 
1998/99 cost and health outcome share - low volume non-elective HRGs
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(c) 1998/99 costs, high volume HRGs (d) 2003/04 costs, high volume HRGs 
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In the following sections we compare estimates of output growth under various 
specifications of the specimen index with CIPS measuring volume. All estimates are 
based on a Laspeyres index. 
 
6.3 Cost weighted output indices 
 
Column (i) of Table 6.6 contains estimates of output change for a cost weighted 
output index (CWOI) corresponding to equation (19) of the form: 
1j jt jtx
ct
j jt jt
x c
I
x c
+∑= ∑  
 
 
 
Table 6.6 Cost weighted output index, with adjustments for survival and health 
effects 
 
CWOI CWOI survival adjustmCWOI health adjustment
In-hospital 30-day 30-day 30-day 30-day
no threshold
k=0.8
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
1998/99 - 1999/00 -1.19% -1.18% -1.17% -1.33% -1.20% -1.19%
1999/00 - 2000/01 2.79% 2.88% 2.90% 2.66% 2.98% 3.16%
2000/01 - 2001/02 2.18% 2.20% 2.23% 1.78% 2.29% 2.57%
2001/02 - 2002/03 9.14% 9.35% 9.39% 4.76% 9.55% 12.37%
2002/03 - 2003/04 6.30% 6.42% 6.46% 6.37% 6.67% 7.49%
Average 3.84% 3.93% 3.96% 2.85% 4.06% 4.88%
threshold<0.90
 
 
This unadjusted CWOI suggests an average annual growth in output of 3.84%. There 
is annual variation in the estimated amount of growth. In particular, there is a large 
increase in the index of 9.14% between 2001/02 and 2002/03. This is driven by an 
increase in activity rather than a change in the costs. The average (unweighted for 
volume or cost) increase in activity between 2001/02 and 2002/03 was 12%. Figure 
6.7 below shows the number of elective and non-elective CIPS in each year for high 
volume HRGs. 
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Figure 6.7 Activity change 2001/02-2002/03, high volume HRGs 
Activity change 2001/02 - 2002/03, high vol HRGs
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Columns (ii) and (iii) in Table 6.6 present results for a survival adjusted cost weighted 
output index, of the form presented in equation (40): 
1 1( / )j jt jt jt jtxa
ct
j jt jt
x a a c
I
x c
+ +∑= ∑  
 
Compared to the unadjusted cost weighted output index, there is slight increase in the 
estimated output growth when survival is included in index, reflecting the general 
improvement in survival over the period. The increase is slight, however, because 
survival rates are high for these HRGs (around 97%). 
 
Inclusion of the survival effect increases estimated annual output growth by 0.09% if 
in-hospital survival is considered and 0.12% based on 30-day survival rates. Given the 
high correlation between these measures, their equivalent influence on the index is 
unsurprising. Subsequent estimations employ 30-day survival as a measure of ja . 
 
The figures in columns (iv) and (v) of Table 6.6 show the estimates including 
adjustment for before and after health status, corresponding to equation (48): 
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* 0 * 0
1 1( ) /( )j jt jt j j jt j j jtxq
ct
j jt jt
x a h h a h h c
I
x c
+ + − −∑= ∑  
As discussed in section 4.8.2, in estimating this equation it is necessary to introduce 
an arbitrary threshold for HRGs with poor survival rates. Failure to make this 
adjustment makes the index disproportionately sensitive to changes in aj for activities 
with small or negative * 0( )jt j ja h h− or * 01( )jt j ja h h+ − . If survival rates are below a 
particular threshold, only the change in survival is taken into account. To illustrate we 
estimate the equation without a threshold and with a threshold at the 90% survival 
rate. 
 
As can be seen, omitting the threshold has a dramatic effect on the estimates, 
particularly in 2001/02-2002/03, where output growth was estimated as greater than 
9% but now appears much lower (4.76%). The divergence stems predominantly (but 
not exclusively) from non-elective E12, which has a poor survival rate (of 85.69% in 
1998/99). The influence of this HRG is felt particularly in the change between 
2001/02-2002/03, when activity increased from 55,455 to 63,691. A formulation of 
the form * 01( )jt j ja h h+ − , takes a negative value for E12, with the adjustment being the 
ratio of two negative numbers and showing the increase in * 0( )ah h− as a reduction. 
This pulls the index down dramatically particularly in years where there was a growth 
in this activity (2001/02-2002/03) and up in years where this activity declined (e.g. 
1999/00-2000/01). 
 
Hence, for HRGs with a survival rate below 90%, the before-and-after health 
adjustment is not taken into account. This threshold applies in most years to E12 
(AMI) and H02 (non-elective primary hip replacement) and in occasional years to 
G01 (liver transplantation). 
 
The set of estimates in column (v) in Table 6.6 show estimates when the threshold is 
included. Inclusion of the health effects leads to an average annual increase in the 
estimates of output growth of 0.1% compared to the CWOI survival adjusted index. 
 
The final set of figures (column (vi)) in table 6.6 assume that health effects are 
constant across treatments, ie where k=0.8. As can be seen this makes a dramatic 
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difference to the estimates of output growth, changing from an average of 4.06% 
when k varies by HRG to 4.88% when k is held constant. This sensitivity reflects both 
the difference in average values of k for the HRGs included in the specimen index 
( jk =0.825) and, more particularly, the substantial variation in kj (standard 
deviation=0.14). Of course, it is not possible to speculate about the direction of 
estimated output change from relaxing the assumption of a constant value of k when 
applied across the full range of NHS activities. However, this analysis does suggest 
the impact might be of substantial magnitude. 
 
Table 6.7 presents estimates for a cost weighted output index where waiting times and 
life expectancy are taken into account with waiting time is discounted to date placed 
on the list, as described in section 4.10.2. 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
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j jt jt
e ee eh a h h
r r r
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e ee eh a h h
r r r
I
x c
+ ++ +
− −− −
+
+ − −− −
⎧ ⎫−⎡ ⎤− −⎪ ⎪− + −⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦∑ ⎨ ⎬−⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪− −− + −⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭= ∑   (105) 
 
Table 6.7 reports the sensitivity of results to: 
• Mean and 80th percentile waiting times 
• Discounting life expectancy at 1.5% or 5% 
• Discounting waiting time at 1.5%, 5% or 10% 
 
The choice between mean wait (top half of Table 6.7) and the wait experienced at the 
80% percentile (bottom half of Table 6.7) has little difference on the estimates, 
unsurprisingly given their close correlation. Use of the 80th percentile generates 
slightly higher estimates of output growth, reflecting the policy concentration on 
reducing the waiting times for long waits during this period. In subsequent estimations 
the 80% percentile wait is chosen to measure waiting time. 
 
As can be seen, the choice of a discount rate of 10% applied to waiting time has a 
significant effect on the estimates. 
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Table 6.7 Cost weighted output index, with adjustment for waiting times 
discounted to date placed on list 
 
Mean waiting time CWOI health, waiting time and life expectancy adjustment
Waiting discounted to date placed on list
discount rate life expectancy 1.50% 5%
discount rate waiting time 1.50% 5% 10% 1.50% 5% 10%
1998/99 - 1999/00 -1.36% -1.35% -1.35% -1.20% -1.19% -1.18%
1999/00 - 2000/01 2.40% 2.40% 2.39% 2.65% 2.65% 2.64%
2000/01 - 2001/02 1.96% 1.97% 1.97% 2.03% 2.03% 2.04%
2001/02 - 2002/03 9.88% 9.89% 9.90% 9.99% 9.99% 10.00%
2002/03 - 2003/04 6.58% 6.59% 6.61% 6.75% 6.77% 6.79%
Average 3.89% 3.90% 3.90% 4.04% 4.05% 4.06%
80% percentile waiting time CWOI health, waiting time and life expectancy adjustment
Waiting discounted to date placed on list
discount rate life expectancy 1.50% 5%
discount rate waiting time 1.50% 5% 10% 1.50% 5% 10%
1998/99 - 1999/00 -1.34% -1.32% -1.30% -1.15% -1.12% -1.08%
1999/00 - 2000/01 2.40% 2.39% 2.39% 2.65% 2.65% 2.65%
2000/01 - 2001/02 1.96% 1.96% 1.97% 2.01% 2.01% 2.02%
2001/02 - 2002/03 9.92% 9.94% 9.97% 10.08% 10.11% 10.15%
2002/03 - 2003/04 6.62% 6.65% 6.70% 6.87% 6.92% 6.98%
Average 3.91% 3.93% 3.95% 4.09% 4.11% 4.14%  
 
An alternative approach to considering waiting times is to discount to date of 
treatment and include a charge for waiting, as discussed in section 4.10.2.2, so that the 
index becomes: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
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⎡ ⎤− −⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞− ⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− ⎡ ⎤− −⎝ ⎠ ⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦=
∑
∑    (106) 
 
We estimate this formulation at different discount rates, with results presented in 
Table 6.8. This generates higher estimates of output growth than the formulation in 
which waits were discounted to date placed on list. 
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Table 6.8 Cost weighted output index, with adjustment for waiting times 
discounted to date of treatment 
 
80% percentile waiting time CWOI health, waiting time and life expectancy adjustment
Waiting discounted to date of treatment, with charge for waiting
discount rate life expectancy 1.50% 1.50% 5% 1.50%
discount rate waiting time 1.50% 1.50% 5% 10% 1.50% 5% 10% 0%
k=0.8
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
1998/99 - 1999/00 -1.17% -1.18% -1.17% -1.16% -0.99% -0.98% -0.97% -1.39%
1999/00 - 2000/01 2.50% 2.32% 2.32% 2.31% 2.58% 2.57% 2.57% 2.40%
2000/01 - 2001/02 2.33% 2.05% 2.05% 2.06% 2.11% 2.11% 2.12% 2.00%
2001/02 - 2002/03 12.46% 9.65% 9.67% 9.69% 9.81% 9.83% 9.86% 9.27%
2002/03 - 2003/04 8.10% 7.29% 7.32% 7.35% 7.52% 7.55% 7.59% 6.54%
Average 4.85% 4.03% 4.04% 4.05% 4.20% 4.22% 4.23% 3.76%  
 
Column (viii) has the results of setting rw = 0 so that there is no adjustment for 
waiting, only for life expectancy as in section 4.8.3.  Compared to the CWOI with 
only a health effects adjustment Table 6.6, column (v) the average growth rate is 
reduced by about 0.3%. 
 
6.4 Health outcome weighted output indices 
 
This section presents the results from calculation of health outcomes weighted output 
indices (HOWOI). For comparative purposes with the CWOI, we first estimate a 
version of HOWOI in which the impact of treatment on life expectancy is ignored. In 
effect, this amounts to comparing the use of cost and survival-adjusted before and 
after health outcomes (not QALYs) as weights: 
* 0
1 1
* 0
( )
( )
j jt jt j j
j jt jt j j
x a h h
x a h h
+ + −∑
−∑        (107) 
This equation is estimated both with k varying by HRG (column (ii) Table 6.9) and 
for a value of k=0 (column (iii) Table 6.9). As can be seen, output growth appears 
lower in this formulation of a HOWOI than the corresponding cost weighted output 
index (figures from Table 6.6 reproduced in column (i) of Table 6.9).  
 
As can be seen, substitution of cost for health outcome weights leads to a reduction in 
estimated output growth for this group of HRGs. The extent to which an index is 
sensitive to the choice of cost and health outcome weights depends on three factors:  
• Whether cost weights are disproportionate to health outcome weights; 
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• The volume of activity in those HRGs where the relative weights are most 
disproportionate; 
• The change in activity over time in those HRGs where the relative weights are 
most disproportionate. 
 
For a handful of HRGs, cost weights are greater than health outcome weights. This is 
particular evident for G01 liver transplants, which are costly (the non-elective cost 
was £23,000 in 2003/04) but their estimated contribution to health outcome is about 
average for the sample of HRGs considered here. However, because this is a low 
volume HRG and there is little change in the amount of activity over time, the impact 
of changing the valuation basis for G01 exerts little influence on the overall index. 
 
In contrast, elective activity categorised to A07 (intermediate pain procedures) 
contributes 7.4% of total 2003/04 activity, and elective activity in this HRG grew by 
17.5% over the period captured by the index. Its cost share in 2003/04 is only 0.6% 
whereas its health outcome share is 4.43%. All else equal, the growth in activity in 
this high volume HRG would lead to an index based on health outcome shares having 
a higher value than one based on cost shares. 
 
There is little difference between the cost and health outcome weights for B02 
(cataract extractions), but they are accorded slightly less weight (-0.06%) when 
relative values are based on health outcomes. However, despite this minimal 
difference, B02 exerts considerable influence on the overall index, contributing 20.7% 
of total volume in 2003/04. There has also been a volume increase of 81% in this 
activity over the period captured by the index. Thus, this HRG exerts downward 
influences on the index. 
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Table 6.9 Health outcome weighted output index 
 
CWOI
No LE No LE With LE
discount rate  k=0.8
life expectancy 1.50% 5%
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
1998/99 - 1999/00 -1.19% -2.96% -1.88% -4.75% -4.06%
1999/00 - 2000/01 2.79% 0.16% 1.87% -3.78% -2.20%
2000/01 - 2001/02 2.18% 1.41% 1.04% 0.27% 0.48%
2001/02 - 2002/03 9.14% 10.17% 9.11% 8.43% 8.85%
2002/03 - 2003/04 6.30% 4.62% 5.07% 1.95% 2.73%
Average 3.84% 2.68% 3.04% 0.42% 1.16%
HOWOI HOWOI
 
 
The previous adjustment makes the assumption that the health status snapshots *, oj jh h  
measure the discounted sum of QALYs *, oj jq q .   More properly health outcome 
weights should incorporate the effect of treatment on life expectancy, so that they 
more nearly measure the discounted sum of QALYs:  
1* 0
1 1
* 0
( )(1 )
( )(1 )
L jt
L jt
r L
j jt jt j j
r L
j jt jt j j
x a h h e
x a h h e
+−
+ +
−
− −∑
− −∑       (108) 
 
Estimates are presented from this index in columns (iv) and (v) of table 6.9, with life 
expectancy discounted at 1.5% and 5%. The impact of including life expectancy is a 
substantial reduction in estimated output growth. The reason for this is that life 
expectancy declined gradually over the period, the main reason for this probably 
being that increasingly older people were receiving treatment, as demonstrated in 
column. Table 6.10 provides evidence. 
 
Table 6.10 Average age and life expectancy 
 Age Life expectancy 
   
1998/99 45.71 25.83
1999/00 45.76 25.34
2000/01 46.17 24.12
2001/02 46.3 23.91
2002/03 46.93 23.59
2003/04 47.9 22.98
 
The health outcomes weighted output index is also estimated after incorporating 
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waiting times to date placed on list 
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and to date of treatment with a charge for waiting: 
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The sensitivity of these two variants of the HOWOI are assessed with respect to: 
• Discounting life expectancy at 1.5% or 5% 
• Discounting waiting time at 1.5%, 5% or 10% 
 
Results are provided in Table 6.11. When waiting time is discounted to date placed  
on  list,  estimates of output growth are slightly higher than those when no waiting  
time  adjustment  is  made,  with  the difference increasing at higher discount rates. 
Compared to discounting to date placed on list, discounting to date of treatment 
results in lower estimates of output growth, decreasing at higher discount rates. 
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Table 6.11 HOWOI, adjusted for waiting time 
 
80% percentile waiting time HOWOI health, waiting time and life expectancy adjustment
Waiting discounted to date placed on list
discount rate life expectancy 1.50% 5%
discount rate waiting time 1.50% 5% 10% 1.50% 5% 10%
1998/99 - 1999/00 -4.64% -4.60% -4.54% -3.79% -3.71% -3.61%
1999/00 - 2000/01 -3.74% -3.74% -3.73% -2.08% -2.07% -2.06%
2000/01 - 2001/02 0.20% 0.19% 0.18% 0.29% 0.28% 0.26%
2001/02 - 2002/03 8.47% 8.48% 8.50% 8.98% 9.00% 9.03%
2002/03 - 2003/04 2.00% 2.03% 2.08% 2.86% 2.91% 2.99%
Average 0.46% 0.47% 0.50% 1.25% 1.28% 1.32%
80% percentile waiting time HOWOI health, waiting time and life expectancy adjustment
Waiting discounted to date of treatment, charge for waiting
discount rate life expectancy 1.50% 5%
discount rate waiting time 1.50% 5% 10% 1.50% 5% 10%
1998/99 - 1999/00 -4.52% -4.52% -4.51% -3.66% -3.65% -3.63%
1999/00 - 2000/01 -3.81% -3.81% -3.82% -2.18% -2.18% -2.18%
2000/01 - 2001/02 0.09% 0.09% 0.08% 0.21% 0.20% 0.19%
2001/02 - 2002/03 8.55% 8.55% 8.56% 9.06% 9.06% 9.07%
2002/03 - 2003/04 2.11% 2.11% 2.12% 3.01% 3.02% 3.04%
Average 0.48% 0.48% 0.49% 1.29% 1.29% 1.30%  
 
6.5  Value weighted output index 
 
Our “ideal” index takes the form specified in equation (12), in which activities are 
valued according to their associated health outcomes and waiting times are considered 
a characteristic of health care. The index takes the form: 
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We estimate this index assuming that the monetary value of a QALY ( hπ ) in 2002/3 
is £30,000 and applying growth rates in money GDP to calculate values for earlier 
years. We explore the sensitivity of results to:  
• the cost of a day spent waiting ( Wπ ) - either £3.13 or £50 in 2002/3 (adjusted 
by money GDP growth in earlier years)  
• discounting life expectancy at 1.5% and 5% 
Estimates of output growth are presented in Table 6.12. These imply lower rates of 
output growth than a CWOI for these HRGs, the main reason being because of the 
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influence of treating an increasing older population (leading to decreasing life 
expectancy). The effect of applying a higher value to the cost of a day spent waiting is 
to increase estimated output growth, but not substantially. 
 
Table 6.12 Value weighted output index 
Value weighted output index
cost of day spent waiting £3.13 £50
discount rate life expectancy 1.50% 5% 1.50% 5%
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1998/99 - 1999/00 -4.71% -4.00% -3.39% -1.54%
1999/00 - 2000/01 -3.86% -2.32% -4.22% -2.53%
2000/01 - 2001/02 0.23% 0.41% -0.29% -0.42%
2001/02 - 2002/03 8.41% 8.82% 8.27% 8.70%
2002/03 - 2003/04 2.00% 2.82% 2.90% 4.59%
Average 0.41% 1.15% 0.65% 1.76%  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
In this section we have applied various formulations of an output index to a limited set 
of HRGs for which data were available on health status before and after treatment. 
The main conclusions are that: 
• Estimates of output growth are sensitive to whether k is assumed constant 
across treatments. In view of this, it would be advisable to ascertain before and 
after health status for a larger sample of NHS treatments. 
• There is a high correlation between indices using the two mortality measures - 
in-hospital and 30-day survival.  
• Although relative cost and health outcome weights differ to some extent for 
our specimen set of HRGs, the difference does not lead to dramatic changes in 
the estimates produced by the specimen index. It cannot be assumed, however, 
that there will not be greater divergence between indices using costs and 
health outcome weights for other NHS activities.  
• Unable to estimate QALYs directly, we have had to rely upon life tables from 
the general population to generate estimates of life expectancy. With an 
increasingly older population being treated over time, this leads to decreasing 
life expectancy, which in turn implies declining output growth in indices 
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where life expectancy is included. This is because our index formulations 
make the value judgement that an additional quality adjusted life year should 
have the same value whatever the age of the person it accrues to.   
• Cost weighted indices with waiting time adjustments are sensitive to whether 
waiting time is discounted to the date placed on the list or to the date of 
treatment, and to the choice of discount rate. 
• The health and waiting time outcomes index, for the HRGs considered here, is 
not particularly sensitive to which point in the distribution is chosen to 
measure waiting time (mean or 80% percentile) or to the cost applied to a day 
spent waiting (£3.13 or £50). 
 
 
 
7 Effects of quality adjustments on hospital and NHS output 
indices: summary 
 
In Section 4 we argued that it was important to include estimates of health effects in a 
quality adjusted output index. This should be done by regular collection of health 
outcomes data for a representative range of NHS activity. In the absence of this data, 
in Section 5 we used available information on outcomes for 29 HRGs and made the 
assumption that the average health gain observed could be applied uniformly to all 
hospital activity. 
 
For the specimen quality adjusted output index discussed in Section 6, it was possible 
to test the sensitivity of results to the assumption of a uniform effect.  For the 
specimen index we were able to estimate quality adjusted output using data for actual 
health effects and compare the result with estimates using a uniform health effect.  As 
expected, the move from uniform to actual values does affect the result. 
 
We recommend that wherever possible actual health effects data be used to estimate 
quality adjusted output indices. Over the next few years the number of HRGs for 
which actual data will be available should increase. This will gradually reduce the 
proportion of activity where it is necessary to make assumptions about health effects. 
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A consequence of this recommendation is that for the next few years a quality 
adjusted output index would have to be based on a mix of actual and assumed values.   
 
In this section we examine the impact of departing from the assumption of uniform 
fixed health effect (k = 0.8) and instead use actual values where they exist and 
assumed values where data is absent.  
• For the 29 elective procedures for which we have data, k varies by HRG as in 
the specimen index. 
• For all other elective procedures we assume k = 0.8 as suggested by the mean 
of the k for the elective HRGs where there are estimates 
• For non-elective HRGs we assume k = 0.4 on the grounds that non-elective 
patients may have worse health (qo) if not treated so that the ratio of health if 
not treated to health if treated (k = qo/q*) is smaller. 
 
Given that non-elective activity is growing more rapidly than elective, the lack of 
knowledge of health state and health gain for non-elective patients is a serious 
problem. 
 
We compare our recommended variant (Q2) based on a health effects adjustment 
which varies by HRG with a variant (Q1) with the same health effect adjustment for 
all HRGs, elective and non-elective.   
 
Quality variant 1 assumes k = q0/q* = 0.8 if a – k > 0.05 and k = 0 otherwise for all 
elective and non-elective HRGs, discounts to date of treatment with charge for wait, 
with discount rates on waits and health equal to 1.5% and the waiting time variable is 
the 80th percentile wait in each HRG.  
 
Quality variant 2 is our recommended quality variant. This sets k = q0/q* = 0.8 for 
electives, k = 0.4 for non-electives, k = actual k for those HRGs included in the 
specimen index where this is known, provided a – k > 0.10 and k = 0 otherwise. This 
quality variant discounts to date of treatment with charge for wait, with discount rates 
on waits and health equal to 1.5% and uses 80th percentile waits.  
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We show the effects of these two quality adjustments variants on the HES hospital 
output in Table 7.1, to all hospital output including outpatients and accident and 
emergency in Table 7.2 and to all NHS output in Table 7.3.   
 
Table 7.1 shows that the Q1 quality adjustment variant, with survival, health effects, 
life expectancy and waiting time adjustments adds just under one percentage point to 
the HES hospital unadjusted index average across the five growth periods. The 
recommended variant Q2 results in a smaller upward adjustment of just over 0.5%   
 
Table 7.1 HES hospital cost weighted output index with hospital sector quality 
adjustments 
 
 Unadjusted Quality variant 1 Quality variant 2 
 
 Survival 
and health 
effect only 
Survival, 
health 
effect, life 
expectancy  
and waiting 
Survival 
and health 
effect only 
Survival, 
health 
effect, life 
expectancy 
and waiting 
1998/99-1999/00 1.87 0.09 0.49 0.63 1.04 
1999/00-2000/01 0.91 1.97 1.73 1.50 1.25 
2000/01-2001/02 0.95 1.01 0.87 0.82 0.65 
2001/02-2002/03 4.44 7.72 7.48 6.77 6.52 
2002/03-2003/04 5.81 8.04 8.15 7.21 7.31 
   
Average 2.80 3.77 3.74 3.38 3.35 
 
Table 7.2 shows the effect of the two variants on a broader definition of hospital 
activity. All variants have faster growth than for the narrower HES output indices in 
Table 7.1. The main reason for this is the faster growth in the activities not captured 
by HES, such as A&E and outpatients, which are excluded from Table 7.1. However, 
because fewer of the quality adjustments apply to these non-HES activities the 
proportionate effect of Q1 and Q2 is smaller than in Table 7.1.  Thus Q1 increases 
average annual growth by 0.44% instead of nearly 1% and Q2 increases growth by 
0.25% instead of 0.55% over the period. 
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Table 7.2 Hospital sector cost weighted output index with hospital sector quality 
adjustments 
 
 Unadjusted Quality variant 1 Quality variant 2 
 
 Survival 
and health 
effect only 
Survival, 
health 
effect, life 
expectancy  
and waiting 
Survival 
and health 
effect only 
Survival, 
health 
effect, life 
expectancy 
and waiting 
1998/99-1999/00 2.03 0.43 0.79 0.91 1.28 
1999/00-2000/01 1.54 2.35 2.16 1.99 1.80 
2000/01-2001/02 4.48 4.52 4.43 4.40 4.31 
2001/02-2002/03 3.94 5.71 5.57 5.19 5.06 
2002/03-2003/04 4.78 5.94 6.00 5.51 5.56 
   
Average 3.35 3.79 3.79 3.60 3.60 
 
 
Finally Table 7.3 shows the impact of the quality adjustments to the hospital sector 
output on the cost weighted output index for the NHS as a whole. We first show the 
CWOI without quality adjustments and then add variants of the adjustments for 
survival and waiting times for the hospital sector. Overall NHS output growth is 
higher than either of the hospital sector output growth rates because of the more rapid 
growth in some non-hospital activities such as prescribing and consultation rates, and 
because of increasing coverage of NHS activity. Quality adjustment variant Q1 
increases average annual growth by 0.29% and Q2 increases it by 0.17%.  Notice that 
for 2001/02 to 2002/03 both variants have a much larger effect (1.04% for Q1 and 
0.71% for Q2) but rather small effects in the middle years and actually reduce growth 
from 1998/99 to 1999/00.  This negative adjustment is due, as we noted in section 
5.4.1, to the fall in survival for a small number of high activity high cost HRG.  
Notice also that from 1998/99 to 1999/00 when both Q1 and Q2 lead to downward 
adjustments our recommended variant Q2 has a smaller negative effect.  Thus in 
general variant Q2 has a smaller positive or negative effect than Q1 because it uses 
smaller assumed health effects for emergency activities.  
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Table 7.3 Aggregate NHS cost weighted output index with hospital sector quality 
adjustments 
 
 Unadjusted Quality variant 1 Quality variant 2 
 
 Survival 
and health 
effect only 
Survival, 
health 
effect, life 
expectancy  
and waiting 
Survival 
and health 
effect only 
Survival, 
health 
effect, life 
expectancy 
and waiting 
1998/99-1999/00 2.61 1.77 1.96 2.03 2.22 
1999/00-2000/01 2.11 2.57 2.46 2.36 2.26 
2000/01-2001/02 3.85 3.88 3.82 3.80 3.74 
2001/02-2002/03 5.07 6.20 6.11 5.87 5.78 
2002/03-2003/04 4.43 5.17 5.20 4.89 4.93 
   
Average 3.62 3.92 3.91 3.79 3.79 
 
We next examine input changes over the period and then in section 9 combine our 
output indices and input indices to calculate productivity growth rates. 
 
 
8 Labour input 
8.1 Introduction  
 
Current practice by DH and ONS calculates labour input by deflating payments to 
labour by a wage index. It is more usual to estimate labour inputs based on number of 
workers or hours worked so it was considered useful to devote effort in the project to 
this alternative method of measuring labour input. In addition the Atkinson Report 
recommended that labour input should be adjusted to take account of variations in 
types of workers employed, in particular the changing use of skilled workers; this 
section also addresses this recommendation. Labour is by far the most important input 
used in producing health services, accounting for about 75% of total hospital 
expenditures.  These measures can then be combined with the aggregate and hospital 
output measures given in section 7 to calculate labour productivity growth rates and 
combined with measures of payment to labour can be used to calculate total factor 
productivity growth rates. Productivity estimates are presented in the next section. 
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8.2 Labour input in the NHS 
 
This section summarises results on constructing measures of labour input. 
 
8.2.1 Volume of labour input 
 
The volume of labour input can be calculated using direct or indirect measures. Direct 
measures include number of persons engaged (including self-employed), number of 
full-time equivalents or total hours worked. The indirect measure is expenditure on 
labour deflated by a wage index, employed by ONS for NHS labour input. 
Productivity analysts tend to prefer direct measures since reasonable data are 
generally available on numbers employed whereas wage indexes are seen as less 
reliable. This section follows this tradition of using direct measures. However it 
should be noted that in sectors where the self-employed account for a large share of 
employment, as is the case for the NHS, there may be more grounds for using an 
indirect measure; this is discussed further below.  
 
The simplest direct measure is a headcount of number of persons employed. Since 
many persons in the NHS work part-time, a more reliable indicator is full-time 
equivalent workers. Such a measure is calculated by the DH where part-time work is 
weighted by normal weekly hours of these people. While full-time equivalents is 
undoubtedly a better measure than headcounts, it is only a half-way house to the 
measure recommended by the OECD productivity manual (OECD, 2001) of annual 
actual hours worked. Normal or usual hours worked do not take account of changes in 
time lost due to holidays, sickness etc. Over time trends in time paid but not worked 
tend to dominate changes in usual weekly hours worked. Adjustments to an annual 
actual hours worked basis are discussed below.  
 
8.2.2 Quality of labour input 
 
“Because a worker’s contribution to the production process consists of his/her 
“raw” labour (or physical presence) and services from his/her human capital, one 
hour worked by one person does not constitute the same amount of labour input as 
one hour worked by another person”, OECD productivity manual (p. 41).  
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Volume measures of labour input hide considerable diversity across types of workers. 
Obviously the productivity of highly skilled workers is greater than that of less skilled 
workers as set out in the quote above. Division by skill type is not the only quality 
dimension; other candidates are age or experience, gender or occupation. Nevertheless 
most research on measuring labour quality suggests skill is the most important 
dimension (Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh, 2005).  
 
The standard growth accounting formula for adjusting for skills divides labour hours 
by skill type and then weights the growth in hours of each type by their wage bill 
shares. This captures the fact that more highly skilled workers get paid more than the 
unskilled, and under competitive market conditions, the wage paid reflects the 
marginal productivity of workers of different types. Merely calculating growth in total 
hours worked is equivalent to weighting worker types by their share in employment. 
Hence if there is general upskilling of the workforce so that growth in hours is greater 
for skilled relative to unskilled workers, weighting by wage bill shares leads to higher 
aggregate labour input growth.  
 
Formally, quality adjusted labour input, with s types of skilled labour can be 
calculated using a Törnqvist index (see section 3) by: 
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is the wage bill share of type s workers in the total wage bill for all workers, averaged 
across periods t and t-1. The difference between the equation above and the growth in 
total hours worked gives the impact of skills on aggregate labour input growth.  
 
8.2.3 Data sources and volume trends 
 
This report reviewed available data sources relating to health sector labour input to 
assess their usefulness in constructing direct measures of labour input for the NHS. 
Two sources seemed particularly useful and formed the basis of the calculations 
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presented in this section. These were:  
 
• NHS Workforce Census – An annual census conducted by the Department of 
Health. This source provides data on numbers employed in the NHS, both in 
headcount and full-time equivalent terms, by occupation and organisation.   
 
• Labour Force Survey – This is a quarterly sample survey conducted by ONS. 
It contains data on numbers employed and annual hours worked by industry 
(SIC92) and occupation (SOC), distinguishing private and public sectors and 
whether the person is employed by an NHS Trust. It also contains data on 
wages, qualifications, region and nationality of employees and questions 
relating to on the job training.10  
 
These sources were supplemented by information from the NHS staff earnings survey. 
 
The NHS Workforce Census has an advantage over the Labour Force Survey in that 
being a census it captures all people whose employer is the NHS. The labour force 
survey headcounts are derived indirectly through both the industry in which the 
individual states they are working (SIC 85.1 – human health activities) and if they 
state that they work for an NHS Trust.  Against this the LFS includes agency workers 
whereas the NHS Census excludes these. The two sources were compared for 
consistency and were found to follow similar but not identical trends through time 
(shown in Figure 8.1).  
 
 
                                                 
10 Note since the LFS is an individual survey, where the person interviewed is frequently reporting for 
their spouses or partner, reporting errors can lead to situations where individuals state that they work 
for industries such as personal services but that they are employed by the NHS, e.g. contract cleaners 
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Figure 8.1 Numbers employed in the NHS 1995-2003 
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The decision was made therefore to employ the NHS Census data for the headcount 
but to include an adjustment using the ratio of agency to other staff from the LFS to 
adjust the Census data. The following table shows growth rates in persons engaged by 
broad occupational group. These show significant growth in total numbers employed, 
in particular since 2000. The growth rates are fairly uniform across broad categories.  
Within categories there is more variation. For example the number of managers, 
included in the infrastructure support group,  increased by about 6.5% per annum 
from 1995 to 2003, with a very large increase of over 11% per annum since 2000. 
However it should be noted that managers represent a very small proportion of the 
NHS workforce, reaching only 2.7% by 2003 despite the high growth. In contrast 
nursing assistants and auxiliaries show growth of less than 2% p.a. since 1995 and 
2.7% since 2000.   
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Table 8.1 Trends in the NHS workforce 
 
 1995-03 2000-03 
 
Total   2.49 4.58 
Professionally qualified clinical staff 2.77 4.53 
All doctors 3.30 4.03 
All qualified nurses (including practice nurses) 2.48 4.66 
Total qualified scientific, therapeutic & technical staff 3.60 4.73 
NHS infrastructure support 1.26 4.66 
Support to Clinical Staff 3.20 5.35 
Other 0.55 1.98 
 
 
 
Rather than use full-time equivalents we employ LFS data on weekly hours to convert 
these headcounts to total annual hours. Weekly actual hours show a slight decrease 
over time from 28.9 in 1995 to 28.6 in 2003 with rises in between.  
 
8.2.4 Quality adjustments based on qualifications 
     
The LFS is used in this project to incorporate quality adjustments. Thus the NHS 
Census data are used as control totals with proportions of workers in each skill group 
and their wage rates from the LFS used in the skills adjustment. We then refine these 
estimates in a number of ways to take account of on the job training, regional 
variations in wage rates and country of birth of workers. In addition we include an 
adjustment for doctors using data from the NHS Census and the Earnings survey since 
the qualification division in the LFS is not fine enough to ensure we are picking up all 
skill variations.  
 
Table 8.2 shows the proportion of workers by qualification group for selected years. 
Employment growth has been relatively strong among workers with higher degrees 
and primary degrees as well as those with A-levels and equivalents. The share of 
those with nursing qualifications or other NVQ4 has declined reflecting the growth in 
degrees among nurses and health care professionals. There has also been a marked 
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decline in the share of the workforce with no skills. While the figures confirm the well 
known high growth in university degrees among doctors, nurses and other health 
professionals, the changes in the lower end of the skill distribution suggest upskilling 
also among other NHS employees, illustrated by the chart for health care assistants 
below. Interestingly, managers have also experienced pronounced changes in their 
skill distribution with the percent of managers having a higher degree (mostly masters 
degrees) rising from about 3% in 1995 to about 16% in 2003 and the percent with 
degrees rising from 22% to 28% over the same time period (Figure 8.2).      
 
Table 8.2 Skill proportions of the Workforce: NHS selected years 
 
 1995 2000 2003
 
Higher degree (Masters, PhDs) 5.4
 
6.9 8.3
Degree 13.2 17.4 18.2
Nursing qualification/other NVQ4  
(higher education below degree) 
36.4 31.3 29.2
NVQ3 (A-levels or equivalent) 6.1 8.6 9.8
NVQ1 and NVQ2  
(GCSEs or equivalent, vocational 
qualifications) 
22.8 23.8 23.2
Other 6.8 5.9 5.9
None 10.0 6.1 5.5
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Figure 8.2 Healthcare assistants: proportions employed by highest qualification 
held 
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Figure 8.3 Managers: proportions employed by highest qualification held 
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It is also worth considering skill use in the NHS with that for the economy as a whole 
or other service sectors. Table 8.3 shows skill proportions in the total economy and 
private market services for the three years shown for the NHS above.  
 
Compared to the total economy, the NHS employs proportionally more workers at the 
high end of the skill distribution. These differences are more pronounced when the 
comparisons is between the NHS and private market services. Over this time period 
growth in proportions of the workforce with the highest qualifications (degree and 
above) has been higher in the NHS than in the total or market services and the 
reduction in the use of unskilled workers has been greater.  
 
One interesting trend that can be considered from the comparison between the NHS 
and other sectors is the extent to which those with nursing qualifications are leaving 
the NHS to work in other sectors. In 2003 the LFS shows about 550,000 individuals 
whose highest stated qualification is a nursing qualification. Of these 42% work in 
NHS Trusts whereas in 1995 nearly 47% worked in NHS Trusts. Some of this 
attrition can be traced to other areas of the public health sector or private health 
sectors but much is to other non health industries. Thus 42% of persons whose highest 
qualification was nursing worked outside the health sector in 1995 and this had risen 
to 45% by 2003. While this suggests some increase in attrition rates it may well be an 
underestimate since many people leaving may have other qualifications higher than 
nursing.    
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Table 8.3 Skill proportions of the Workforce: NHS selected years 
 
 1995 2000 2003
 
Total Economy 
 
Higher degree (Masters, PhDs) 2.7 4.6 5.6
Degree 11.6 13.1 13.8
Nursing qualification/other NVQ4  
(higher education below degree) 
9.5 9.7 9.9
NVQ3 (A-levels or equivalent) 12.1 16.3 17.8
NVQ1 and NVQ2 (GCSEs or equivalent, 
vocational qualifications) 
40.0 36.5 34.6
Other 7.9 8.0 7.7
None 16.2 11.8 10.6
 
Market Services1 
 
Higher degree (Masters, PhDs) 1.9 3.1 3.7
Degree 10.9 13.1 13.5
Nursing qualification/other NVQ4  
(higher education below degree) 
5.9 6.6 6.7
NVQ3 (A-levels or equivalent) 13.8 17.6 19.5
NVQ1 and NVQ2 (GCSEs or equivalent, 
vocational qualifications) 
42.7 38.9 36.7
Other 8.6 8.6 8.5
 16.2 12.1 11.4
1. Comprising distribution, transport, communications, hotels & catering, business services, financial 
services and personal services. 
 
 
The changes in the skill use pattern noted above changes aggregate labour input only 
if there are significant differences in wage rates across skill groups. Table 8.4 shows 
wages relative to the lowest group for the qualifications given in the Table above. In 
fact there are very large differences in the wages paid to workers in the NHS with on 
average those with higher degrees earning about 4 times the average unskilled wages. 
Note however that these differentials tend to be smaller in the public sector than in the 
private sector.  Also wage differentials have tended to stay reasonably constant 
through time. Therefore, based on these data, quality change is driven by greater 
employment growth among skilled workers rather than by any movement to 
employing more expensive and under competitive assumptions more productive 
workers, within these skill groups.  
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Table 8.4  Wages relative to the unskilled, selected years 
  
 1995 2000 2003 
 
Higher degree 3.88 4.07
 
3.81 
Degree 2.72 2.61 2.68 
Nursing qualification/other NVQ4 1.88 1.87 1.87 
NVQ3 1.39 1.33 1.21 
NVQ1 and NVQ2 1.14 1.14 1.09 
Other 1.48 1.41 1.70 
None 1 1 1 
 
 
Combining the information on skill use and wages gives growth in quality adjusted 
labour. Table 8.5 below shows growth in headcount, quality adjusted labour and the 
percentage point contribution of quality change for all NHS workers, and selected 
occupation groups. 
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Table 8.5 Growth in volume and quality adjusted labour input, Total NHS  
 
  Numbers Quality-adjusted Difference 
 
Total 
   
1995-03 2.68 3.47 0.79 
2000-03 4.50 5.19 0.69 
Doctors    
1995-03 3.30 3.33 0.03 
2000-03 4.03 4.20 0.17 
Nurses    
1995-03 2.75 3.00 0.25 
2000-03 4.24 4.32 0.08 
Nursing aux.     
1995-03 2.22 2.34 0.13 
2000-03 2.71 3.72 1.01 
Health associate profs    
1995-03 3.30 3.39 0.09 
2000-03 4.48 4.64 0.16 
Healthcare assistants    
1995-03 2.89 3.60 0.71 
2000-03 5.00 5.64 0.64 
Managers    
1995-03 6.59 8.10 1.51 
2000-03 11.18 12.90 1.72 
Administrative     
1995-03 2.41 2.93 0.52 
2000-03 5.35 6.17 0.82 
 
 
Again it is useful to compare these trends with other sectors of the economy. In 
addition we also show growth in labour input for the hospital sector alone, since 
calculations for other inputs discussed below are carried out mainly for the hospital 
sector. In this calculation we also include the adjustment for agency workers and 
convert to an annual hours basis. The sample sizes in the LFS were such that it was 
not possible to include occupation specific hours or agency adjustments in the 
previous table. Adjusting for agency workers raises the annual average growth rate 
over the entire period from 2.68% to 2.78% and since 2000 from 4.5% to 4.63%, 
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small upward adjustments. Adjusting for trends in hours raises the growth rate further 
to 4.75% from 2000-2003 but lowers the growth rate marginally over the entire 
period. Ideally, in the calculations we would like to incorporate trends in hours by 
qualification group. However when we attempted such a division in the LFS the 
resulting weekly hours turned out to show implausible variations from year to year 
and so this calculation was not attempted.  
 
The table shows growth rates over the six years considered in the output calculations. 
It shows much higher quality adjusted labour input growth in the total NHS and in 
hospitals than in the economy as a whole. Quality adjustments were similar in 
percentage points to those in the total economy and larger in the more comparable 
market services sector proportionally more important in the total economy or market 
services than in the health sector averaged across the entire time period and the period 
since 2000. However the aggregate and private sector estimates have been more 
sensitive to the stage of the business cycle and hence to the starting year chosen. In 
the past few years the NHS adjustments have been greater.  
 
Table 8.6 Growth in volume and quality adjusted labour input, comparison 
between the NHS and other sectors, annual average 1999/00-2003/04   
 
  Annual hours Quality-adjusted Difference 
    
Total NHS  3.37 4.24 0.87 
    
Hospitals  3.58 4.35 0.77 
    
Total Economy  0.92 1.74 0.82 
    
Market Services  0.71 1.36 0.65 
 
 
8.2.5 Quality adjustments: refinements 
 
So far the calculations assume that the only variation in type of worker is skill. We 
also calculated a number of variations which accounted for a further disaggregation of 
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doctors, regional variations, on the job training and country of birth of workers. The 
rationale for the first is that since all doctors must have degrees or equivalents in order 
to practice, the LFS data are not capturing skills acquired through on the job learning. 
To take account of this we need to disaggregate doctors by type, e.g. consultants, 
registrars, junior doctors. Data from the Census for the secondary care sector, coupled 
with snapshots of relative wages from the NHS earnings survey were employed to 
achieve a crude adjustment based on a division of doctors by consultants and others. 
Over the period from 2000/01 to 2003/04 this resulted in growth in quality adjusted 
doctors about 30% above numbers employed. For the same period quality adjusting 
based on certified qualification led to only an increase in growth of 4%. Therefore at 
least for doctors, using qualification data alone may not be sufficient to capture all 
quality change. However since doctors represent less than 1.5% of the NHS Trusts 
wage bill this amount to only a very small adjustment for the hospital sector. As we 
do not have comparable data to consider GPs, the adjustment for overall NHS activity 
is even smaller.  
 
It is likely that workers have received some additional training beyond that associated 
with their certified qualifications. Using LFS data we can divide workers according to 
whether they received any job related training or education during the 13 weeks 
previous to the survey date. Since the data are averaged across quarters this variable 
picks up any job related training carried out over entire years. For 2003/04 just over 
50% of NHS workers answered yes to the question of whether they received some job 
related training over the past year and the percentage is high across all occupation 
groups (table 8.7). Nearly half the training occurs in the employees workforce with 
about 30% off site in education institutions (Table 8.8). About half the workers 
engaged in training with duration lasting one month or less while about 20% was on 
going at the time of the survey. Nearly 30% of training was for more than 6 months.  
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Table 8.7  Percent of NHS workers receiving job related training, 2003/04 
 
Occupational group % 
Total 50.2 
Managers 56.5 
Medical practitioners 68.2 
Other health professionals 62.7 
Science & engineering professionals, technicians, IT, research 44.0 
Teaching & all other professionals etc, plus skilled trades 34.1 
Nurses, midwives 64.0 
Other health associate professionals, therapists 57.2 
Nursing auxiliaries and assistants 48.8 
Other healthcare and related personal services 46.2 
All other occupations 25.5 
 
 
Table 8.8 Location of job related training 
 
Location of job related training % 
Employer/another employer's premises 49.1 
Training centres etc 11.5 
Educational institution 30.9 
None of these 8.5 
 
 
Job related training can vary from one day courses on health and safety to extensive 
formal learning from senior colleagues. If most training were concentrated in the 
former then this would have very little impact on overall productivity of workers 
whereas the latter type of training is likely to have a significant impact. Consistent 
with the method employed in the remainder of this section, we look at relative wages 
as an indicator of relative productivity. In 2003/04 workers who gave a positive 
response to the on the job training question earned on average 28% more than those 
who gave a negative response. The differential was greatest among highest skilled 
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groups but was also large across all skill divisions. 
 
In order to account for on the job training we compared the quality adjustments when 
labour is divided by skill level with those where we included the further division 
according to whether they received job related training or not. The results of this 
calculation were to raise the quality adjusted labour input growth rate on average from 
1999/00 by about 5%, a small but not insignificant impact. Therefore our estimates of 
quality adjusted labour were scaled up to reflect the impact of on the job training.  
 
 
Finally we tried two additional calculations using a division by region and by country 
of birth but neither significantly altered the results.  
 
8.3 Conclusion 
 
This section considered trends in the use of labour input in the NHS. It showed that 
labour input growth has been rising very rapidly in recent years, mainly due to growth 
in the numbers of workers employed but also there is a significant contribution from 
upskilling of the workforce. The latter is important in understanding why expenditure 
on the NHS has been increasing rapidly in recent years. Thus a crude calculation 
suggests some 20% of payments to labour is due to paying for higher skilled workers.  
 
 
9 Experimental productivity estimates 
 
This section considers measurement of inputs and combining these with output 
estimates from previous sections to calculate productivity. Lee (2004) reported 
productivity estimates for the total NHS with details of calculations given in 
Hemingway (2004). The focus has been on refining the estimates of labour input to 
take account of the use of various types of skilled labour. Labour is by far the most 
important input used in producing health services, accounting for about 75% of total 
hospital expenditures.  These measures can then be combined with the aggregate and 
hospital output measures given in Section 7 to calculate labour productivity growth 
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rates. Total factor productivity (TFP) estimates are then calculated for the hospital 
sector and the NHS as a whole. In the hospital sector it is straightforward to combine 
the direct measures of labour input discussed in the next section with data on the use 
of intermediate inputs and capital from Trust Financial Returns to calculate TFP 
growth. ONS data are combined with the estimates for labour input from Section 8 to 
derive the aggregate TFP estimates.  
  
9.1 Labour input and labour productivity growth 
 
Using the calculations reported in section 8, annual estimates of the volume of labour 
input, and quality adjusted labour input, are shown in the following table for the 
aggregate NHS and the Hospital NHS.  
 
Note the hospital sector captures activities that are recorded in HES, which were the 
focus of Chapter 5, and non-HES activities such as outpatient, A&E, rehabilitation 
and mental health activities. This broader definition of outputs corresponds to the 
basis on which hospital inputs are measured. The overall NHS includes activities such 
as primary care, prescriptions, community care, dental and ophthalmic. 
 
Table 9.1 Volume of labour input and quality adjusted labour input, annual 
estimates of growth rates 
 
 Labour input: volume Labour input: quality adjusted 
 Total NHS Hospital Total NHS Hospital 
1998/99-1999/00 1.58 1.49 2.53 3.47 
1999/00-2000/01 1.05 1.77 1.45 2.75 
2000/01-2001/02 5.42 5.05 5.31 3.77 
2001/02-2002/03 4.69 4.51 5.57 5.91 
2002/03-2003/04 4.48 5.47 4.94 5.83 
     
Average 3.43 3.64 3.95 4.34 
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Labour productivity growth rates are derived by taking the growth in output minus the 
growth in labour input. Here we show calculations for unadjusted cost weighted 
output and the quality variants chosen for illustrative purposes in Section 7 adjusting 
for survival and waiting times. Denote these two variants by Q1 and Q2. For 
comparison purposes these output growth rates are shown in Table 9.2.  
 
The first panel in Table 9.3 presents labour productivity estimates based on volume of 
labour and shows positive average labour productivity growth across the period for all 
output variants for the total NHS and for the Q1 variant for hospital output but a small 
negative number for unadjusted hospital output. When quality adjusted labour is used 
instead, average labour productivity growth becomes negative in the total NHS when 
output is not quality adjusted, but is approximately zero using the Q1 variant of 
quality adjusted output. Hospital labour productivity growth is negative for all output 
variants when quality adjusted labour is used. Note negative labour productivity 
growth in health services is not unusual in international comparisons. Data from the 
US national accounts suggests labour productivity growth, unadjusted for labour 
quality changes, was -0.31% on average from 1999 to 2002. Adjusting for labour 
quality would reduce this further.  
 
Table 9.2 Output growth 
 
 Total NHS  Hospital 
 Unadjusted Q1 Q2  Unadjusted Q1 Q2 
1998/99-1999/00 2.61 1.96 2.22  2.03 0.79 1.28 
1999/00-2000/01 2.11 2.46 2.26  1.54 2.16 1.80 
2000/01-2001/02 3.85 3.82 3.74  4.48 4.43 4.31 
2001/02-2002/03 5.07 6.11 5.78  3.94 5.57 5.06 
2002/03-2003/04 4.43 5.20 4.93  4.78 6.00 5.56 
Average 3.62 3.91 3.79  3.35 3.79 3.60 
Notes: Q1 is the ‘high’ quality adjustment variant with k = q0/q* = 0.8 if a – k > 0.05, and k = 0 
otherwise, discounts to date of treatment with charge for wait, discount rates on waits and life 
expectancy equal to 1.5% and where the waiting time variable is the 80th percentile wait in each HRG. 
Q2 is our recommended quality variant and sets k = q0/q* = 0.8 for electives, k = 0.4 for non-electives, 
k = actual k for those HRGs where known, if a – k > 0.10, and k = 0 otherwise; discounts to date of 
treatment with charge for waits, discount rates on waits and life expectancy equal to 1.5% and uses 80th 
percentile waits.  
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Table 9.3 Labour productivity growth 
 
 Total NHS  Hospital 
 Unadjusted Q1 Q2  Unadjusted Q1 Q2 
Labour volume       
1998/99-1999/00 1.02 0.38 0.63  0.53 -0.69 -0.20 
1999/00-2000/01 1.05 1.40 1.20  -0.23 0.38 0.03 
2000/01-2001/02 -1.49 -1.51 -1.59  -0.54 -0.58 -0.70 
2001/02-2002/03 0.35 1.35 1.04  -0.55 1.02 0.53 
2002/03-2003/04 -0.05 0.69 0.42  -0.65 0.51 0.09 
        
Average 0.17 0.46 0.34  -0.29 0.13 -0.05 
        
Quality adjusted labour    
        
1998/99-1999/00 0.08 -0.56 -0.30  -1.40 -2.60 -2.12 
1999/00-2000/01 0.65 1.00 0.79  -1.18 -0.57 -0.92 
2000/01-2001/02 -1.38 -1.41 -1.48  0.68 0.64 0.52 
2001/02-2002/03 -0.48 0.51 0.20  -1.87 -0.32 -0.81 
2002/03-2003/04 -0.48 0.26 -0.01  -0.99 0.16 -0.25 
        
Average -0.32 -0.04 -0.16  -0.95 -0.54 -0.72 
Note: all productivity estimates use geometric means 
 
9.2 Intermediate and capital inputs  
 
Intermediate input for the hospital sector comes from the Trust Financial Returns 
(TFR) and is deflated by a modified version of the DH Health Services Cost Index 
(HSCI) to derive a volume measure. Intermediate input was defined as all current non 
pay expenditure items in the TFR, and hence excluded all purchases of capital 
equipment and capital maintenance expenditures as these items cannot be allocated to 
a particular year’s output.  
 
The list of items included and their shares in total intermediate expenditure in selected 
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years is shown in Table 9.4. This shows the share of drugs increasing rapidly and a 
declining trend in the miscellaneous category with no other intermediate category 
showing much change. Within the final category, external purchase of health care 
from non-NHS bodies has shown an increased share through time but remains small at 
about 6% of total intermediate in 2003/04. 
 
Table 9.4 Share of intermediate expenditure by type 
 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04
Drugs 0.238 0.242 0.286 0.303 0.316 0.338
Other Clinical Supplies 0.041 0.042 0.053 0.055 0.052 0.056
General Supplies and 
Services1 
0.139 0.134 0.150 0.144 0.128 0.122
Establishment 
expenditure2 
0.166 0.159 0.187 0.176 0.151 0.143
Non-capital premises3 0.112 0.101 0.115 0.114 0.101 0.104
Other4   0.304 0.322 0.209 0.209 0.252 0.237
1. Hotel, catering and cleaning services; 2. Stationery, communications, advertising and transport costs; 
3. Energy, rent and external services; 4. Miscellaneous services including external purchase of health 
care from non-NHS bodies and other external contract expenditures.  
 
 
These numbers for intermediate input were deflated by an aggregate price index, 
derived as a chain linked index of corresponding HSCI items. This resulted in a very 
small upward adjustment in the intermediate input deflator than one using all items in 
the HSCI, as the prices of capital items have been growing more slowly than current 
items and in the case of computers have been falling.  
 
To be consistent with the methodology employed by ONS, capital input could be 
measured by depreciation from the TFR. However this calculation ignores any capital 
services from capital purchases in the current year. An alternative is to assume a 
proportion of these expenditures are depreciated in the current year. Since much of the 
expenditure is on computers, software and medical equipment with low asset lives, we 
assume one third of these assets are depreciated. These capital services are deflated by 
a chain linked deflator for capital items in the HSCI while depreciation is deflated by 
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the ONS capital consumption deflator for the total NHS. Adding a proportion of 
capital expenditures implies average annual real capital growth of 4.76% per annum 
from 1998/99 to 2003/04 compared to 4.69% using depreciation alone, a small effect. 
However it does raise capital’s share from 0.041 to 0.080. Finally consistent with the 
methodology employed in private services the value of business rates are added to 
capital’s share. 
  
Calculating input shares is more difficult for the total NHS since we attempt to 
combine data from different sources. For the aggregate NHS we use TFR data on 
payments to labour in the hospital sector and use ONS data for payments to labour in 
other parts of the NHS. Similarly, intermediate inputs are derived combining 
expenditures from TFR and PFR with ONS data on other parts of the NHS. Capital 
inputs are those employed by ONS in their measures of Health Sector Productivity. 
Family Health Drugs are deflated by the cost of all items rather than the ONS quality 
adjusted Paasche variant. The estimates for the NHS should be treated with 
considerable caution since data are being taken from a number of sources which may 
need further reconciling.   
 
Table 9.5 shows average period input shares and average growth in the three inputs 
where labour input is the quality adjusted variant. 
 
Table 9.5 Average period input shares and average growth in inputs 
 
 NHS Hospital 
 Shares Input growth Shares input growth 
Labour 0.61 3.95 0.72 4.34 
Intermediate 0.33 8.58 0.20 4.93 
Capital 0.06 3.12 0.08 4.76 
 
Labour represents a lower share in the total NHS than in the hospital sector, mainly 
due to the inclusion of family health prescribing in the former. Growth in intermediate 
input is very large in the total NHS, while all three inputs show similar average 
growth rates in the hospital sector.  
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9.3 Total factor productivity growth 
 
Combining the input shares with growth in real inputs allow the calculation of total 
input growth and subtracting this from output growth yields total factor productivity 
growth rates, shown in Table 9.6. Average TFP growth rates are strongly negative for 
the total NHS for all quality variants. The numbers based on quality adjusted output 
are similar to those calculated by ONS reported in Lee (2004). The ONS estimates 
using the most comparable methods to measure inputs suggest average TFP declining 
by 1.34% per annum over the same period. However it should be noted that ONS 
output measures use reference cost activities which are not directly comparable with 
the HES based data employed in this report’s calculations.  Average TFP growth is 
also negative for the hospital sector but less so than for the total NHS.  The results are 
sensitive to the allocation of expenditures between the three broad categories of 
inputs.  Lee (2004) highlighted the sensitivity of the results to the deflators used, in 
particular for drugs – see also the discussion in section 10.5. However since drugs are 
both an input and an output this sensitivity is surprising. Hence some further 
investigation is required and will be carried out following discussions with ONS.  
 
Table 9.6 Total factor productivity growth 
 
 Total NHS  Hospital 
 Unadjusted Q1 Q2  Unadjusted Q1 Q2 
1998/99-1999/00 -2.33 -2.95 -2.71  -2.82 -4.00 -3.53 
1999/00-2000/01 0.55 0.89 0.69  0.30 0.91 0.56 
2000/01-2001/02 -2.12 -2.15 -2.22  0.17 0.13 0.01 
2001/02-2002/03 -1.86 -0.88 -1.19  -2.01 -0.46 -0.95 
2002/03-2003/04 -2.97 -2.25 -2.51  -1.13 0.02 -0.39 
        
Average -1.75 -1.48 -1.59  -1.11 -0.70 -0.87 
 
 
The finding that TFP growth is negative is not unusual in the private sector. For 
example Basu et al. (2003) report negative gross output based annual average TFP 
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growth rates for a number of sectors in the 1990s including insurance and business 
services. Similar results have frequently been reported by the US Bureau of Labour 
Statistics. Negative TFP growth is mostly likely to occur in service sectors where 
output is poorly measured and quality adjustment is minimal. TFP growth rates for the 
private sector using comparable measurement methods are not yet available for the 
period under consideration in this report.  
 
When inputs are measured correctly, with adjustments for quality change then the 
TFP residual is close to a measure of pure technical change so long as output is also 
measured correctly. But as emphasised in many parts of this report, we are only 
capturing part of the improvement in quality of care via our proposed adjustments for 
survival, health effects and waiting times. Because of this incomplete adjustment for 
quality change we expect to underestimate TFP growth.  There are also reasons why 
in the short term at least we might expect negative growth rates. The literature on the 
impact of information technology on productivity in the private sector points to an 
important role of organisational changes in facilitating benefits from new technology. 
Basu et al. (2003) suggest that these changes can lead to declining TFP in the short 
run due to disruption of production processes. There is no doubt that the NHS is 
undergoing significant change. 
 
Of more consequence for the health sector is the notion that there are diminishing 
returns as increased activity allows treatment of more complex and hence most costly 
cases. Activity rates have been increasing more rapidly in recent years. Some 
evidence in support of this is provided by the increased average age of patients treated 
in hospitals, from 48.6 years in 1999/00 to 50 years in 2003/04. In addition there has 
been some increase in the expenditure shares of HRG categories with the title 
‘complex elderly’ from 3.4% of expenditures to 4.2% over the same period. Changes 
in the case mix are likely to be larger within than across HRGs but we lack the 
necessary data to examine this. Data that identified the characteristics of patients 
would also be useful in identifying the extent to which changes in NHS productivity 
are affected by diminishing returns.      
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10 Improving the data 
  
We appreciate that the Department of Health is trying to reduce the amount of data 
collected from the NHS (Review of Central Returns Unit).  However, the data 
requirements outlined below are essential to development of robust measures of 
output, productivity and quality change in the NHS.  These data will be required not 
only by the DH and Trusts to improve performance of the NHS but also by outside 
bodies such as the Treasury and ONS. 
  
10.1  Outcomes data 
 
10.1.1 Health outcomes 
 
The main aim of the health system is the improvement of the health of the population. 
This being so, it would seem reasonable that any measure of health system 
performance, output and productivity should include measures of the effect of the 
system on health. The challenges associated with measuring the effect of interventions 
are discussed in Appendix C. 
 
The construction of a productivity index requires information about changes in health 
status attributable to interventions. Such information currently is not collected by the 
NHS. We suggest the systematic use of a standardised measure of health status to 
improve the effective management of the NHS and to provide the fundamental data 
needed to properly reflect changes in NHS productivity. 
 
We have suggested that the NHS should collect data on the health of patients before 
and after treatment. An outcome measure based on the difference between snapshot 
measures of health status before treatment hb and after treatment ha is an imperfect 
measure of the change in the discounted sum of QALYs due to treatment. It does not 
measure health with and without care but health before and after care.  It also replaces 
each time profile with a single snapshot.  For some treatments and conditions the 
effect of treatment is merely to slow down the rate of decline in health status, so that 
0a bh h− <  even though the treatment increases the sum of QALYs compared with no 
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treatment. For these cases incorporating estimates of hb and ha in estimates of the level 
of output in any given year would reduce measured output.  
 
However, since the aim is to measure the rate of growth of output productivity we are 
interested in whether the rate of growth of h∆ = ha – hb  is a reasonable approximation 
to the rate of growth of the effect of treatment on the discounted sum of QALYs.   The 
important issue is how well the rate of change in measures based on the snapshots hb, 
ha approximates the rate of change in the areas under the two time profiles of health 
streams with treatment h*(s) and without treatment ho(s)    
 
Both the level of health before treatment hb and the health of treated patients if not 
treated depend on the patient population selected for treatment and on the general 
health of the population.  It is not unreasonable to suggest that the rates of change of 
hb and the discounted value of the no treatment health profile ho(s) over time will be 
similar.   Both the snapshot level of health after treatment ha and the discounted value 
of the time profile h* will be measured on the same population and hence are affected 
by the same factors including any technological change.   
 
Hence, despite the imperfections of the difference between snapshots of post and pre 
treatment heath status for calculating the level of productivity, we suggest that rates of 
change of measures based on hb, ha will improve estimates of NHS output growth 
compared to estimates where such information is not used.  
 
The following points need to be addressed in such a data collection exercise. 
 
? NHS patient sample. Since the scale of NHS activity is so broad and the 
potential volume of patients is so large sampling seems a more sensible 
strategy than attempting to measure health effects for all NHS patients in a 
sector.  Sample sizes are likely to vary across different types of patients. While 
a random sample of the NHS patient population would be preferable, in the 
first instance it may be satisfactory to undertake a pilot exercise at a handful of 
Trusts. This might be adequate for national measures of output but would be 
inadequate if information on health outcomes are to be used to improve 
performance of the NHS.  
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? Choice of instrument. A single generic, rather than condition-specific 
instrument is required in order to facilitate aggregation across different types 
of NHS activity. Profiles such as SF-36 provide multiple measures of outcome 
but are unsuitable for most non-clinical purposes since they typically lack the 
capacity to form a single aggregate index. Derivatives of SF-36 such as the 
SF-6D do not suffer from this deficiency. The EQ-5D is designed to produce a 
single index and its five dimensions have been calibrated in terms of social 
preference weights of a UK population and is probably the primary candidate 
measure.  
 
? Timing.  The timing of before and after health status measurement may 
depend on the type of activity (emergency or elective) and on diagnostic 
category or intervention type since different treatments may have an effect 
over shorter or longer periods.  Our analysis of data for two elective 
procedures (hip and knee replacement) shows most treatment gain after six 
months but clinical advice could be used to determine the appropriate period 
for follow-up post treatment for other conditions. 
 
? Grouping of NHS activities.  Given the enormous range of NHS activities it 
is necessary to group them for data analysis. The main grouping of secondary 
care activities is at present by HRG which attempts to group activities by their 
costs. But a given HRG may contain a large number of procedures which have 
very different effects on health. The availability of patient-level health 
outcomes data by ICD will permit matching to other datasets (such as HES) 
and will make it possible to explore the extent to which health outcomes are 
related to other routinely collected patient characteristics, such as age, gender, 
diagnoses, procedure, survival rates and mortality.  This is essential if we are 
to develop disease specific studies of improvement in health care.  
 
? Frequency of data collection.   If the pace of technological change in 
medicine was slow enough it could be argued that collecting data on health 
outcomes was an exercise that needed to be undertaken only at intervals of 
several years. But technological change in medicine and pharmaceuticals is 
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rapid, the NHS is subject to frequent organisational change which may affect 
the mix of patients receiving particular treatments and the speed at which new 
technology spreads.  We believe that only a continuous sampling of the NHS 
patient population will be adequate to capture trends in the impact of NHS 
services on patients.  
 
10.1.2 Feasibility 
 
Outside clinical trials, experience of routine collection of health status data in the UK 
is patchy.  Individual clinicians and clinical teams make use of a variety of 
standardised measures, but this is largely uncoordinated, its coverage remains 
undocumented and aggregation of such data is problematic given the use of different 
instruments.  
 
Although there are a limited number of examples of prospective health data collection 
these examples demonstrate that such data collection would be feasible in the NHS. 
 
? The survey of acute inpatients conducted by Picker International showed 
that it was possible to collect EQ-5D data from a sample of patients recently 
discharged from all NHS Trust hospitals.  The value of these data would have 
been enhanced if they been linked with basic HES variables, such as diagnosis 
or procedure. Given current DH policy to regularly survey patient experience, 
inclusion of questions on health outcomes would involve very low marginal 
cost. 
 
? The Health Outcomes Data Repository (HODaR) operates a continuous 
survey of all inpatients and outpatients at a single large Welsh Trust. These are 
now linked to individual level primary and community care data. Data for 
more than 30,000 patients have been collected, almost 10% of these having 
completed EQ-5D on more than one occasion. However, the data are 
predominantly based on post-discharge observations and this limits their value 
in measuring health outcomes. Since the advent of this project the HODaR 
survey has started to collect data on pre-admission health status. 
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? As described in Appendix C, for a number of years BUPA has been routinely 
administering health status questionnaires to patients before and three months 
after treatment, with some 100,000 having now been surveyed. These data are 
restricted primarily to elective procedures. BUPA plan to extend them to four 
types of cancer.  
 
10.1.3 Cost 
 
The incremental costs of introducing systematic observation of health status via 
existing information systems are difficult to estimate. Currently BUPA estimates that 
it costs around £4 per patient to administer their manual system of health status 
measurement based on SF-36.  
 
The introduction of systematic health status measurement might be achieved under the 
aegis of the National Programme for Information Technology announced in 
December 2002 with a budget of £2.3 billion and which the Audit Commission 
suggested would provide the Department of Health with the opportunity to improve 
NHS data quality. 
 
It would seem sensible to consider an extension to the current HES-based data to 
provide maximum scope for exploitation through record linkage. Modification of this 
sort ought not to incur a significant cost. However, the data captured from patients 
will require additional organisational and administrative costs. Patient-centred 
reporting systems using traditional paper and pencil techniques require costly 
processing in order to link them to other NHS data. Computer-assisted interview 
methods have scope for more efficient data acquisition and transmission but would 
need more costly administration. The use of handheld PDA recording systems is now 
becoming a feature of many clinical trials that record patient-reported health status 
and it can be expected that hardware costs will continue to fall.  
 
10.2 Other outcome measures: patient satisfaction 
 
As we emphasised in our First Interim Report the effect of the NHS on health status is 
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obviously an extremely important dimension of NHS outcomes but other dimensions, 
especially process related outcomes, should also be taken into account.  However, 
existing patient surveys rarely ask similar questions over time.  The DH should decide 
on core aspects of the patient experience and ensure these questions appear each year 
in patient satisfaction surveys. A problem we discuss in this report is that of 
identifying a relevant weight to place on patient experience in a quality adjusted 
output index.  Ryan (2004) recommended that the DH undertake a series of discrete 
choice experiments to obtain evidence on the relative value patients attach to different 
aspects of process quality. We endorse this recommendation. 
 
10.3 General practice data 
 
10.3.1 GP activity  
 
We have discussed the measures of GP consultations in section 4.4, noting the 
unsatisfactory nature of the current source (General Household Survey) and that the 
DH is now planning to obtain consultations directly from GP record systems via the 
QRESEARCH database.  We have agreed to investigate this new data for the DH to 
determine what if any adjustments need to be made to improve its reliability.   
 
Ideally NHS productivity measures should be based on numbers of patient journeys of 
different types where journeys are likely to involve both primary and secondary care. 
In the absence of routine record linkage such measures are not currently feasible but it 
would still be worthwhile getting a finer breakdown of GP consultations to allow for 
the changing mix of providers and for the changing mix of types of consultations.   
 
We have also discussed measures of general practice quality in section 4.13. Whilst 
QRESEARCH and similar databases of GP record systems and the central collection 
of the greatly enlarged set of quality indicators linked to GP pay will provide 
potentially useful quality adjustment these will need to be based on careful empirical 
modelling of GPs responses to the new financial incentives, especially possible 
diversion of effort from unremunerated quality efforts. 
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10.3.2 GP cost weights   
 
The PSSRU estimates the unit costs of GP and nurse consultations 
(http://www.pssru.ac.uk/pdf/uc2003/uc2003.pdf) using a variety of official and 
unofficial sources.  Several of the estimates rest on self reported GP activity from the 
1992/3 GP Workload Survey undertaken for the DDRB. There does not appear to be a 
more recent survey of GP activity and we recommend that DH should consider 
undertaking such a survey at regular intervals.  
 
10.3.3 General practice staff 
 
Prior to April 2004, practice staff such as practice nurses, although practice 
employees, were partly paid for by the NHS and so a record was kept, though it was 
not a reliable source because not all practices claimed these subsidies.  Under the new 
GP contract the subsidies have been abolished and there is no record of non-GP staff 
in practices. Now practices instead receive a sum of money based on their practice.  
We recommend that the DH make it a condition of the practice contract that a full 
return of employed staff is made.   
 
10.3.4 Prescribing  
 
The prescription activity measure in the recently revised NHS outputs index is derived 
from PPA data.  The PPA data are collected in order to remunerate pharmacists (and 
dispensing GPs). It is therefore a comprehensive measure of prescriptions dispensed 
and can be disaggregated to product type if required.  The data are reliable, 
comprehensive and readily available at national levels of aggregation. They have been 
used to construct a number of indicators of practice prescribing quality as well as 
quantity.   
 
The usefulness of the data could be greatly improved and this would be relatively 
simple.  The most obvious example is by improving the patient information on the 
prescription form.  At the moment the only patient data on the form indicates if the 
patient is entitled to free prescriptions and on what grounds.  The information has 
been used by the Prescribing Support Unit to produce the Low Income Scheme Index 
(LISI) which measures the proportion of prescriptions which are dispensed without 
 195
charge on grounds of low income. The LISI is the only direct variable measuring 
practice population socioeconomic status which relates directly to practice patients 
rather than being attributed from Census or Social Security data on the basis of patient 
postcode.  Adding a field for diagnosis to the prescription form would greatly enhance 
the usefulness of routine prescribing data as a measure of prescribing quality.  Adding 
gender and age fields would also improve the socioeconomic data and improve 
prescribing quality indicators.  We recommend that the DH should add these fields to 
the prescription form. 
 
10.4 Other primary care data 
 
NHS Direct, NHS Direct Online and Walk-In Centres are recent innovations in the 
provision of first contact advice and information. They are likely to reduce the costs to 
patients of such first contacts, leading both to an increase in primary care activities 
and to a change in the mix of activities in general practice. The organisations are 
expected to play an increasing role in the NHS over the coming years and it is 
important that their presence is recognised in measures of NHS output and 
productivity. 
 
Aggregate data on use of NHS Direct and NHS Direct Online are available. In order 
to measure the outputs of the services more accurately it would be helpful to have data 
on  
? the breakdown of enquires between the provision of health advice and 
information about the health service 
? the type of conditions people seek health advice about 
? actions that are recommended as a result of the request 
 
It is possible that such data have been collected, for example via the website service 
for those who seek advice from a nurse which involves self-completion of a detailed 
questionnaire on the nature of the symptoms and condition, as well as personal 
information. Presumably – although we have not been able to ascertain whether this is 
the case – enquiries that result in a self-care recommendation are logged also. The 
telephone service seems to be set up in a similar fashion, the difference being that the 
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information is recorded by NHS Direct staff.  
 
It appears, therefore, that these two organisations routinely collect (or, at least, have 
the capacity to collect) detailed electronic information from every person making an 
enquiry about their (or their family member’s) health condition. 
  
We recommend that the DH should utilise more of the data collected by NHS Direct 
to improve measures of output. 
 
10.5 Inputs 
 
It is important to have a comprehensive coverage of inputs used in producing health 
services in order to explain changes in outputs and to measure productivity.  Thus we 
require values of expenditures on inputs, volume measures and price deflators to 
convert values to volume measures when the latter are not available. We also require 
data on the extent to which the quality of inputs are changing through time. When 
volume measures are available, under the assumption that payments to labour equal 
marginal products, weighting diverse inputs by their shares in wage bills can be 
employed to adjust for quality change. Alternatively hedonic regressions may be 
employed to quality adjust price deflators. Both methods depend on competitive 
market assumptions which are unlikely to characterise many of the markets in which 
the NHS operates.  
 
The analysis of labour input showed that it is possible to derive reasonable volume 
measures and adjustments for quality change by linking readily available data sources. 
The quality adjustment employed was certified qualifications with an additional 
adjustment for job related training. While certified qualifications are useful they may 
not be sufficiently detailed to capture differences in the productive capacity of some 
employees. Many professionals within the NHS have similar qualifications since there 
are minimum requirements set by professional bodies. While the NHS census does 
include very detailed data on numbers of professionals by grade, there is no 
comparable data on earnings. The persons responsible for the Earnings survey within 
DH were unwilling to attempt to match earnings to the Census numbers by type on the 
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valid grounds that the sample size was too small. A larger sample survey of wage 
rates and earnings within the NHS would be very useful, not only for the productivity 
calculations carried out in this report but also to calculate the extent to which 
increases in payments to labour are due to employing more highly skilled personnel as 
against mere wage inflation.  
 
 
The productivity calculations in section 9 above highlight the importance of 
intermediate inputs in overall NHS activity and to a lesser extent in hospital activity. 
Reliable volume measures require reasonable estimates of intermediate input 
deflators. The main problem with intermediate inputs is the price deflator employed 
for drugs. As mentioned in section 3.3 above ONS is currently attempting to refine its 
deflator for prescription drugs based on detailed data on prices. Data sources for 
prices of hospital drugs are not readily available. Even if such data could be collected, 
it is doubtful if they would be useful as a tool for quality adjustments. Hedonic type 
adjustments are only valid in competitive markets. The market for hospital drugs in 
Britain is best characterised as a bilateral monopoly with a monopsony purchaser 
buying from powerful oligopoly drug producers. The standard textbook model of 
bilateral monopoly shows that the price will depend on the relative bargaining power 
of the purchasers and suppliers. It is well known that the NHS buys drugs at a 
discount and it may well be the case that discounting on new drugs may swamp any 
quality change, at least at the point of entry. The use of prescription drugs are in the 
control of independent GPs so the monopsony element is less important but there 
remain market imperfections on the producer side.  
 
These remarks suggest that using drugs prices to measure quality requires an 
understanding of how markets operate and should be based on a time profile of prices 
rather than comparisons between old and new drugs at the time new drugs enter the 
market. A more fruitful but also costly approach might be to examine patient 
outcomes and drug use from disease registers or to obtain opinions from panels of 
experts. This is simply another example of the need for outcomes data if we are to 
measure technical change and productivity in health care. 
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In order to quality adjust capital input it would be useful to have separate investment 
data on types of equipment that have seen rapid technological change and change in 
unit cost (e.g. MRI scanners). Alternatively it would be useful to have the value of the 
stock of these assets, numbers of items and age profiles of the stock. One problem that 
must be addressed is the gap in data created by PFI confidentiality.  We understand 
that a significant proportion of new investment in equipment such as scanners is being 
undertaken under PFI contracts.  Unless it is possible to access information on stocks 
and value, it may not be possible to adequately deal with questions of productivity 
growth and technical change associated with investment in new equipment. It would 
also be useful to have information on investment by GPs. 
 
 
11 Conclusions and recommendations 
11.1 Methods 
 
11.1.1 The preferred approach 
 
Economic theory suggests that the preferred way of measuring NHS output is with a 
value weighted output index.   
• The unit of output is the patient treated, the characteristics of output valued by 
individuals indicate quality and the weight attached to each characteristic 
reflects the marginal social value of the characteristic. 
• The index overcomes the serious problem of a cost weighted index where 
movement to more cost-effective ways of treating patients appears as a 
reduction in output. 
• Data necessary to estimate this index are not currently available but are 
feasible to collect.   
• A condition specific value weighted index can be constructed as data on major 
diseases becomes available. 
 
Not only is the value weighted index theoretically correct, it would allow 
measurement of improvements in delivery of services intended to raise both 
productivity and patient satisfaction. 
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11.1.2 Methods using existing data 
 
It is not possible to calculate a value weighted index with current data.  It is possible 
to quality adjust the hospital component of a cost weighted NHS output index using 
existing data combined with some assumptions.  We have  
• spelt out the methods for quality adjustment with existing data in some detail, 
taking care to emphasise the necessary assumptions and their implications, 
rather than merely presenting plausible ad hoc adjustments which may in fact 
contain dubious assumptions or value judgements.    
• shown how it is possible to use routine data on short term survival and waiting 
times, coupled possibly with an explicit assumption about the proportionate 
effect of treatment on health, to calculate quality adjusted cost weighted output 
indices.   
• presented experimental calculations of these indices to compare their effects 
on a simple cost weighted output index and to investigate the empirical 
implications of the assumptions about important parameters which are 
required. 
• used data on the health effects of a limited set of treatments to illustrate the 
construction of a value weighted index for the set and to shed further light on 
the implications of making possibly inaccurate assumptions about the health 
effects when constructing an index for all hospital treatments. 
• described how it is possible in principle to use data on other aspects of care 
(readmissions, MRSA, patient satisfaction with food, cleanliness and non-
clinical care) to provide an additional quality adjustment and have produced 
some illustrative examples of such adjustments based on the current 
unsatisfactory data on these characteristics of care. 
• described a method of quality adjustment using the information on longer term 
survival which will become available in the near future. 
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11.2 Results 
 
11.2.1 Results for the hospital sector 
 
Results are reported for a cost weighted quality adjusted output index over the period 
1999/00 – 2003/04.  It was only possible to quality adjust for hospital activity, 47% of 
expenditure covered in the DH cost weighted output index.  In Section 5 we examine 
sensitivity to discount rates and key assumptions. Table 11.1 summarises the central 
results. 
 
Table 11.1  Hospital sector cost weighted output index with recommended 
quality adjustments (growth rates%)  
 
 No adjustment
Survival and 
health effects 
adjustment1 
With survival. health 
effects, and waiting 
time adjustments2 
1998/99-1999/00 2.03 0.91 1.28 
1999/00-2000/01 1.54 1.99 1.80 
2000/01-2001/02 4.48 4.40 4.31 
2001/02-2002/03 3.94 5.19 5.06 
2002/03-2003/04 4.78 5.51 5.56 
 
Average p.a. 3.35 3.60 3.60 
1 This sets k = q0/q* = 0.8 for electives, k = 0.4 for non-electives, k = actual k for those HRGs included 
in the specimen index where this is known, provided a – k > 0.10 and k = 0 otherwise. 
2 Recommended quality variant 2. As note 1 plus discounts to date of treatment with charge for wait, 
with discount rates on waits and life expectancy equal to 1.5% and uses 80th percentile waits.  
 
 
Table 11.2 shows the impact of incorporating quality adjustments for the hospital 
sector into the overall NHS cost weighted output index. 
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Table 11.2 Aggregate NHS cost weighted output index with hospital sector 
quality adjustments (growth rates %) 
 
 
Unadjusted CWOI CWOI with hospital survival 
and waiting time adjustments1 
1998/99-1999/00 2.61 2.22 
1999/00-2000/01 2.11 2.26 
2000/01-2001/02 3.85 3.74 
2001/02-2002/03 5.07 5.78 
2002/03-2003/04 4.43 4.93 
 
Average p.a. 3.62 3.79 
1 Recommended quality variant 2. This sets  k = q0/q* = 0.8 for electives, k = 0.4 for non-electives, k = 
actual k for those HRGs included in the specimen index where this is known, provided a – k > 0.10 and 
k = 0 otherwise; discounts to date of treatment with charge for wait, with discount rates on waits and 
life expectancy equal to 1.5% and uses 80th percentile waits.  
 
 
Overall, our results show that quality adjustment with existing data can make an 
impact on measures of NHS output and as more routinely collected data becomes 
available, the quality adjustment can be improved. 
 
11.2.2 Other quality indicators 
 
We were asked to explore the use of indicators such as patient satisfaction, 
readmission rates, clinical errors and incidence of MRSA.  The data are not at present 
suitable for inclusion in an output index but some “illustrative” adjustments are 
reported in Table 11.3. 
 
Table 11.3 Illustrative calculations of hospital CWOI with adjustments for 
survival, waiting times, patient satisfaction as measured in patient surveys, 
readmissions and MRSA. Average annual growth rates 2001/2 to 2003/4 
 
Average Growth Rates 2001/2 to 2003/4 % p.a. 
Unadjusted cost weighted output index 4.34% 
With adjustment for survival and waiting times1 5.74% 
With adjustment for adjustment for satisfaction with food, cleanliness, 
and non clinical care2 
5.71% 
With adjustment for MRSA, readmissions satisfaction with food, 
cleanliness, and non clinical care2  
5.71% 
1 Variant 1 (k = 0.8, mortality cut off 0.15, discounting to date of treatment, discount rate on waits 
1.5%, on life expectancy 1.5%, 80th percentile waiting time measure). 
2 5% weight on non-clinical care 
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11.3 Total factor productivity growth 
 
Employing a new quality adjusted index of labour input in the hospital sector, 
provisional estimates of productivity growth are reported.  Key results appear in Table 
11.4. They highlight the importance of quality adjustments to output in evaluating 
NHS performance. 
 
Table 11.4 Total factor productivity growth (%) 
 
 Total NHS  Hospital 
 Unadjusted Recommended 
Quality 
Variant 
 Unadjusted Recommended 
Quality 
Variant 
1998/99-1999/00 -2.33 -2.71  -2.82 -3.53 
1999/00-2000/01 0.55 0.69  0.30 0.56 
2000/01-2001/02 -2.12 -2.22  0.17 0.01 
2001/02-2002/03 -1.86 -1.19  -2.01 -0.95 
2002/03-2003/04 -2.97 -2.51  -1.13 -0.39 
      
Average p.a. -1.75 -1.59  -1.11 -0.87 
 
 
11.4 Recommendations 
 
Recommendations for improving quality adjustment were made throughout the report.  
We summarise the main ones here.   
For the medium term improvement of the output index improvements to the data are 
required. We recommend: 
• Routine collection of outcomes data for a range of NHS treatments.  The 
programme should start with a few high volume elective and medical 
conditions that would permit sampling rather than complete coverage. The 
data would also be immensely useful for other purposes including monitoring 
of Trust performance and improved cost-effectiveness analysis of particular 
treatments. 
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• Collection of longer term survival data by linkage of HES and ONS records to 
produce estimates of patient life expectancy. 
• A patient identifier that will permit grouping NHS activities across institutions 
and by disease. The DH has plans to implement this change.  
• Stated preference studies of patients to establish their relative valuations of the 
characteristics of NHS output from waiting times to being treated with 
courtesy and dignity by staff.  The studies should also include a cost 
characteristic so that monetary valuations can be inferred and all 
characteristics can be valued in a common unit.  The studies will enable the 
data from patient satisfaction studies to be utilised for quality adjustment as 
well as informing decision making in the NHS. 
 
For the short run improvement of the output index with available data: 
 
• We recommend the use of short term survival coupled with life expectancy to 
quality adjust hospital output.  
• The short term survival adjustment will underestimate output growth. We 
recommend that it be coupled with an estimated health effect derived from an 
estimate of the proportionate effect of treatment: 
o As the data become available from surveys of patient health before and 
after treatment and elsewhere, treatment specific estimates of */oj jt jtk q q=  
should be used. 
o Where there are no treatment specific estimates, kj should be estimated as 
the volume-weighted mean of existing treatment specific estimates for the 
relevant class (electives and non-electives). 
o In the absence of any estimates of treatment specific k for non-electives 
the estimate for non-electives should be equal to half the volume-weighted 
mean k of the electives. 
o The health effects adjustment should be used only for treatments with a 
mortality rate of 0.10 or less. 
• We recommend the use of a waiting time adjustment based on discounting to 
date of treatment, with a charge for waiting. Theoretical considerations 
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suggest that the discount rate on waits should be the same as the discount rate 
on QALYs.  We suggest 1.5%.  
• We do not recommend quality adjustments based on patient satisfaction with 
food, cleanliness, and non-clinical care until there are data on the relative 
marginal values of these outcomes.  If it is felt that estimates of the costs of 
cleaning and food derived from Trust accounts reasonably reflect marginal 
social values then it would be possible to include an adjustment just for these 
satisfaction indicators. 
• We do not recommend quality adjustments based on readmission rates and 
MRSA because of data problems and because they may reflect aspects of care 
which are better captured in the other quality adjustments. 
• We recommend the use of 30 day mortality, rather than in hospital mortality, 
as the measure of short term survival, since we believe its greater theoretical 
merits outweigh the difficulties in calculating it.  As data linkage methods are 
improved the advantage of the 30 day mortality will increase. 
• The waiting time measure should be a certainty equivalent wait, to avoid the 
need to calculate adjustments on individual data. The 80th percentile wait 
seems a reasonable value. 
• Quality adjustments of hospital output should use CIPS rather than FCEs as 
the unit of output. 
• HES rather than the Reference Cost data base should be the source of data on 
hospital outputs. 
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Annex: How should NHS output be measured?  
 
Value weighted output index 
 
The value weighted output index is our preferred way to measure NHS output: 
 
1 1jt kt kjtj kxq
yt
jt kt kjtj k
x q
I
x q
π
π
+ += ∑ ∑∑ ∑  
 
where xjt is the volume of output j in period t,  qkjt is the amount of outcome or characteristic k produced 
by a unit of j, and πkt  is marginal value of outcome k.11  
The index requires data on both the characteristics produced and on their marginal social value. Since 
improving the health of patients is a primary objective of the NHS, improved health outcomes are one 
of the most important characteristics of treatment. But other characteristics of treatment also affect 
utility, e.g. the length of time waited for treatment, the degree of uncertainty attached to the waiting 
time, relationship with doctors, hospital food and safety. These can be incorporated in the value 
weighted output index when the necessary data are available. 
 
 
 
Cost weighted output index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Please refer to the table of notation at the end of this report for further details of the notation used 
here. 
Information on long term survival (not 
currently available for most treatments) could 
be used to adjust the index as follows: 
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Data on short term survival can 
be used to adjust the index as 
follows: 
 
1
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Information on survival can be used to adjust the cost weighted output index 
If the data needed to calculate the value weighted output index are not 
available, we can instead use unit costs to weight outputs, and make use of 
available data to quality adjust these cost weighted outputs. The cost weighted 
output index is: 
 
1jt jtjx
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Continuous  
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spells 
(CIPS) 
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The simple survival adjustment above implies that the patient would have zero quality adjusted life 
years if not treated. It is possible to introduce an additional term into the formula to include a 
uniform estimate of the difference between health before and after treatment, giving the health 
effect survival index: 
1
1
jt j
jt jtj
jt j
jt jtj
a k
x c
a k
x c
+
+
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  
Note that for HRGs where the mortality rate is high, we make no health effect adjustment and use 
only the change in survival. 
Information on waiting times can be used to 
quality adjust the cost weighted output index. 
This approach regards reductions in the wait 
for treatment as valuable because of their effect 
on the discounted value of the health gain from 
treatment 
Discount to date placed on list 
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(assumes rW  = rL = r) 
 
Discount to date of treatment with charge for waiting 
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This is the form of the CWOI that we recommend should be 
used in the interim, where;  
• rL = rW = 0.015, 
• kj = actual kj if known, = mean k for known electives  
if kj not known and elective, = ½ mean k for electives 
if non-elective, 
• if (ajt+1 – kj)  and (ajt – kj) < 0.10 then kj = 0. 
• wjt, wjt+1 are 80th percentile waits 
Certainty 
equivalent wait – 
measured as the 
waiting time for 
patients at the 80th 
percentile of the 
waiting time 
Information on changes in the life expectancy of patients treated can also be included as follows: 
 ( )
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There are two main forms of waiting time adjustment 
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Additional quality adjustments can also be made to the CWOI.  A lack of appropriate data means that
 only illustrative adjustments for these additional aspects of quality could be calculated at present. 
A quality adjustment for readmissions and MRSA can be 
incorporated based on the assumption that their cost is a 
deadweight loss which reduces the value of treatment. 
Hence the CWOI (ignoring other quality adjustments for 
illustrative purposes) can be adjusted as follows, 
1 1
b b
jt jt jt jtj
j
b b
jt jt jt jtj
j
x c x c
x c x c
+ +−
−
∑ ∑
∑ ∑  
where xb denotes the number of readmissions or cases of 
MRSA and cb their costs.  
Patient satisfaction can also be incorporated in the 
CWOI, using measures of patient experience, derived 
from patient satisfaction surveys, as summary indicators 
of characteristics that patients value.  
This can be incorporated as follows; 
0
 
n
Comp k
t k t
k
I Iω
=
=∑  
where ItComp is calculated as the weighted sum of the 
growth rate of one of the quality adjusted output indices 
and the growth rates of the other indicators. We denote 
the growth rate of indicator k by Itk. If there are n such 
indicators, and the relevant weights are denoted by ωk
then the overall index is given by the formula above. 
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Table of Notation  
 
Notation Interpretation 
jtx  quantity of output j at time t (units of 
j) 
ktπ  marginal social value of 
characteristic k at time t 
jktq  quantity of characteristic k produced 
by one unit of output j at time t 
∑= k jktktjt qp π  marginal social value of unit of output j at time t (£s per unit of j) 
jtjtjt xpy =  value of output j at time t (£s) 
∑= i jtt yy  total value of NHS output 
xq
ytI  value weighted output index 
xjtg  growth rate of output xj 
qkjtg  growth rate of characteristic k 
produced by output j 
kt
ptω  proportion of marginal value of 
output j accounted for by 
characteristic k 
jt
ytω  proportion of the total value of 
period t output accounted for by 
output j 
x
ctI  cost weighted output index CWOI 
jtc  unit (average) cost of output j at 
time t (£s per unit of j) 
jtm  mortality rate from NHS output j in 
period t 
ajt survival rate (1-mjt) θ  vector of mental and physical health 
characteristics ( )θh  health level from having health state 
θ  
( )sjt*σ  probability of surviving s periods 
given that the patient survived 
treatment j at date t 
( )sp jt ,* θ  probability of being in health state θ  
conditional on surviving s periods 
after treatment j at date t 
( ) ( ) ( )* * ,jt jth s p s hθ θ θ= ∑  expected level of health conditional on surviving  s periods  
δ  discount factor 
( )* * *( )s tjt jt jtsq s h sδ σ−= ∑  discounted sum of quality adjusted life years produced by the treatment 
if the patient survives treatment 
( )ojh s  expected health s periods hence if 
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the patient does not receive 
treatment j conditional on surviving  
s periods 
( )sj0σ  probability of surviving without 
treatment 
( )sp j ,0 θ  probability of being in health state θ  
after s periods conditional on 
surviving without receiving 
treatment 
( ) ( )0 s o ojt j jsq s h sδ σ= ∑  discounted sum of quality adjusted life years if patient not treated ( ) 0*1 jtjtjtjt qqmq −−=  expected increase in discounted 
QALYs from treatment j at time t 
ajtg  growth rate of survival 
*
jtq
g  growth rate in *jtq  
0
jtq
g  growth rate in 0jtq  
xa
ctI  survival adjusted cost weighted 
output index 
wjtπ  value of a reduction of one day in 
waiting time for treatment j in year t 
htπ  value of health gain 
rw, rL discount rates on the wait for 
treatment, QALYs 
jtw  waiting time for treatment j in year t 
( )twsh ;*  time path of health with treatment 
after wait w 
0
tL  life expectancy without treatment 
*
tL  life expectancy with treatment 
xaw
ctI  survival and waiting time adjusted 
cost weighted index 
 
 
 
